

Universidad Nacional de La Plata  
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TESIS

***"Syntax seems not to be all about algorithms" vs. "It seems that Syntax is not all about algorithms": una perspectiva cognitivista y funcionalista de por qué los hablantes de inglés optan por uno o por el otro perfilamiento. Del objeto sintáctico al contexto real de uso.***

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# CAPÍTULO 1

## 1.1 Introducción General

En este trabajo de investigación abordamos el análisis del par opositivo a) “Syntax seems not to be all about algorithms” y b) “It seems that Syntax is not all about algorithms” del inglés a partir de, por un lado, la *Gramática Cognitiva*, más precisamente desde el *Enfoque-Cognitivo Prototípico*, y por otro lado, desde teorías gramaticales de corte *funcionalista*.

Dicha investigación surge de una experiencia personal como docente en la cátedra Gramática Inglesa 2, en la Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación de la Universidad Nacional de La Plata, donde el marco teórico que sustenta las prácticas docentes es aquel propuesto por el lingüista formal-teórico Noam Chomsky. Partiendo de dicho modelo, el foco está puesto en la forma y en los principios que rigen las operaciones sintácticas que entran en juego a la hora de formar un objeto sintáctico gramaticalmente correcto. Más precisamente, es el *Modelo Minimalista* presentado por Chomsky en su *Programa Minimalista* de 1995 del cual se parte para dar cuenta de todo en lo que a los objetos sintácticos respecta.

En su libro *Language and Mind* (2006), Chomsky asevera lo siguiente:

We abstract away from conditions of use of language and consider formal structures and the formal operations that relate them. Among these formal structures are those of syntax, namely, deep and surface structures; and also the phonetic and semantic representations, which we take to be certain formal objects related to syntactic structures by certain well-defined operations. This process of abstraction is in no way illegitimate, [...]. It expresses the working hypothesis that we can proceed with the study of “knowledge of language” – what is often called “linguistic competence” – in abstraction from the problems of how language is used. The working hypothesis is justified by the success that is achieved when it is adopted. A great deal has been learned about the mechanisms of language, and, I would say, about the nature of mind, on the basis of this hypothesis. But we must be aware that in part, at least, this approach to language is forced upon us by the fact that our concepts fail us when we try to study the use of language. (Chomsky, 2006, p. 98)

Ahora bien, no podemos abstraernos del mundo real ni de las manifestaciones de la lengua en contextos reales de uso si lo que pretendemos es explicar por qué un hablante o escritor en un contexto determinado recurre al *perfilamiento* a) “Syntax seems not to be all about algorithms” y en otros –o incluso en el mismo texto– recurre al *perfilamiento* b) “It seems that Syntax is not all about algorithms”. Por ende, partiremos de la idea de que es preciso analizar la lengua desde una perspectiva en la que las conclusiones acerca del uso de

la misma se hallan en el centro del debate y dichas conclusiones se relacionan tanto con el entramado de significados involucrados en la construcción de las manifestaciones lingüísticas, así como con aspectos que tienen que ver con la cognición y experiencia humanas. (Langacker, 2013, p. 4)

Además de estos conceptos básicos propuestos por la *Gramática Cognitiva*, apelaremos a los contextos *verbal*, de *situación*, y de *cultura*, para poder dar cuenta de la divergencia entre los *perfilamientos* a) y b) recién mencionados. Desde esta perspectiva funcionalista, asumiremos el compromiso de que la función de la lengua es por excelencia la de propiciar la comunicación entre los seres humanos. (Adam, 2013, p. 9)

A) Los objetivos generales que persigue esta investigación son los siguientes:

I) Estudiar ciertos fenómenos lingüísticos a la luz de teorías acerca de la lengua que, por un lado, contemplen cuáles y de qué índole son los procesos cognitivos que tienen lugar cada vez que un emisor construye una estructura lingüística, y por otro lado, analicen qué recursos están disponibles y cómo se desarrolla el avance de la información en un contexto de comunicación concreto que implica la interacción de hablantes/escritores y oyentes/lectores reales.

II) Probar –partiendo de enfoques lingüísticos de corte cognitivista y funcionalista– que entre emisiones tales como “Syntax seems not to be all about algorithms” e “It seems that Syntax is not all about algorithms” existen diferencias que sobrepasan los límites de la *Sintaxis oracional y formal*, es decir que no podrían explicarse si no recurriéramos a este tipo de marcos teóricos.

Así mismo, con respecto a los marcos teóricos dentro de los cuales centramos nuestra investigación, en concreto, recurrimos a la *Gramática Cognitiva* –más precisamente al *Enfoque Cognitivo-Prototípico*– y en especial a algunas de las investigaciones en relación a nuestro tema de interés de los lingüistas Ronald Langacker y George Lakoff con el objetivo de poder dar cuenta de los procesos cognitivos que subyacen a los *perfilamientos* del predicado “seem” del inglés que acabamos de destacar.

Por otro lado, y ahora sí con el objetivo de analizar, para luego poder explicar, cómo se desarrolla la información en emisiones concatenadas y reunidas en un texto particular, nos servimos de los análisis de cierto material teórico-práctico desarrollado por los lingüistas de la Escuela Lingüística de Praga, en especial de Jan Firbas y por Claudia Borzi.

Así iniciamos nuestro análisis teórico cognitivista-funcionalista de las estructuras bajo análisis.

Ahora bien, desde el inicio hemos intentado mostrar que nuestra intuición acerca de que si existe la opción en la lengua entre decir o escribir cierto mensaje de un modo utilizando más o menos los mismos ítems léxicos, empero desplegándolos de manera diferente, las divergencias entre dichos despliegues de ítems léxico no estaría relacionada solamente a cuestiones puramente sintácticas, sino –muy por el contrario– como afirma la lingüista Angelita Martínez dichas “combinaciones sintácticas y sus evidentes regularidades son motivadas por principios cognitivos generales a los que el hablante apela para lograr relevancia y coherencia comunicativas.” (Martínez, 2009, p.280)

A su vez, partimos de la convicción de que podíamos explicar el porqué de dicha alternancia en el uso de las estructuras bajo análisis. En nuestro caso particular, quisimos mostrar qué ocurre cuando un emisor particular recurre al predicado modal “seem” para comunicar cierto mensaje en un escenario comunicativo concreto. Dicho predicado modal es usado en varios y variados *perfilamientos*, aunque solamente dos de ellos se constituirán en nuestro foco de atención. Dichos *perfilamientos* fueron vistos, por un lado, a la luz de los procesos cognitivos implicados en la selección y despliegue de los ítems léxicos que los componen, y, por el otro, en términos de cómo es el avance de la información en uno y otro. Por tal motivo, y para poder dilucidar qué es lo que en realidad distinguía a un *perfilamiento* del otro, optamos por una metodología que además de contemplar los ejemplos elegidos y analizarlos cualitativamente, nos permitiera cuantificar los datos que resultarían del análisis.

Para ese fin, recurriremos al tipo de análisis llevado a cabo por la *Etnopragmática* –excepto por el hecho de que no se trata de contextos donde se da contacto de lenguas, sino que se trata de la elección del mismo predicado “seem” en dos contextos de uso de ocurrencia muy frecuente: uno, en el cual la emisión inicia con el anticipador “It” y el otro, en el que, por el contrario, hay un sujeto nominal o un pronombre/ determinante explícito con todos sus rasgos flexionales y conceptuales-semánticos.

Como sostiene la investigadora en *Lingüística* Angelita Martínez: “el análisis etnopragmático parte de una hipótesis semántica de los desvíos cuantitativos observados en el empleo de formas que apuntan a un mismo referente y de la convicción de que el uso alternante de unidades lingüísticas no es casual ni caótico, sino que responde a necesidades de los hablantes en sus intentos comunicativos.” (Martínez, 2009, p. 209)

Entonces, como estas nociones están estrechamente relacionadas al tipo de análisis que queríamos llevar a cabo, recurrimos a la metodología propuesta por este corriente lingüística

que sostiene la necesidad de darle cientificidad a las investigaciones lingüísticas por medio de un análisis, por un lado cualitativo de los resultados, así como también cuantitativo de los mismos.

La manera cómo desarrollaremos los temas abordados en este trabajo de investigación será la siguiente:

- En el Capítulo 1 damos cuenta de cuál es el *estado de la cuestión* en relación a nuestro tema de análisis, así como también justificamos la elección de los *marcos teóricos* que elegimos para llevar a cabo nuestra investigación. Así mismo, en este capítulo, exponemos nuestras *hipótesis*.
- En el Capítulo 2 presentamos los conceptos y premisas básicas tanto de la *Lingüística Cognitiva* –y más precisamente del *Enfoque Cognitivo-Prototípico*– como de las propuestas de los lingüistas de la *Escuela de Lingüística de Praga* y de la redefinición de *Dinamismo Comunicativo* (DC) de Borzi.
- En el Capítulo 3 desarrollamos el tema de la *metodología* que guió nuestro análisis de los datos del corpus que seleccionamos.
- El Capítulo 4 es el más extenso de todos. En él llevamos a cabo un *análisis* minucioso de los casos más salientes de nuestro corpus.
- En el Capítulo 5 –además de volcar las *conclusiones generales* a las que arribamos una vez concluido nuestro trabajo de investigación– presentamos una *propuesta pedagógica* que consiste en una posible clase que podría ser llevada al aula de la materia Gramática Inglesa 2 en la Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación en la Universidad Nacional de La Plata al momento del curso de dicha materia en el que se revisan los llamados “predicados de ascenso” por los gramáticos generativistas chomskianos.
- Al final de dichos capítulos, hallamos la *Bibliografía* y el *Apéndice* con nuestro corpus.

## 1.2 Estado de la Cuestión

El predicado “seem” en inglés es un ejemplo de lo que dentro del marco teórico de la



*Gramática Generativa* chomskiana se conoce con el nombre de *predicados de ascenso*.<sup>1</sup> Desde dicho enfoque, “seem” puede ocurrir en dos tipos de configuraciones sintácticas, las cuales difieren entre sí solamente en términos de un principio básico que rige a la teoría generativista: el *Principio de Economía*.<sup>2</sup> Más precisamente, dicha divergencia respondería a aspectos relacionados con el *macheo* (“matching”) de rasgos pura y exclusivamente sintácticos. Esta concepción nos llevaría a considerar sinónimos ejemplos tales como a) “Syntax seems not to be all about algorithms” y b) “It seems that Syntax is not all about algorithms”.

Una explicación generativista de las mismas (Chomsky, 1981, pp. 67-74) sería la siguiente: la divergencia entre a) y b) radica en el hecho de que en a) “Syntax” –que se origina como argumento del predicado “not be all about algorithms” y recibe el rol temático de *tema* (“theme”)– se *mueve* (“move”) desde dentro de la cláusula no finita “not to be all about algorithms” a la posición de *especificador* del ST finito para satisfacer el *PPE* (*Principio de Proyección Extendida*). Antes de que se produzca la operación *Movimiento-A(rgumental)* (“A-movement”), “Syntax” y el ST finito entran en una relación de *Sonda-Meta* (“Probe-Goal”) en la cual la *Meta*, “Syntax”, *machea* los *rasgos-phi* (“phi-features”) –es decir los rasgos *no interpretables* de *persona* y *número*– de la *Sonda* ST finito. Este último a su vez *valida* (“value”) el rasgo *no interpretable* de *Tiempo*<sup>3</sup> en el Sintagma Determinante (SD) “Syntax”. En cambio en b) para *machear* (“match”) los rasgos de persona y número alojados en el *Sintagma de Tiempo* (ST), así como también para satisfacer el *Principio de Proyección Extendido* (PPE), es necesario *ensamblar* (“merge”) el expletivo “It” en la posición de especificador del ST en cuestión. En dicha configuración, el *socio* (“associate”) del expletivo “It” es una cláusula declarativa finita cuya distribución sintáctica

<sup>1</sup> Los predicados de *ascenso* (“raising predicates”) fueron introducidos por Chomsky en su programa de *Rección y Ligamiento* de los años 80, más precisamente en su libro *Lectures on Government and Binding* de 1981.

<sup>2</sup> En la derivación, las relaciones entre los elementos de la NUMERACION se hacen explícitas por medio de la unión de dichos elementos para formar estructuras de frase aplicando la operación ENSAMBLE (“merge”). En el dominio temático las relaciones son de tipo temática (predicación, asignación de roles temáticos, entre otros). Además dichas relaciones son también sintácticas (asignación de caso, *macheo* de rasgos). Las primeras son básicas, las segundas son secundarias, y son establecidas por medio de una operación que es más costosa, por ende menos económica y elegante que es la operación MUEVE (“move”). Lo que hace esta operación es incidir en el orden las palabras en diferentes estadios de la derivación. La misma está siempre restringida por condiciones de economía, que favorecen las relaciones locales y las estructuras simples y prohíben tanto símbolos como pasos superfluos.

<sup>3</sup> A partir de Chomsky (1995) los movimientos sintácticos que dan cuenta de varios y variados fenómenos lingüísticos se explican en términos de *macheo* (“matching”) de rasgos. La *concordancia* (“agreement”), por ejemplo, consiste en la relación que se establece entre el núcleo de un ST finito–que aloja rasgos *validados e interpretables* de tiempo, aspecto, voz, modalidad, etc. y además un manojito de *rasgos-phi* (es decir, rasgos de persona y número) y el *PPE* (*principio de proyección extendida*), que no son interpretables– pero que sin embargo deben ser validados por un nominal. ST es la *Sonda* que busca una *Meta* y la halla en el primer nominal dentro de su dominio inmediato. Por su lado, dicho nominal también posee una serie de rasgos interpretables (los rasgos-phi) y un rasgo de *tiempo no validado y no interpretable*. En realidad, este último se materializa como el rasgo de *caso nominativo* que según el *Filtro del Caso* (Chomsky, 1981) todo nominal en posición de sujeto de una cláusula finita ha de tener.

es la de complemento de “seem”.

En su libro *The Minimalist Program* de 1995, Chomsky propone el siguiente análisis formal de las estructuras bajo análisis (i.e. aquellas en las que tengo la opción de elegir entre *mover* o *desplazar* un argumento a la posición argumental en el *especificador* de ST o *ensamblar* un expletivo):

It is worth highlighting the basic assumption about reference sets that underlies the preceding discussion: they are determined by the initial numeration, but in a ‘fairly’ local fashion. At a particular stage  $\Sigma$  in the derivation, we consider only the continuations that are permitted from  $\Sigma$  to LF, using what remains of the initial numeration: the most economical of these blocks the others. But we ask even a narrower question: at  $\Sigma$ , **which operation that yields a convergent derivation is most economical at this point?** Thus, **we select Merge over Attract/Move if that yields a convergent derivation**, irrespective of consequences down the road as long as the derivation converges; but we select Attract/Move even violating Procrastinate if that is necessary for convergence. The problems of computational complexity are thus considerably reduced, though more remains to be done, no doubt. (El resaltado es nuestro)

Ahora bien, apropiándonos de las palabras de Langacker (1987, p.23), acordamos con él en que “what is self-evidently real in the context of one theory is pure fiction from the standpoint of another.”

Entonces, lo que quisimos mostrar es qué ocurre cuando un emisor particular recurre al predicado modal “seem” para comunicar cierto mensaje en un escenario comunicativo concreto.

### 1.3 Justificación de la Elección de los Marcos Teóricos Seleccionados

Los *perfilamientos* a) “Syntax seems not to be all about algorithms” y b) “It seems that Syntax is not all about algorithms” fueron vistos a la luz de, por un lado, los procesos cognitivos implicados en la selección y despliegue de los ítems léxicos que los componen, y, por el otro, en términos de cómo es el avance de la información en uno y otro.

Partimos del hecho básico de que el predicado modal “seem” modaliza o proyecta un contexto en el cual el emisor no se compromete el cien por ciento con el contenido proposicional de su mensaje. Ahora bien, si hay una variación en el despliegue de ítems léxicos en las emisiones que nos interesan, quiere decir que en unos y otros contextos comunicativos se desarrollan distintos *procesos cognitivos* y además dicho despliegue sirve como indicador de cómo y hacia dónde ha de dirigirse el receptor para poder avanzar en el

desarrollo dinámico de la información en dicho contexto.

Desde el punto de vista de otras gramáticas, logramos comprender dichas estructuras a partir de explicaciones no apriorísticas, sino basándonos en las relaciones conceptuales que subyacen a las emisiones que hallamos en un contexto de uso real. Relaciones conceptuales –así como también la consideración de cómo se despliegan los ítems léxicos en un discurso de manera tal que la información avance en dicho discurso– es lo que necesitamos para poder no sólo describir –sino y sobre todo EXPLICAR– la función comunicativa del lenguaje.<sup>4</sup>

A la luz de marcos teóricos de corte funcional-cognitivistas, revisamos el análisis propuesto por la teoría generativista chomskiana y pudimos *resignificar* estas estructuras, destacando las divergencias entre las mismas. Observamos que el *perfilamiento* (“profiling”) de ejemplos tales como a) y b) varía no solamente en cuanto a la *concordancia* entre el sujeto y el predicado “seem” y al tipo de *sujeto* que hallamos en ambas estructuras, sino que lo que aquí ocurre es que entran en juego diferentes *procesos cognitivos*<sup>5</sup> que subyacen a los *perfilamientos* a) y b). Para resolver este tema, hemos recurrido a la *Gramática Cognitiva*, y –en particular– al *Enfoque Cognitivo-Prototípico*.

A su vez, estudiamos –por medio de la observación y análisis– el objetivo comunicativo de un emisor concreto en un contexto de uso real en un medio escrito y procuraremos probar que las diferencias entre a) y b) están relacionadas con grados variados de *Dinamismo Comunicativo* (DC) entre ellas. Esta aproximación la realizamos dentro del marco teórico de la *Escuela de Lingüística de Praga*.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> En su libro *Functional Sentence Perspective in Written and Spoken Communication* (1992), el lingüista Jan Firbas asevera lo siguiente: “Una estructura gramatical con rasgos semánticos puede ser vista desde dos ángulos: una estático y otro dinámico. El primero contempla una estructura que no está relacionada con contexto alguno; dicha estructura no opera en ningún acto de comunicación. Vista la misma desde una perspectiva dinámica, dicha emisión opera dentro de un acto de comunicación y está ligada a un contexto de situación particular.” (p. 87). Chomsky –y la lingüística chomskiana en general– se inclina por la primera visión de oración. Por el contrario, Firbas –así como todos los lingüistas que conformaron la *Escuela de Lingüística de Praga*– estudia las emisiones que tienen lugar dentro de un contexto comunicativo y se focalizan en el contenido comunicativo de las mismas.

<sup>5</sup> Para poder dar cuenta de lo ocurrido en estos casos desde la perspectiva de la *Gramática Cognitiva* seguiremos a Ronald Langacker, quien en 1995 presentó un paper que se tituló *Raising and Transparency* y que fue publicado en una recopilación que realizó Péter Pelyvás de varios artículos relacionados con diferentes estudios llevados a cabo dentro del marco teórico de la *Gramática Cognitiva*.

<sup>6</sup> Recurriremos a material producido por la *Escuela de Lingüística de Praga*, más precisamente retomaremos la perspectiva del destacado lingüista Jan Firbas, en cuanto a la *Perspectiva Funcional de la Oración*, especialmente en relación al concepto de *Dinamismo Comunicativo*. Así como también a la investigadora Claudia Borzi, quien hace una revisión del concepto de *Dinamismo Comunicativo* proponiendo que a mayor ligamiento contextual, mayor dinamismo comunicativo; reformulando así lo que proponen los lingüistas de Praga.

En un plano más amplio, lo que justifica la elección de los recién destacados marcos teóricos es el hecho de que, durante los últimos treinta años, los estudios en *Lingüística* han mostrado la necesidad de estudiar el lenguaje tomando en consideración una relación que tiene tres ejes: lenguaje-cognición-realidad.<sup>7</sup>

En sus orígenes, la discusión acerca de qué era el lenguaje y de cómo los niños lo adquirirían dio lugar a enconados enfrentamientos entre lingüistas con bases epistemológicas diferentes y –por ende– cosmovisiones del mundo muy distintas también.

Por un lado, se encontraban aquellos que defendían la idea de que los seres humanos nacemos con una capacidad innata para adquirir una *lingua-i* (es decir, una lengua particular) a partir de una *Gramática Universal* (GU), y que lo hacemos muy rápida y eficazmente, a pesar de estar expuestos a un estímulo lingüístico muy pobre.<sup>8</sup> Por el otro lado, estaban aquellos que –muy por el contrario– proponían que una lengua se aprende, no se adquiere, y que dicho aprendizaje consiste precisamente en aprender –a partir del uso y la repetición– un par de *significado y forma* en un contexto comunicativo real.

Dentro del primer grupo, se encuentran el lingüista formal-teórico Noam Chomsky y sus discípulos. En el otro grupo, hallamos lingüistas tales como Ronald Langacker, George Lakoff, y William Croft –entre muchos otros varios y variados estudiosos que han venido trabajando interdisciplinariamente– quienes proponen un acercamiento al estudio del lenguaje más integral, que implica abordarlo partiendo del estudio de cómo se aprende y usa una lengua teniendo en cuenta operaciones cognitivas tales como la *categorización*, la *conceptualización*, la *esquemización*, la *imaginación*, entre otras, siempre partiendo de la relación del ser humano con su entorno.

De igual modo, varias son las corrientes lingüísticas funcionalistas que han hecho aportes invaluable acerca de la importancia de investigar cómo el lenguaje es utilizado como una herramienta de comunicación por excelencia. Entonces, otro aspecto que justifica nuestra investigación es el hecho de que vamos a estudiar qué ocurre fuera de los límites de la oración cuando un emisor tiene la intención de comunicar cierto mensaje a un receptor en un contexto comunicativo particular y cuáles son las marcas allí presentes que el primero

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<sup>7</sup> Los primeros trabajos de investigación que dan cuenta de esta necesidad son los famosos libros *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things* y *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar. Theoretical Prerequisites* de los renombrados lingüistas cognitivistas George Lakoff y Ronald Langacker, respectivamente.

<sup>8</sup> Las bases de la teoría generativista de Noam Chomsky la podemos hallar en su fundador libro de tres ensayos que llevó el nombre *Language and Mind* de 1968. (Nosotros consultamos la 3ra edición de dicho libro de 2006)

Según Chomsky, lo que debería interesarle a los lingüistas es el estudio de la *GU*, la cual constituye el estado inicial de la gramática y forma parte del genotipo humano. La misma está regida por principios que imponen restricciones sobre las *linguas-i*. Estas últimas son el estadio al que arribamos luego de estar expuestos a algún tipo de estímulo lingüístico particular.

despliega a la hora de hacer que la información presente en dicho mensaje avance en el devenir del discurso en un texto dado.

Por último, nos parece pertinente resaltar que el hecho de considerar los *procesos cognitivos* que subyacen a las estructuras bajo análisis, así como también dilucidar la manera cómo la información se va desarrollando y avanzando a lo largo de un texto, vista la emisión como un proceso, hace que la investigación sea más integral y holística. De esta manera, contemplamos mucho más que aspectos meramente sintácticos: abordamos la lengua como un todo –como una *Gestalt*– integrando aspectos cognitivos y por ende experienciales, ensamblando el cuerpo, la mente y el alma.

#### 1.4 Hipótesis

Durante casi veinte años, nos hemos dedicado a la enseñanza de la gramática del inglés en el nivel superior, y el teoría dentro del cual hemos enmarcado nuestra práctica docente ha sido el del enfoque *generativista chomskiano*. De tal experiencia, nace nuestra inquietud con respecto a una mirada de la lengua en uso y contemplando a los usuarios de ella y a sus intenciones comunicativas. Tal inquietud no es una crítica al marco generativista chomskiano, sino más bien una posible complementariedad entre tal marco y otros enfoques funcionalistas y cognitivistas.

Nuestra **primera hipótesis general** es que hay algo –en realidad, hay mucho– más allá de los límites de la oración como objeto de estudio. Dicho en otras palabras, la *Sintaxis* parece estar estrechamente ligada tanto a la *cognición* como a la *experiencia* del ser humano. Más precisamente, lo primero que intentaremos mostrar es que *Sintaxis* parece estar ligada a otro tipo de operaciones cognoscitivas tales como la *conceptualización*, la *esquemización*, entre otras, sin las cuales no podría ocurrir el lenguaje.

Nuestra **segunda hipótesis general** es que el nivel sintáctico ha de ser abordado en primera instancia desde el ámbito del discurso y desde aspectos pragmático-semánticos. Partiremos, entonces, del nivel suprasintáctico (tomando el término que usa la Escuela de Praga), ya que nuestro objetivo es estudiar el lenguaje en su más indispensable rol como herramienta de comunicación única e irremplazable.

Estas hipótesis generales, son de carácter más bien teórico-epistemológico.

Ahora bien, en un terreno más práctico-pedagógico, nuestra **hipótesis particular** es que las estructuras del tipo a) “Syntax seems not to be all about algorithms” y b) “It seems that Syntax is not all about algorithms” no son sinónimas: son *perfilamientos* diferentes del predicado “seem” que se relacionan con *procesos cognitivos* subyacentes y con intenciones

y estrategias comunicativas de emisores concretos en contextos comunicativos reales cuando los mismos entran en un intercambio comunicativo con ciertos receptores también concretos. Pretendemos probar que esta puesta en funcionamiento tanto de *procesos cognitivos* como de *estrategias comunicativas* avala la **hipótesis general** de que el lenguaje es un instrumento de comunicación.

Cualquier modificación en el despliegue de ítems léxicos en una emisión va a ser *motivada*. Por eso, si existe la opción entre a) y b) quiere decir que hay detrás una intención, un propósito comunicativo que activa *procesos cognitivos* diferentes.

## CAPÍTULO 2

### MARCO TEÓRICO

#### 2.1 La *Gramática Cognitiva* de Langacker como marco complementario de la *Gramática Generativa* chomskiana

Adoptar un marco teórico implica no solamente una concepción particular de *lenguaje*, sino –y sobre todo– optar por cierta metodología y realizar cierto recorte del objeto de estudio.

El marco teórico adoptado en las cátedras Gramática Inglesas 1 y 2 de las carreras de Profesorado, Traductorado y Licenciatura en inglés de la Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación en Universidad Nacional de La Plata es el del lingüista formal-teórico y generativista Chomsky, quien concibe la lengua como un dispositivo genéticamente heredado (la *Gramática Universal*) que permite a los seres humanos –de manera inconsciente y muy eficientemente– adquirir una lengua particular (una *lengua-i*)<sup>9</sup> apenas entramos en contacto con otros miembros de una misma comunidad de habla. Esta habilidad o capacidad es puramente humana y es justamente ella la que nos diferencia de los demás seres vivos.

Dentro de la perspectiva teórica de la *Gramática Generativa* de Chomsky, el lenguaje no tiene existencia aparte de su representación mental.<sup>10</sup> Estudiar el lenguaje es entonces analizar y tratar de dar cuenta de las reglas –que son finitas– que subyacen a las *lenguas-i* y que nos permiten formar un número infinito de objetos sintácticos.

Por el contrario, hay otros lingüistas –tales como Ronald Langacker<sup>11</sup> y George Lakoff<sup>12</sup>– que poseen y promueven una postura y visión de la lengua diferente a la de Chomsky. Para ellos debemos partir del contexto real de uso y de ahí volver a la estructura sintáctica, a la morfología, a la fonología –e incluso a la prosodia. Partiendo del marco teórico de la *Gramática Cognitiva* y dentro de la misma el *Enfoque Cognitivo-Prototípico*,

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<sup>9</sup> Según Chomsky, la *GU* es lo que a todos los lingüistas debería interesarle, ya que es el estado inicial de la gramática y forma parte del genotipo humano. La misma está regida por principios que imponen restricciones sobre las *lenguas-i*. Éstas últimas serían el estadio último, al que arribamos luego de estar expuestos a algún tipo de estímulo lingüístico particular.

<sup>10</sup> Esta idea es desarrollado por Chomsky en su libro *Language and Mind* de 2006 (3ra Edición)(pp. 64-77)

<sup>11</sup> Las bases de la *Gramática Cognitiva* propuesta por este autor la hallamos en el libro *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar. Theoretical Prerequisites* de 1987.

<sup>12</sup> Uno de los libros que más difusión ha tenido dentro del *Enfoque Cognitivo-prototípico* ha sido *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things* de George Lakoff. El mismo fue editado por *Chicago University Press* en el año 1987.

el lenguaje es concebido como una parte más de la cognición humana, no como un módulo separado de la misma. Para dichos estudiosos la *razón* está materializada en el cuerpo y no es trascendental. La misma es alimentada por la experiencia particular de todos y cada uno de los individuos que usamos una lengua. Además, la *razón* es imaginativa. El estudio de cuáles son y cómo se llevan a cabo los mecanismos implicados en el *razonamiento* y en la *cognición* surgen de la observación y el análisis de cómo los seres humanos *categorizamos* el mundo que nos rodea. Empero, los objetos del mundo no son solamente aquellos que podemos ver, tocar, escuchar, o gustar, sino –como asegura Lakoff– “categorizamos objetos concretos y abstractos; también eventos, acciones, emociones, relaciones espaciales, relaciones sociales y entidades abstractas.” (Lakoff, 1987, p. 7)

Como postula la lingüista Claudia Borzi en su artículo “Gramática cognitiva-prototípica: conceptualización y análisis del nominal” de 2012, la *gramática* dentro del *Enfoque Cognitivo-Prototípico* es en sí misma el producto que resulta de un proceso de pasos rutinarios que implican que ciertas combinaciones lingüísticas sean más utilizadas en ciertos contextos de uso, por ser las mismas más fáciles de expresar, así como también de procesar. Las rutinas lingüísticas forman parte no solamente del aprendizaje de la lengua, sino que además nos servimos de las mismas para crear contextos de uso lingüísticos lo más transparentes posible.

Como parte de nuestro conocimiento del mundo en general –y lingüístico, en particular– los seres humanos sabemos que el mundo está habitado por objetos y que los mismos establecen distintos tipos de interrelaciones entre sí. Dichos objetos están recortados contra un fondo, y son conceptualizados como una [COSA], y las relaciones entre los mismos son conceptualizadas como un [PROCESO]: el primero es instanciado por un *nominal*; el segundo, por una *cláusula finita*.

Respecto del *nombre sustantivo* en particular, el mismo delimita una región dentro de un dominio que se materializa en un discurso, dentro de un marco. Según Borzi (2012, p.4), el *nombre sustantivo* “es la conceptualización más o menos convencionalizada de un objeto según la particular y continua percepción de cada hablante y por eso es que decimos que el nombre sustantivo ‘predica’ de ese objeto.”

Para poder caracterizar un *nombre sustantivo* es indispensable contemplar las siguientes características referidas al objeto que estamos designando:



- características morfo-sintáctica-funcionales,
- aquellas características relacionadas con la situación comunicativa y con los participantes de la misma.

Existen dos *Modelos Cognitivos Idealizados (MCIs)* que sirven de base para poder interpretar todo trozo de lengua: el del **escenario** y el de la **bola de billar**. El primero es estático y recurrimos al mismo toda vez que queremos interpretar un objeto contra un fondo. El elemento prototípico de este MCI es del *nombre sustantivo* concreto y determinado. El segundo es típicamente instanciado en la *cláusula finita* en la que hay objetos que reciben energía de otros y, en consecuencia, se transforman.

Dentro de este marco teórico, respecto de los predicados de *ascenso* “seem”, Langacker (1995) propone que los variados *perfilamientos* del predicado “seem” pueden entenderse y, en consecuencia, explicarse en términos de los siguientes conceptos básicos de la *Gramática Cognitiva*:

-La *transparencia* y la *discrepancia en el perfilamiento*

-La *zona activa* y el *punto de referencia*

-La *metonimia*

Dicho análisis nos permitió centrar nuestra atención en la **oración** como objeto de estudio por excelencia, es decir, en el nivel **sintáctico**.

Más precisamente, iniciamos nuestro análisis partiendo del hecho de que dentro del marco teórico de la *Gramática Cognitiva* no se pueden dissociar el *significado* de la *estructura* o *forma*: el contenido **léxico**, **morfológico**, **semántico** y **sintáctico** forman un continuo. Entonces, para una teoría que no admite movimientos ni derivaciones desde una estructura profunda a una superficial, los ejemplos a) “Syntax seems not to be all about algorithms” y b) “It seems that Syntax is not all about algorithms” habían de ser abordados desde otro ángulo.

Recordemos también –como propone Langacker (1995, p.117)– que esta corriente lingüística enfatiza el carácter semiológico del lenguaje y señala que las estructuras lingüísticas se reducen a estructuras de carácter fonológico, semántico y simbólico. Dichos elementos se relacionan entre sí por medio de dos relaciones básicas: la *esquemmatización* –

que es el establecimiento de estructuras recurrentes y/o semejantes (“commonalities”)– y la *categorización*, que se traduce en la puesta en funcionamiento de dos operaciones: la *instanciación* ( $A \rightarrow B$ ) y la *extensión* o *elaboración* desde un prototipo ( $A \dashrightarrow B$ ).

También es importante tener en cuenta que dentro del marco teórico de la *Gramática Cognitiva* todo se construye, y tal construcción surge de una relación estrecha entre el cuerpo y la mente. Además, las regularidades son captadas y explicadas en términos de *esquemas* (“schemas”), los cuales nos permiten combinar estructuras simbólicas más simples para dar con estructuras simbólicas más complejas.

Si lo que hicimos fue analizar –en primer lugar– algunos ejemplos que muestran los diferentes *perfilamientos* del predicado “seem” en el nivel sintáctico, corresponde que mencionemos brevemente la visión que tiene Langacker (1995) de lo que es una **oración**.

Para dicho lingüista, conceptualizar un *proceso* implica imaginarse y construir una escena o escenario en el que ciertos objetos se relacionan entre sí en dicho escenario, ejerciendo cierta fuerza los unos sobre los otros, desplazándose de un punto a otro, y haciéndolo a lo largo del tiempo. De nuestra experiencia del mundo, extraemos la noción de *cadena de acción* (“action chain”), la cual consta de un *inicio* (“head”) y un *fin* (“tail”). Para concluir este breve repaso de lo que para Langacker es una **oración**, nos remitimos a sus propias palabras:

My proposal, then, is that a subject and direct object are properly identified as the CLAUSE-level trajector and landmark. The most schematic and most fundamental characterization of subjects and objects is that they instantiate the entities accorded primary and secondary focal prominence in the process profiled at the clausal level of organization. (Langacker, 1995, p. 126)

Por último, queremos clarificar algunos conceptos que nos fueron indispensables a los fines de nuestro análisis. En primer lugar, la *zona activa* (“active zone”) hace referencia al hecho de que no necesariamente el sujeto y el objeto entran en una relación directa con respecto al *proceso* perfilado. Puede darse el escenario en el que sólo un aspecto, parte o porción del ‘trajector’ y el ‘landmark’ se relacionan entre sí. Por eso Langacker recurre al término *discrepancia de perfilamiento* (“discrepancy of profiling”) para dar cuenta de este fenómeno que es más habitual de lo que uno espera.<sup>13</sup> El caso es –según Langacker– que

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<sup>13</sup> Para ejemplificar los conceptos de *zona activa* y *discrepancia en el perfilamiento*, Langacker (1995) ofrece los siguientes casos:

- a. She heard a trombone. (Sus oídos oyeron el trombón, no ella en su totalidad)
- b. The kettle is boiling. (Es el agua dentro del contenedor pava (“kettle”) que hierve, no todo el objeto)
- c. I’m in the phone book. (Es mi nombre y apellido lo que está en la guía telefónica, no yo mismo)

esta *discrepancia de perfilamiento* es resuelta si partimos de la idea básica de que hay en el lenguaje un proceso cognitivo que es fundamental y que es utilizado y explotado por emisores/escritores y receptores/lectores muy productivamente para conseguir cometidos comunicativos. Dicho proceso es conocido dentro de la *Gramática Cognitiva* como la *metonimia* (“metonymy”), que lejos de ser un recurso netamente literario, forma parte de nuestra comunicación cotidiana en contextos donde utilizamos la lengua en forma escrita y/u oral. La *metonimia* “instancia nuestra habilidad cognitiva básica de invocar una entidad como un punto de referencia conceptual con el propósito de establecer contacto mental con otra entidad.” (Langacker, 1995, p. 23) La *metonimia* como operación cognitiva y lingüística involucra a un conceptualizador que establece un *punto de referencia* mental y lo relaciona con una *meta* (“target”). El *dominio* de un *punto de referencia* está constituido por todas aquellas entidades a las que dicho conceptualizador puede acceder relacionadas con dicho *punto*.

## 2.2 La Perspectiva Funcional de la Oración (PFO)

Con la pretensión de sobrepasar los límites de la oración como constructo para estudiar lo que acontece en el nivel **discursivo-pragmático**, intentamos mostrar también que, en términos de *Dinamismo Comunicativo (DC)*, las emisiones a) “Syntax seems not to be all about algorithms” y b) “It seems that Syntax is not all about algorithms” eran diferentes. Por consiguiente, tomamos en consideración materiales diversos que aportan conocimiento acerca del lenguaje como la herramienta humana de comunicación por excelencia. Dicho material proviene del legado de los lingüistas de la *Escuela Lingüística de Praga*. En particular, seguimos a los lingüistas František Daneš y a Jan Firbas. De particular importancia han sido los conceptos de *Dinamismo Comunicativo* y *Avance Textual*.

En palabras de Firbas:

En el acto de comunicación algunos elementos son más dinámicos que otros. Esto me induce a hablar de Dinamismo Comunicativo, un fenómeno que es siempre desplegado por los elementos lingüísticos en el acto de comunicación. Dicho fenómeno constituye una cualidad inherente de la comunicación y se manifiesta en un constante desarrollo hacia la obtención de algún objetivo comunicativo. Participando de este desarrollo, un elemento lingüístico asume una posición en dicho desarrollo y de acuerdo a la posición que ocupe desplegará cierto dinamismo comunicativo. (Firbas, 1992, p.7)

Como bien lo explica Borzi (1998), el acto de comunicación es un proceso y como

tal tiene un *inicio*, un *medio* y un *fin*. El escritor, en el caso de un acto de comunicación escrito, despliega marcas para que el lector entienda qué dirección toma el flujo del mensaje con el objetivo de llevar a cabo su propia intención comunicativa. Desde el punto de vista de la *Escuela de Lingüística de Praga*, la oración/emisión está conformada por un *tema*, una **transición**, y un REMA. Empero, la *tematicidad*, la *transicionalidad* y la *rematicidad* no están invariablemente relacionados con el *principio*, el *medio*, y el *fin* del campo distribucional de la información, respectivamente.

Para los lingüistas de Praga, los *elementos temáticos* acarrear niveles más bajos de *Dinamismo Comunicativo* que los no temáticos. Y dentro del no-tema, los elementos *remáticos* son más dinámicos en términos comunicativos que los que conforman la *transición propiamente dicha*. Así lo explica Firbas (1995, p.105):

Vistos a la luz de la *Perspectiva Funcional de la Oración*, los elementos temáticos acarrear niveles más bajos de DC que los elementos no temáticos. Dentro del no-tema, los elementos transicionales acarrear grados de DC menores a aquellos elementos remáticos. Dentro de la transición, el grado más bajo de DC lo acarrea la transición propiamente dicha (TIEMPO, ASPECTO y MODO). Dentro del no-tema, el elemento que acarrea mayor DC es el REMA propiamente dicho, el elemento hacia el cual la comunicación es orientada.

Sin embargo, estaremos de acuerdo con Claudia Borzi (1998), quien propone que –a diferencia de los lingüistas de Praga– cuando un elemento está más ligado contextualmente, el mismo acarrea un mayor grado de *Dinamismo Comunicativo*. En consonancia con dicha investigadora, creemos que hay ciertos elementos en el *tema* que están más ligados contextualmente que otros elementos en la *transición* y en el *rema*, que sin embargo empujan el mensaje hacia delante.

El cuadro 2.1 a continuación muestra las divergencias entre I) Praga y II) Claudia Borzi (1998):

TEMA	TRANSICIÓN	REMA
Sujeto/Agente	Verbo (TIEMPO, MODO, ASPECTO, MODALIDAD, VOZ)	Objeto/Frases adverbiales
Tema/Tópico		Paciente o Tema
Posición Inicial	Posición Intermedia	Posición Final
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PRAGA</li> </ul> +Ligado Contextualmente		-Ligado Contextualmente +Dinamismo Comunicativo

- Dinamismo Comunicativo		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• BORZI</li> </ul> -Ligado Contextualmente + Dinamismo Comunicativo		+Ligado Contextualmente - Dinamismo Comunicativo

Cuadro 2.1: Diferencias entre Praga y Borzi en términos de *Dinamismo Comunicativo* (DC)

Según Borzi (1998, p.7), si el texto es un proceso constituido por un *inicio*, un *medio* y un *fin* y para avanzar en el desarrollo o despliegue de la información en el mismo hay marcas explícitas acerca de dónde debemos buscar la información para avanzar en el texto, son entonces los elementos que ubicamos al inicio de la oración/ emisión los que van a ser acarreadores de mayor *DC*.

Para dicha investigadora, existen tres categorías con alto nivel de *DC*: a) la *Indeterminación*, b) la *Presentatividad* y c) el *Contraste*.

Por una parte, la *Indeterminación* está relacionada con las construcciones nominales y tienen que ver no sólo con los tradicionalmente llamados artículos definido e indefinido, sino también con el valor semántico genérico de ciertos sustantivos. Por otra parte, la *Presentatividad* hace referencia a estructuras que introducen elementos contextualmente ligados o no en el texto. Por último, el *Contraste* –que Firbas (1992) lo asocia con elementos del *rema*, contextualmente NO ligados y por ende con mayor grado de *DC*– según la estudiosa Borzi (1998)– puede estar asociado tanto a mayor o menor grado de *DC*.

Con el objetivo de analizar y dilucidar cómo se lleva a cabo el avance de la información en el texto *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things* de Lakoff (1987) procuramos mostrar que las emisiones del predicado “seem” que inician con el expletivo o *tema eterno* “It” son *presentativas*: las mismas indican que entrará en juego en el discurso una *idea* que habrá de rastrearse hacia delante en el transcurso de la oración o emisión que viene a continuación. Por ende, “It” es un elemento que posee un alto grado *de DC*.

Por su parte, cuando en la configuración de “seem” hallamos un nominal/ pronombre/ determinante, los ejemplos analizados muestran que dichos elementos también constituyen *información dada*. En particular, los mismos responden a información

previamente mencionada en el contexto discursivo. Sugerimos que estos nominales/pronombres/determinantes, si bien están ligados contextualmente, poseen un grado menor de *Dinamismo Comunicativo* que el expletivo o *tema eterno* “It”.

En el caso de la opción b) “It seems that Syntax is not all about algorithms” –en términos de *DC*– proponemos que hay un *tema eterno* que abre la emisión y que por ende se constituye en el elemento más dinámico dentro de la misma. Recordemos que, según Borzi (1998), hay ciertos elementos –en este caso un elemento *presentacional*– que actúan como marcas que le ofrece el emisor/ escritor/ hablante al receptor/ lector/ oyente para que éste último avance en el texto con el objetivo de hallar la información a la que aún no ha tenido acceso. “It” crea un contexto de *Carencia*, siendo él mismo un elemento que –si bien no posee contenido semántico completo– es utilizado en inglés para indicar que tenemos la intención de presentar o introducir una situación, evento, o estado que ‘parece’ ser el caso.

Ahora bien, el contenido proposicional de la cláusula finita complemento de “seem” introduce *información nueva*: una *idea* que está modalizada por el valor epistémico de “seem” en términos de *posibilidad*.

Luego de la *transición propiamente dicha* (constituida por “seems”), el escritor/emisor decide introducirse en el contexto discursivo para hacer hincapié en el hecho de que lo que él va a presentar como *información nueva* es no solamente una mera especulación, sino también que dicha especulación es de su propia autoría. Si bien él no se compromete el cien por ciento con el contenido proposicional de la cláusula en cuestión, sí le indica a su interlocutor su punto de vista y su relación con dicho contenido. Ahora bien, podríamos preguntarnos si “to me” es parte de la *transición propiamente dicha* o parte del *rema*. A nosotros nos parece que es parte de la primera: la *información nueva* es la especulación que realiza el emisor y que la expresa en una cláusula declarativa finita, la cual introduce información que no está ligada al contexto comunicativo.

Recordemos que según Firbas (1992, p. 24), el pronombre expletivo impersonal o *tema eterno* (“eternal theme”) “It” pertenece a un grupo de pronombres que toman su referencia extralingüísticamente. Además, dicha referencia es siempre *obvia*. Este grupo de pronombres es reducido en cuanto a sus miembros, ya que sólo lo componen los pronombres “I” (*Yo*, es decir la primera persona del singular) y “you” (*vos/ ustedes*: la segunda persona del singular y plural), que corresponderían a los referentes del emisor y receptor,

respectivamente. También hallamos en este grupo al pronombre universal “one” (*uno*), y –por último– el otro expletivo o *tema eterno* “There”, presente en reducidos contextos, como ser las estructuras existenciales. Todos estos pronombres pueden ser introducidos en el discurso sin previa referencia a los mismos, y esto es posible por su alto grado de *obviedad constante* (“permanent obviousness”).

Sin embargo, en el caso a) “Syntax seems not to be all about algorithms,” el nominal o pronombre/determinante que aparece en la posición de sujeto está ligado contextualmente de algún modo u otro.

A modo de síntesis, con respecto a la PFO, planteamos que siguiendo el orden interpretativo y no el lineal del despliegue de elementos léxicos en las emisiones que analizamos, el mismo predicado “seem” orienta la perspectiva de la emisión en dos direcciones:

- I. una hacia delante, con “It” como el elemento *presentador* del fenómeno, “seem” – la *transición propiamente dicha* que no solamente modaliza sino también introduce el fenómeno en el discurso– y por último el *fenómeno*: la cláusula finita complemento de “seem” que acarrea la *información nueva*;
- II. la otra hacia atrás, con el nominal como el elemento *acarreador de una cualidad*, “seem” –que como en el caso anterior es además de la *transición propiamente dicha*– es el elemento que indica que se le *adscribirá* una cualidad al nominal, y la *cualidad* en sí es manifestada por la semi-cláusula no finita complemento de “seem” en esta configuración.

Este análisis, nos permitió hipotetizar que el mismo predicado “seem”, dependiendo del contexto en el que es usado, va a materializar en el *perfilamiento* a) la *Escala de Cualidad* y en el *perfilamiento* b) la *Escala de Presentación*.

Por último, a raíz de nuestro análisis desde la PFO logramos reforzar nuestra idea de que tanto el *valor interpretativo del despliegue de ítems léxicos*, el *factor semántico* y el *contextual* y todo lo que se analice dentro de estos ámbitos es una cuestión de grados: la diferencia entre TEMA y REMA y la relación entre los mismos; cuán ligado está un elemento al *contexto inmediatamente relevante* y cuál es la Escala que está siendo materializada en cada emisión.

## CAPÍTULO 3

### METODOLOGÍA DE LA INVESTIGACIÓN Y RESULTADOS A PARTIR DE LOS DATOS

#### 3.1 Contextualización

Con el objetivo en mente de estudiar contrastivamente el par opositivo a) “Syntax seems not to be all about algorithms” y b) “It seems that Syntax is not all about algorithms” recurrimos al texto del lingüista cognitivista George Lakoff, más precisamente a su pionero libro *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things* de 1987.

Creemos esencial aclarar el motivo por el cual el corpus seleccionado se trata de ejemplos del inglés. La razón tiene que ver con el hecho de que esta investigación surge de una inquietud personal relacionada con la enseñanza de la lengua inglesa en el ámbito de las carreras del profesorado, traductorado y licenciatura en inglés en la Facultad de Humanidades de la Universidad Nacional de La Plata, donde para dar cuenta de la diferencia entre los *perfilamientos* a) y b) se recurre a principios teóricos apriorísticos sintácticos. Por ende, y con el foco puesto en el estudio de este par opositivo en un contexto de uso real de la lengua inglesa, consideramos que sería una muy buena idea pensar en –para luego trabajar con– un corpus que fuera en dicho idioma.

De *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things* tomamos cincuenta párrafos donde hallamos varios y variados ejemplos del predicado “seem”. Empero, hemos restringido nuestro análisis al dominio de la variación que se corresponde con los usos de seem anteriormente mencionados sólo algunos de dichos ejemplos se correspondían con los *perfilamientos* del verbo “seem” que pretendíamos analizar. Partimos así de una visión “libremente creativa” (García, 1995, p. 55) de la lengua. Y lo hicimos a partir de dos marcos teóricos de corte funcionalista.

Por un lado, recurrimos a la *Gramática Cognitiva* –más precisamente al *Enfoque Cognitivo Prototípico*– y en especial a algunas de las investigaciones en relación a nuestro tema de interés de los lingüistas Ronald Langacker y George Lakoff con el objetivo de poder dar cuenta de los procesos cognitivos que subyacen a los *perfilamientos* del predicado “seem” del inglés que acabamos de destacar.

Y por el otro lado, nos servimos de los análisis de cierto material teórico-práctico desarrollado por los lingüistas de la *Escuela Lingüística de Praga*, en especial de Jan Firbas



y de Claudia Borzi.

Con el ánimo de estudiar la lengua en un contexto real de uso, nos resultaba indispensable recurrir a una metodología que por un lado nos permitiera analizar exhaustiva –además de sensatamente– los ejemplos, y que por el otro nos permitiera contabilizarlos. Dicho instrumento lo hallamos en la metodología a la cual recurren los estudiosos de la *Escuela lingüística de Columbia* –especialmente aquellos interesados en estudiar la *Variación Sintáctica*, tal como la entiende la lingüista Erica García.

Este marco metodológico nos permitió no solamente *describir*, sino –y sobre todo– *descubrir*, para luego poder *explicar* cuándo, cómo y porqué en ciertos contextos reales de uso en algunos momentos un emisor concreto utilizaba una ‘estructura’ similar a “Syntax seems not to be all about algorithms”, y en otros, el mismo emisor decía o escribía “It seems that Syntax is not all about algorithms”. Dicha metodología propone llevar a cabo un análisis cualitativo del corpus, así como también cuantitativo del mismo.

Todo trabajo de investigación persigue ciertos objetivos generales, y otros particulares. Nuestro primer gran objetivo era mostrar que si existe la opción en la lengua entre decir o escribir cierto mensaje de un modo utilizando más o menos los mismos ítems léxicos, empero desplegándolos de manera diferente, las divergencias entre dichos despliegues de ítems léxico no se debe a cuestiones puramente sintácticas, sino –muy por el contrario– como afirma la lingüista Angelita Martínez dichas “combinaciones sintácticas y sus evidentes regularidades son motivadas por principios cognitivos generales a los que el hablante apela para lograr relevancia y coherencia comunicativas.” (Martínez, 2009, p.280)

Partimos del hecho básico de que el predicado “seem” modaliza o proyecta un contexto en el cual el emisor no se compromete el cien por ciento con el contenido proposicional de su mensaje. Ahora bien, si hay una variación en el despliegue de ítems léxicos en las emisiones que nos interesan, quiere decir que en unos y otros contextos comunicativos se desarrollan distintos procesos cognitivos y además dicho despliegue sirve como indicador de cómo y hacia dónde ha de dirigirse el receptor para poder avanzar en el desarrollo dinámico de la información en dicho contexto.

Con el objetivo de evaluar y validar los datos se procedió a:

- ✓ formular variables dependientes e independientes.
- ✓ considerar tanto cifras absolutas como porcentajes.
- ✓ utilizar procedimientos estadísticos tales como la prueba de significación estadística *chi cuadrado* y la herramienta *odds ratio*. La prueba del *chi cuadrado* comprueba si la distribución de dos variables es dependiente o independiente, es decir si su

distribución es o no azarosa. La herramienta *odds ratio* –por su parte– permite ver el peso del valor independiente.

Con el objetivo de plasmar los datos en términos cuantificables, confeccionamos tablas de doble entrada en las que establecimos las siguientes variables independientes, discriminando los aspectos cognitivos, de los contextuales/comunicativos, aunque por supuesto ambos van de la mano.

Con respecto al primer aspecto, establecimos como variable independiente la [+/- **Saliencia Cognitiva**] de los sujetos/ “trajectores”. En este punto, nos parece de suma importancia definir dicha variable. La *saliencia cognitiva* es un fenómeno conceptual que lejos de hallarlo en el mundo exterior o en la naturaleza misma del objeto del mundo, la misma está relacionada con la necesidad de destacar y darle prominencia a cierto objeto, recortado este contra un fondo en un escenario abstracto donde acontecen fenómenos.

Dentro de dicho escenario, hay ciertos elementos que por ser [+humano], [+ animado], [+determinado], y/o [+singular] se hallarán en una situación más privilegiada para constituirse en “trajector”, es decir, en el elemento más prominente en una construcción lingüística particular. Por otro lado, los objetos [-humano], [-animado], [-determinado], y/o [-/+ singular] serán menos prominente o saliente en términos cognitivos.<sup>14</sup>

Por otra parte, en relación a aquellos aspectos más emparentados con la comunicación y con cómo la misma avanza en un texto, destacamos como variable independiente [+/- **Dinamismo Comunicativo**] también de los elementos que iniciaban las emisiones en las que hallamos las instancias de “seem” que estudiamos en un *contexto genuino* (Martínez, 2009, p. 273), que en nuestro caso corresponde a una manifestación lingüística escrita.

Con respecto a esta variable, lo que hicimos fue contemplar los contextos de **Carencia/Compleitud** tal como los entiende la lingüista Claudia Borzi, y dentro de los mismos qué elementos iniciaban los objetos lingüísticos que contenían el predicado “seem” para poder dar cuenta de cuáles entre ellos eran comunicativamente más dinámicos, es decir llevaban el flujo de la información hacia delante con mayor celeridad. Una descripción mas

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<sup>14</sup> La bibliografía en relación al tema de la *saliencia cognitiva* es muy vasta, empero podemos nombrar algunos de los textos que consultamos: el capítulo 3 de *Essentials of Cognitive Grammar* (2013), de Langacker, y varios artículos de Borzi, como por ejemplo “Consideración del uso de la cláusula ditransitiva en el discurso” de 2019; “Reflexión acerca de la iconicidad entre la posición del sujeto en las cláusulas y la distribución de los participantes en la situación de comunicación” de 2018; “Por qué dado un contexto el hablante elige a veces ‘en el que’ y otras veces ‘(en) que’” de 2013, entre otros.

minuciosa de estos contextos hallaremos más adelante en este mismo capítulo.

La metodología mixta cualitativa y cuantitativa de la *Etnopragmática* nos permitió realizar tres tipos de hallazgos:

1. Dar cuenta –en términos cognoscitivos y comunicativos– por qué en algunos contextos reales de uso el mismo emisor alterna entre un *perfilamiento* (a), y el otro (b), es decir, creemos que dicha metodología fue determinante para conseguir el éxito de nuestra investigación
2. Haber intentado descubrir y explicar las razones por las cuales un usuario real de una lengua real en un contexto comunicativo real alterna entre un *perfilamiento* y otro.

Lejos de tratarse de un uso regular de reglas sintácticas, el emisor –considerando a su interlocutor y partiendo de la idea básica de que la comunicación se construye *colaborativamente*– focaliza ciertos aspectos de una situación y los transmite de cierta manera, desplegando los ítems léxicos de una manera particular en un caso y en otro. (Martínez,2009, p. 282)

Constatar nuestra intuición acerca de la necesidad imperiosa de rever y modificar el enfoque –y de la mano del mismo– los contenidos y las prácticas desarrolladas en la materia Gramática Inglesa 2 en las carreras de Profesorado, Traductorado y Licenciatura en inglés en la Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación en la Universidad Nacional de La Plata ha sido nuestro gran objetivo. Quizás ésta haya sido, precisamente, la conclusión a la cual con más entusiasmo queríamos llegar, y confiamos en que los resultados que obtengamos en este trabajo podrá constituir un aporte al conocimiento del lenguaje y, en especial, a la enseñanza de la gramática del inglés en dicha casa de estudios.

### **3.2 Corpus y Datos**

Nuestro corpus está constituido por cincuenta párrafos que extrajimos del libro de George Lakoff *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things*, en el cual dicho lingüista cognitivista propone una nueva cosmovisión del mundo en general que necesariamente influye y penetra la lingüística como ciencia en su totalidad. Este nuevo enfoque teórico provoca cambios muy profundos que van desde la propia concepción de lo que es la adquisición de una lengua, cómo concebimos y conceptualizamos los seres humanos el mundo, la relevancia del aspecto comunicativo y cognitivo del lenguaje, hasta el nuevo valor que adquiere el contexto real de uso y las nociones de tiempo y espacio en relación con nuestro cuerpo en su totalidad –entre muchos otros.

Hallamos en los cincuenta párrafos ochenta y cinco ocurrencias del predicado “seem”, 73 de las cuales corresponden a los dos *perfilamientos* bajo análisis, es decir, dichos ejemplos corresponden a los *perfilamientos* a) “Syntax seems not to be all about algorithms” y b) “It seems that Syntax is not all about algorithms”.

Ahora bien, como podemos observar en el CUADRO 3.1 a continuación, hallamos una columna con el título “Otros” que corresponde a ejemplos que no contemplamos en este trabajo final. Los mismos presentan la siguiente distribución de la información, en términos de la PFO: la *cualidad* (en la Escala de Calidad) en lugar de estar expresada por medio de una cláusula no finita encabezada por la partícula “to”, se encuentra materializada por un adjetivo propiamente dicho. Un ejemplo que hallamos en nuestro corpus de este otro tipo de *perfilamiento* es “As Berlin has observed, interactional properties and the categories they determine **seem objective** in the case of properties of basic-level categories--categories like chair, elephant, and water.”

En el CUADRO 3.1 que mostramos a continuación, volcamos los datos en términos de la distribución de los dos *perfilamientos* del predicado “seem” que nos proponemos analizar, tal y como los hallamos en nuestro corpus.

**CUADRO 3.1: Distribución de los casos sobre el total del corpus**

Nominal/Pronombre+ seem(s)+cláusula no finita	It +seems+ [that] cláusula finita nominal declarativa	Otros	Total de ejemplos del predicado “seem”
63	10	12	85
74,1 %	11,7 %	14,1 %	100%

**CUADRO 3.2: Distribución de los casos correspondientes a los *perfilamientos* a) y b) sobre el total de los ejemplos de dichos *perfilamientos* en el corpus**

Nominal/Pronombre+ seem(s)+cláusula no finita A	It +seems+ [that] cláusula finita nominal declarativa B	Total de ejemplos de los <i>perfilamientos</i> a) y b) del predicado “seem” de nuestro corpus
63	10	73
86, 30 %	13,70 %	100%

Ahora bien, respecto de nuestra primera hipótesis inicial, partimos de la idea de que de los dos *perfilamientos* del predicado “seem” bajo análisis, el *perfilamiento* a) “Syntax seems not to be all about algorithms”, cuando el mismo muestra un sujeto/ “trajector” nombre sustantivo –como en “The Kay-McDaniel theory seems to work well for characterizing the focal colors corresponding to basic color categories”– encabezando la emisión, habría mayor *saliencia cognitiva*, ya que el conceptualizador de la emisión elegiría contra un fondo uno de los participantes en un escenario abstracto donde ocurren acontecimientos que implican el ejercicio de distintas fuerzas ejercidas por dichos participantes, que a su vez poseen una naturaleza muy variable en cuanto a sus rasgos particulares (+/- humano, +/- determinado, +/- singular).

En contraposición, el *perfilamiento* b) “It seems that Syntax is not all about algorithms,” como en “It seems to me that image-schema transformations are cognitively real” muestra menor *saliencia cognitiva*, ya que se trata de un escenario en el cual el conceptualizador decide no destacar un solo participante involucrado en dicho escenario, sino que él mismo elige inaugurar la emisión con el así llamado *expletivo, anticipador* o ‘dummy’ “It”. Empero, creemos que cuando el emisor se inmiscuye en el discurso explícitamente por medio de la frase preposicional “to me” hay, en cierto punto, un grado mayor de relevancia en términos de los *procesos cognitivos* intervinientes.

**TABLA 3.1: [+/- Saliencia cognitiva]**

**Frecuencia relativa de las expresiones sintácticas en relación con la saliencia cognitiva que se evidencia en el contexto**

	Nominal/Pronombre+ seem(s)+cláusula no finita A	It +seems+ [that] declarat declar nominal declarative B	Total
<b>1</b> <b>[+ Saliencia</b> <b>Cognitiva]</b>	95,32% 61 96,83%	4,68% 3 30%	100% <b>64</b>
<b>2</b> <b>[- Saliencia</b> <b>Cognitiva]</b>	22,23% <b>2</b> 3,1 7%	77,77% <b>7</b> 70%	100% <b>9</b>
Total	<b>63</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>73</b>
	100%	100%	

Odds ratio:  $(61 \times 7) \div (2 \times 3) = 71,16$

Como nuestra tabla es de 2x2 y en consecuencia el grado de libertad es de 1, hay que alcanzar al menos un valor de 3.84 según la tabla de grado de libertad 1 (Früm, 1996, p 151), que es la que corresponde en este caso. El resultado del Chi cuadrado es 35.6553; el valor p es de 0.00001 por lo que corroboramos que las variables están asociadas.

A la luz de los resultados obtenidos, nos preguntamos si dentro de los grupos de los *perfilamientos* a) y b) no habría algún (o algunos) aspecto(s) que nos diera(n) indicios de grados dentro de los mismos. Fue entonces que decidimos que era crucial subcategorizar la variable independiente [+**Saliencia cognitiva**]. Es decir, al observar la disparidad porcentual entre los *perfilamientos* a) y b) y al detenernos en cada uno de los casos del *perfilamiento* a) , percibimos que no todos los *nominales* o *pronombres/ determinantes* que habían sido seleccionados como sujetos/“traectores” en las emisiones en las que se hallaban mostraban el mismo grado de *saliencia cognitiva*. Por el contrario, había ciertos “traectores” que por ser humanos, animados, determinados y singulares eran más *relevantes* cognitivamente que otros. Claramente, como todo en la lengua, la *saliencia cognitiva* es también una cuestión de

grados. De este hecho crucial se desprende nuestra aseveración de que aún dentro de cada subgrupo, podemos –y sentimos que debemos– desmenuzar los casos para insistir en que hay –partiendo de nuestros ejemplos y de nuestra propuesta– distintos *grados* y *matices* en relación a las variables recién destacadas.

A continuación, plasmamos en una escala numérica ascendente los resultados obtenidos de dicha gradación sobre el total de los sesenta y tres casos correspondientes al *perfilamiento a)* bajo análisis.

**ESQUEMA 3.1: Distintos grados de saliencia cognitiva de los “trajetors”/sujetos del *perfilamiento a)* del predicado “seem”**

-Grado Saliencia Cognitiva (1-10%)				+Grado de Saliencia Cognitiva (90/100%)			
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
- humano - animado - det. + singular	- humano -animado - det. - singular	- humano - animado + det. + singular	-humano +animado +det -singular	+humano +animado - det. - singular	+humano + animado + det. - singular	+ humano +animado +det. + singular	
Ej. “A task...”	Ej. “Conceptual systems”	Ej. “it”, “that”, “The idea that...”	Ej. “They”, “Such real names”	Ej. “Children” “People”	Ej. “We”, “They”	Ej. “Lewis”, “Smith”	
2 casos	9 casos	21 casos	17 casos	4 casos	3 casos	6 casos	<b>Total casos 63</b>
3,17 %	14,28 %	33,33 %	26,98%	6,34%	4,76%	9,52%	<b>Total 98,38</b>

Como ya mencionamos anteriormente, lo primero que nos llamó la atención a la luz de los resultados que obtuvimos fue que el *perfilamiento* preferido es el a), que equivale a un 86,30 % sobre el total de los 73 casos analizados que muestran los *perfilamientos a)* y b). Esto implica en términos cognoscitivos, que el escritor, a la hora de modalizar una proposición recurriendo al predicado modal “seem”, lo hará tomando del escenario aquel participante cuya referencia es más saliente –y entonces, más fácil de recordar y más rápido

de elegir– en un escenario abstracto donde acontecen eventos o estados. En cambio, en el caso del *perfilamiento* b), correspondiente a un 13,70 % del total de 73 casos estudiados, el escritor decide manifestarse él mismo como el que conceptualiza el evento desde afuera, obviando la tarea de elegir de entre los participantes el que para él es el más destacable cognitivamente hablando.

Ahora bien, si prestamos atención a los datos que recabamos a partir de la subcategorización del parámetro [+Saliencia Cognitiva] para los casos del *perfilamiento* a), podemos observar que el mayor porcentaje de casos (33,3 %) corresponde a aquel *perfilamiento* en el que el “trajector” es [- humano, - animado, + determinado, + singular] y el menor porcentaje (3,1%) está dado por aquellos casos en los que el sujeto (=“trajector”) posee casi los mismos rasgos, empero difiere en su *determinación*: en este caso es un nominal no determinado. En el medio de la gradación, encontramos unos pocos casos (9,5%) –aunque no por eso menos interesantes– en los que la *saliencia cognitiva* es óptima. La misma se da en los casos en los que nominales muestran los siguientes rasgos: [+ humano, + animado, + determinado, + singular]. Observamos aquí un ser humano concreto con nombre y apellido que participa de una acción, ejerciendo cierta fuerza sobre otros participantes, y está –a su vez– comprometido con su entorno, de manera tal que su lugar en la posición de sujeto lo hace ser claramente el elemento más destacable contra el fondo de un escenario que el escritor está recortando.

En cuanto al enfoque de la PFO, tuvimos que repensar nuestras variables, tomando en consideración los variados contextos de **Carencia/ Completitud** que propone Borzi (1998), dígame el contexto de *Presentatividad*, de *Indeterminación* y de *Contraste* – además de nuestro aporte del contexto que hemos llamado de *Alto grado de Cohesión Discursiva*. Dicha lingüista establece una relación entre la noción de *Carencia* y la *ausencia* de algo o la *presencia* de una *expectativa*. Y propone que “ el hablante tiende a satisfacer toda ausencia o expectativa que cree su discurso, mejor dicho intenta lograr que el oyente en el proceso de comprensión trate de hacer eso.”(Borzi, 1998, p. 11)

La *Presentatividad* hace referencia a elementos a los que recurre el hablante o escritor para indicarle a su interlocutor que lo que él mismo está llevando a cabo es una estrategia de presentación de un elemento que está poco –o directamente– no está ligado discursivamente.

Este es el contexto que hallamos en los casos del *perfilamiento* b) “It seems to me that Syntax is not all about algorithms”.



Observamos aquí que la emisión inicia con un expletivo/tema eterno y –por ende, dicho elemento anticipador– se convierte en el elemento más dinámico dentro de la misma.

Observamos que “It” crea un contexto de carencia, siendo él mismo un elemento con escaso contenido semántico, pero que es utilizado en inglés como forma de manifestación de una intención comunicativa de introducir en el discurso un proceso o una idea que está modalizada por el semi-auxiliar “seem”.

Luego de la *transición propiamente dicha* (constituida por “seems”), el enunciador se inmiscuye en el texto por medio de la frase preposicional “to me” que le sirve a dicho enunciador como índice de que el proceso o idea están siendo modalizados de acuerdo a su propio [unto de vista, de acuerdo a su conocimiento o experiencia del mundo.

A la *Indeterminación* la relacionamos con el rol del artículo indefinido respecto de la referencia del nominal que antecede y con la naturaleza semántica de ciertos sustantivos genéricos. En nuestro corpus, por ejemplo, hallamos ejemplos tales como “**a task** does not seem to be a problem of categorization to an adult experimenter unless objects are taken from different basic level categories”. Podemos observar aquí que el artículo indefinido “a” en inglés actúa como una señal de que la información nueva respecto de dicho nominal ha de buscarse más adelante en el texto. Por dicha razón, insistimos en el hecho de que existe cierto grado de DC en este tipo de contextos comunicativos.

En cuanto al *Contraste*, se trata de un contexto en el que cierto elemento –en general una conjunción coordinante (“However”) o subordinante (“though”)– sirve para establecer un punto de inflexión entre lo dicho hasta entonces y lo que está por venir, creando así cierta expectativa en el lector u oyente de que lo nuevo o novedoso es lo que continúa en el discurso, hacia el final de la emisión. Un ejemplo de nuestro corpus es “In short, more than one of these models contributes to the characterization of a real mother, and anyone of them may be absent from such a characterization. **Still**, the very idea that there is such a thing as a real mother *seems* to require a choice among models where they diverge.”

Por último, hemos propuesto un cuarto contexto de **Carencia/Compleitud**: el de *Alto Grado de Cohesión Discursiva*. Éstas últimas corresponden a marcas que despliega el emisor/escritor/hablante que invitan al receptor/lector/oyente a seguir leyendo/escuchando para buscar la información nueva.

Retomando el hilo argumentativo de la *Escuela de Lingüística de Praga* respecto de la PFO, entendemos que la *información nueva* puede estar constituida por el *escenario* – cuando se despliega la **Escala de Presentación**, con “It” encabezando la emisión (en el caso del *perfilamiento b*)–, o por la *cualidad* –cuando lo que se pone de manifiesto es la **Escala**

**de Calidad**, en cuyo caso la emisión inicia con algún elemento *altamente cohesivo*, ya sea en forma de una *pronombre/determinante* (proforma), de una *repetición léxica* o un *sinónimo*. Dicha información ha de ser hallada en el contexto discursivo precedente (en el caso del perfilamiento a).

Estas marcas de *Alto Grado de Cohesión Discursiva* siempre están en la posición de *tema* y funcionan como indicadores de que estamos al **inicio** de un proceso comunicativo que posee también un **medio** y un **fin**, constituido éste por el *rema*, que contiene lo nuevo, es decir, la adscripción de una cualidad acerca de algo/ alguien.

Con el objetivo específico de estudiar estos últimos contextos tan frecuentes en inglés, y a su vez de naturaleza tan particular, hemos focalizado nuestra atención en las *cadena cohesivas* (“cohesive ties”) que se establecen entre el sujeto/”trajector” de los *perfilamientos* de “seem” que estamos analizando y aquellos elementos que se hallan en el *contexto inmediatamente relevante* del texto en cuestión. Siguiendo a los lingüistas de Praga, podemos aseverar que el *contexto inmediatamente relevante* determina la naturaleza de la información en términos de *información dada* e *información nueva*. Dicho contexto se divide en contexto *verbal* y *situacional*. La naturaleza de un objeto del mundo o idea manifestada en la lengua oral o escrita está relacionada tanto con el contexto de situación particular donde tiene una lugar una cierta interacción verbal, así como también del desarrollo del texto, es decir de la manifestación lingüística precedente y posterior.

El último concepto fundamental que creemos necesitamos definir a la luz de los principios de Praga es el de *información dada*. Los lingüistas de la *Escuela de Lingüística* de Praga entienden por *información dada*, por un lado, a aquella información que, si bien transmite conocimiento compartido por los interlocutores, debe ser considerada como *no conocida* en relación al desarrollo comunicativo desplegado inmediatamente después y, por lo tanto, no es información que se puede recuperar del contexto. Por el otro lado, también puede referirse a aquella información que no sólo transmite conocimiento compartido por los interlocutores, sino que, además, es totalmente recuperable del contexto, incluso en relación con el paso comunicativo inmediatamente relevante.

En la tabla que presentamos a continuación, mostramos los resultados de la comparación de los datos de nuestro corpus respecto de la *PFO*, más precisamente partiendo de la variable [+ **Dinamismo Comunicativo**]. Nuestra hipótesis es que el *Dinamismo comunicativo (DC)* está estrechamente relacionado a contextos de **Carencia/ Completitud**

que propician la ocurrencia en la posición del sujeto de un elemento encabezador de una emisión determinada que está muy ligado al *contexto inmediatamente relevante*.

A mayor ligación contextual, mayor será la fuerza del elemento en cuestión para hacer avanzar el discurso hacia delante, hacia la culminación del proceso comunicativo que –como ya lo manifestamos anteriormente– consta de un *inicio*, un *medio*, y un *punto final*.

**TABLA 3.2: [+/- Dinamismo Comunicativo]**

**Frecuencia relativa de empleo de las construcciones sintácticas en relación con el dinamismo comunicativo**

	Nominal/Pronombre+ seem(s)+cláusula no finita  CONSTRASTE+SU ST  A	It +seems+ [that] declarat declar nominal declarative B INDET+'IT'	Total
<b>1</b> <b>[+ Dinamismo</b> <b>Comunicativo]</b>	89,40 % <b>59</b> 93,65 %	10,60 % <b>7</b> 70 %	<b>66</b> 100%
<b>2</b> <b>[- Dinamismo</b> <b>Comunicativo]</b>	57,15 % <b>4</b> 6,35 %	42,85 % <b>3</b> 30 %	<b>7</b> 100%
<b>Total</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>73</b>
	100%	100%	100%

Odds ratio:  $(59 \times 3) \div (4 \times 7) = 6,32$

Otra vez, en el caso de las variables relacionadas con el grado de *Dinamismo Comunicativo* nuestra tabla es de 2x2 y en consecuencia el grado de libertad es de 1, hay que alcanzar al menos un valor de 3.84 según la tabla de grado de libertad 1, que es la que corresponde en este caso. El resultado del Chi cuadrado es 5.5682; el valor p es 0.01829 por lo que corroboramos que las variables están asociadas

A continuación presentamos una escala numérica ascendente en la que intentamos mostrar los **Contextos de Carencia/Complejidad** que propician un mayor grado de *Dinamismo Comunicativo*.

## ESQUEMA 3.2

### Distintos grados de *DC* dentro de los Contextos de Carencia/ Completitud

-Grado Dinamismo Comunicativo

+Grado Dinamismo Comunicativo

(1-10%)

(90/100%)

1	2	3	
<p><b>Alto grado de Coherencia Discursiva</b></p> <p><b>I) Nominal (Repetición léxica, sinónimo) + seem(s)+cláusula no finita</b></p> <p><b>II) Determinante/ Pronombre (Uso de un pronombre con Referencia Endofórica Anafórica) + seem(s)+cláusula no finita</b></p>	<p><b>III) Contraste</b></p> <p><b>IV) Indeterminación</b></p>	<p><b>V) Presentatividad</b></p> <p><b>It +seems+ [that] cláusula finita nominal declarativa</b></p>	
<p>Ej.<sup>15</sup></p> <p><b>I) SMITH seems</b> not to have been aware [...]</p> <p><b>II) THEY seem</b> to have no <i>concept</i> of it [...]</p>	<p>Ej.</p> <p><b>III) BUT that doesn't seem</b> to be what's going on at all.</p> <p><b>IV) A TASK does not seem</b> to be a problem of categorization [...]</p>	<p>Ej.</p> <p><b>V) It seems to me</b> that image-schema transformations are cognitively real;</p>	
<p>35 casos</p> <p style="text-align: center;">18casos</p>	10 casos	10 casos	<b>Total 73 casos</b>
<p style="text-align: right;">47,94%</p> <p style="text-align: right;">24,65%</p> <hr style="width: 20%; margin-left: auto; margin-right: 0;"/> <p style="text-align: right;">72,59%</p>	13,69 %	13,69%	<b>Total 100%</b>

<sup>15</sup> Es de fundamental relevancia destacar aquí que cuando proveemos ejemplos de casos con elementos de varios grados de *DC* lo hacemos conscientes de que fuera del contexto donde los mismos tienen lugar es difícil apreciar tanto el *DC* implicado, como también la importancia del contexto inmediatamente relevante a la hora de evaluar el *DC* desplegado en cada caso particular. Empero hemos decidido transcribir algunos ejemplos en el **ESQUEMA 2** con el fin de que el lector pueda, de alguna manera, comprender lo que estamos midiendo.

Los datos reflejados en la escala 3.2 anterior son muy contundentes: el 72,59% de los casos analizados corresponde a elementos que están altamente ligados contextualmente y muestran a su vez un alto grado de cohesión discursiva. Esta combinación hace que el discurso avance con celeridad particularmente hacia delante en estos contextos textuales.

Comparativamente hablando, en cuanto al *perfilamiento* b) “It seems that Syntax is nota ll about algorithms,” consideramos que si bien en términos de *saliencia cognitiva* este perfilamiento es el menos saliente, en términos de dinamismo comunicativo, es este el *perfilamiento* más dinámico. Así las cosas, podemos decir –en términos generales– que a mayor *dinamismo comunicativo*, menor será la *saliencia cognitiva*, y viceversa.

Recapitulando entonces, la conclusión general a la que arribamos luego de observar, comparar, y descubrir el valor semántico-pragmático de la alternancia entre los *perfilamientos* bajo análisis es la siguiente: tanto desde un punto de vista cognitivo como funcional, no es lo mismo abrir una emisión con un pronombre *impersonal/ expletivo/ tema eterno* “It” que hacerlo con un nominal o un pronombre/determinante.

En el primer caso, desde ambos enfoques (desde el *Enfoque Cognitivo-Prototípico* y de la PFO de los lingüistas de Praga) hay un emisor que –en un contexto real de uso– le advierte a su interlocutor que lo que sigue en el desarrollo discursivo es de especial relevancia, ya que él va a introducir en el discurso un *escenario* nuevo, donde acontecen eventos o situaciones o tienen lugar estados que involucran a ciertos participantes que ejercen distintos tipos de fuerzas entre sí.

Por otra parte, “It” –como ya lo hemos dicho anteriormente– posee una referencia incompleta y abstracta, y él mismo constituye una señal de alerta y un punto de inflexión en el discurso: por intermedio de dicho ítem léxico, el emisor en cuestión le da aviso a su interlocutor que la *información nueva* viene después, y que para hallarla ha de continuar oyendo o leyendo. Dicha *información nueva* se encuentra en la cláusula finita declarativa complemento de “seem”.

En cambio, cuando las emisiones son introducidas por un *nominal* o un *pronombre/determinante*, desde el punto de vista cognitivo, el mismo constituye el elemento más saliente en una proposición que pone de manifiesto un *proceso* en el que ciertos *participantes* se relacionan entre sí de diversas formas. Este *nominal* o *pronombre*, además, representa siempre *información dada*, y la misma es hallada en el contexto previo a su introducción en el discurso. Por ende, desde el punto de vista de la PFO –tal como la misma

fue revisada y resignificada por Borzi (1998)– dicho elemento es menos dinámico en términos comunicativos que “It”, ya que este último presenta un rasgo de *Presentatividad* que favorece el desarrollo de la información hacia adelante en el discurso.

Habiendo dicho esto, y de acuerdo a los datos recabados, podemos aseverar que, en general, los emisores/ hablantes/ escritores prefieren recurrir a la alternancia a) y no a la b), ya que en dicha alternancia se mantiene el flujo de información estable al constituir el nominal o pronombre en posición de sujeto un elemento activo en el discurso y, por ende, fácil de recuperar por el receptor/oyente/lector. A su vez, el emisor hace uso de un recurso cognitivo muy productivo: la *metonimia*. El recurso a la *metonimia* implica –cognitivamente hablando– destacar la *saliencia* de uno de los participantes en el proceso en cuestión. El objetivo, en este caso, es facilitar o agilizar la tarea de recuperar dicho participante en relación al *proceso* que se quiere focalizar

El emisor logra así un objetivo doble: por un lado, ser colaborativo con su interlocutor al presentar un elemento ligado discursivamente y cuya referencia está en el discurso precedente, y por el otro, ser preciso al seleccionar como punto de referencia el elemento más saliente –y por ende, fácilmente recuperable– en relación a una meta que es menos interesante o más difícil de nombrar. (Langacker, 1993 a, p.30)

Cabe decir que el *perfilamiento* b) es más disruptivo, ya que el mismo constituye un punto de inflexión en el discurso que invita al receptor a avanzar en el devenir discursivo con el fin de poder comprender el mensaje global.

Comparamos la frecuencia relativa de uso de dicha alternancia, habiendo atendido a los tres factores que destaca la investigadora Erica García (1988):

1. El valor semántico-pragmático de los dos *perfilamientos* bajo análisis,
2. El contexto cognitivo compartido por los usuarios de una lengua,
3. El conocimiento del mundo que poseen todos los participantes de un proceso comunicativo,

y lo que pudimos observar es que la frecuencia relativa de la alternancia b) es menor a la de a). Ahora bien, para poder explicar el porqué de dicha divergencia, tuvimos en cuenta que, por un lado, “los hablantes evalúan cuánta información los oyentes pueden aportar a la comunicación y esperan que los mismos cooperen” y, por otro lado, “los oyentes desean ejercitar su poder de inferencia y sacan conclusiones sobre la intención del hablante, usando cualquier cantidad de información.” (Huffman, 2001, p. 4)

Si la comunicación es un proceso de “construcción” y si la “inferencia humana” es uno de los grandes factores de mayor preponderancia en dicho proceso, la alternancia a) es más

fácil de recuperar, y la primera que se infiere, por el hecho de que están las referencias de los *participantes* del *proceso* que se quiere comunicar “a mano”. Por el contrario, en b) entra en escena el emisor como un *participante* más en la *escena* (valga la redundancia) al presentar un elemento icónico –“It”– por medio del cual hace la presentación de la *escena en cuestión*: hay aquí una elección funcional de dicho ítem léxico, que aunque más abstracto, más restringido en su ocurrencia en contextos comunicativos, no deja de ser un elemento fundamental en la lengua inglesa.

No está demás insistir en que no ignoramos el hecho de que dicho elemento ha sido considerado por las gramáticas tradicionales y la gramática generativa chomskiana como un elemento vacío de significado, un mero sujeto gramatical que había de ser insertado en la posición de sujeto gramatical para dar con una estructura correcta gramaticalmente hablando. Somos conscientes también de que nuestro planteo puede suscitar mucha controversia. Empero, creemos que nuestro estudio metodológico cualitativo y cuantitativo será suficiente para al menos comenzar a pensar en esta posibilidad otra –alternativa y disruptiva– que nos brinda el sistema lingüístico de la lengua inglesa.

Sin duda, como sostenía la estudiosa Erica García (1985) la **sintaxis es icónica** y el hecho en sí de que haya una alternancia indica que hay en juego dos *perfilamientos*, es decir, dos formas de conceptualizar una escena desde dos perspectivas diferentes.

## CAPÍTULO 4

### ANÁLISIS Y DISCUSIÓN DE LOS DATOS

#### 4.1 El Enfoque Cognitivo-Prototípico

##### Análisis del Grado de *Saliencia Cognitiva* de los Sujetos/ “Traectores”

Luego de haber analizado cuantitativamente las variables dependientes e independientes en el Capítulo 3 de este trabajo final, nos resta ahora proveer una explicación cualitativa de los resultados obtenidos.

Desde el *Enfoque Cognitivo-Prototípico*, y como ya dijimos anteriormente, además de comparar los *perfilamientos* a) “Syntax seems not to be all about algorithms” y b) “It seems that Syntax is not all about algorithms” considerando el orden de ítems léxicos de las emisiones que elegimos, tuvimos que subcategorizar la variable independiente [+**Saliencia cognitiva**]<sup>16</sup>, es decir, tuvimos que observar y analizar el porqué de tanta disparidad en términos de porcentajes respecto de los *perfilamientos* a) y b).

Luego, al observar cada uno de ellos en detalle, logramos darnos cuenta de que no todos los *nominales* o *pronombres/determinantes* que habían sido seleccionados como sujetos/“traectores” en las emisiones en las que se hallaban mostraban el mismo grado de *saliencia cognitiva*, sino que ciertos “traectores” por ser humanos, animados, determinados y singulares eran más *relevantes* cognitivamente que otros.

Claramente, como todo en la lengua, la *saliencia cognitiva* es también una cuestión de grados. De este hecho crucial se desprende nuestra propuesta de mostrar que aún dentro de cada subgrupo, podemos – y sentimos que debemos– desmenuzar los casos para insistir en que hay –partiendo de nuestros ejemplos y de nuestra propuesta– distintos *grados* y *matices* en relación a las variables recién destacadas.

A continuación, seleccionamos y explicamos esta *gradación*, que va de sujetos/ “traectores” más salientes, a otros con un bajo grado de *saliencia cognitiva*.

Incluso en aquellos casos en los que los sujetos/ “traectores” son seres vivos, particulares, específicos, únicos e irrepetibles, existe –dentro de este grupo– cierto grado de variación en preponderancia de los mismos respecto del contexto.

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<sup>16</sup> Esta variable es analizada y desarrollada contrastivamente en la Tabla 3.1 presentada en la página 33 en el Capítulo 3 de este trabajo final.



Por ejemplo, en 4.1 “**Lewis seems to be suggesting** something like adding a temporal dimension to model theory, and some small upper limit on how many references can be fixed at anyone time,” “Lewis” –además de poseer los rasgos [+humano, +animado, +determinado, + singular]– es un ser que está llevando a cabo la acción de “sugerir”, una acción exclusiva de los seres humanos, lo que refuerza el carácter de ese designado como ser vivo y humano y que además resulta un acto de habla iniciativo.<sup>17</sup>

En cambio, en los tres ejemplos que copiamos a continuación, hay un ser humano, animado, recortado contra un escenario, pero a quien –sin embargo– no se le atribuye un accionar, un compromiso activo dentro de un contexto determinado. En definitiva, “think” –que en este caso particular indica un estado– “view” y “believe” son verbos de estado y no de acción.

4.2 So far as I can tell, **Whorf seemed to think** conceptual systems were monolithic.

4.3 Whorf **seemed to view** the actual linguistic forms-morphemes, words, grammatical constructions-as the locus of variation in conceptual systems.

4.4 **Whorf did not seem to believe** that one had control over the most important parts of one's conceptual system -the grammaticized parts.

En el caso 4.5 “**Smith seems not to have been** aware that this example was in conflict with the theory of semantics in which the classical theory of categorization is embedded,” el predicado verbal “be” –que recordemos en inglés puede significar tanto “ser” como “estar”– es el más estático de los predicados asociados a los sujetos/ “traectores” más salientes cognitivamente hablando. Entonces, en este caso “Smith” es menos saliente que en el caso 4.1 por el mero hecho de ser un participante con un rol menos activo respecto de la *cadena de acción* en cuestión.

En un nivel inferior respecto de la *saliencia cognitiva*, hallamos en la posición de sujeto de las emisiones estudiadas, *nominales* y/o *pronombres/determinantes* que si bien designan objetos que poseen el rasgo de ser [+ humanos] y [+animados] son nombres sustantivos indeterminados o colectivos o pronombres plurales anafóricos.

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<sup>17</sup> Seguramente en próximas investigaciones, contemplaremos los casos bajo análisis también a partir del *tiempo verbal* en el que el verbo finito “seem” es usado, así como también el *valor aspectual* de las formas no finitas de las cláusulas introducidas por “to” que sirven de complemento a “seem”. Dichos temas exceden los límites de este trabajo, empero no ignoramos el hecho de que no es lo mismo usar “seem” en presente que en pasado, o que el verbo en la cláusula no finita esté en su forma imperfectiva continua progresiva, o en el perfectivo perfecto, etc.

Observemos los ejemplos a continuación:

4.6 **We** thus *seemed* to have our system grounded comfortably in the real world.

4.7 **Tahitians**, Levy found, not only do not have a word for sadness, **they seem** to have no *concept* of it and, correspondingly, no ritualized behavior for dealing with depression or bereavement.

4.8 Thus **English speakers** did *seem* to be using the naming strategy.

4.9 **Children** do not *seem* to have been asked to sort together objects belonging to the same basic level category (e.g., several shoes or several dogs).

4.10 Try to imagine a piece of furniture that doesn't look like a chair, or table, or bed, etc., but is more abstract. **People seem** not to be able to do so.

Los ejemplos 4.6 y 4.7 muestran pronombres de 1ra (“We”) y 3ra (“They”) persona del plural, respectivamente. Y si bien podemos aseverar que “they” halla su referencia en el texto previo (endofórica y anafóricamente) en “Tahitians”, “We” es menos claro en cuanto a si se refiere a “our subjects”, o exofóricamente a los seres humanos en general.

Una vez más, los escenarios modalizados por el predicado “seem” caracterizan estados; en este caso, estados de *posesión* expresados por el verbo “have”. En ambos casos, la referencia de los pronombres es definida.

En cambio, los nominales “English speakers”, “Children” y “People” –si bien designan entidades con los rasgos [+humano] y [+animado]– los mismos conceptualizan sujetos indeterminados o indefinidos, y –por ende– menos destacables desde el punto de vista cognitivo que un nominal humano, animado, determinado y singular.

El rasgo [+humano] es determinante a la hora señalar la *saliencia cognitiva* de un sujeto/ “trajector”. De todos modos, dentro del grupo de *nominales* que son **no** humanos encontramos algunos –que por ser determinados y singulares– despliegan cierta *saliencia cognitiva*, en comparación a otros ciertos *nominales* que poseen los mismos rasgos, empero están conceptualizados como un conjunto de objetos<sup>18</sup>, en su forma plural. Estos pueden ser *nominales* o *pronombres/determinantes* de 3ra persona singular o plural.

Analícemos los ejemplos que siguen:

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<sup>18</sup> Recordemos que –como recalca Borzi (2012) en su artículo “Gramática Cognitiva Prototípica:

Conceptualización y análisis del nominal”– cuando un nominal (sea cual fuere) está en su forma plural, el mismo no deriva directamente del singular, sino que hay una conceptualización de seres u objetos en un conjunto – todos y cada uno con ciertos rasgos particulares que hacen al todo.

4.11 **The Kay-McDaniel theory** *seems* to work well for characterizing the focal colors corresponding to basic color categories.

4.12 But if **the doctrine of natural kind terms** fits well for the Tzeltal at even one level of categorization, it still *seems* to be quite a remarkable result.

4.13 If **thought** is independent of language (as **it** *seems*, at least in part, to be), and if language is a way of framing and expressing thought so that it can be communicated, then one would expect that many (not necessarily all) aspects of natural language syntax would be dependent in at least some way on the thoughts expressed.

4.14 At the basic level of physical experience, many of the principles of objectivism appear to work well. **Our intuitions that objectivism is "just common sense"** *seem* to come from the pre-conceptual structure of our physical experience at the basic level.

4.15 Color categories thus have central members. There is no general principle, however, for predicting **the boundaries from the central members**. **They** *seem* to vary, somewhat arbitrarily, from language to language.

En el ejemplo 4.11, el *nombre sustantivo* “**The Kay-McDaniel theory**” es el nominal que muestra mayor saliencia cognitiva respecto del resto de los ejemplos de la serie, por ser el mismo [-humano,-dinámico], aunque, a su vez, [+determinado, +singular]. No está demás destacar que hay una intencionalidad de recortar este objeto y perfilarlo contra un fondo de una manera distinta que en los casos del 4.12 y 4.13, en los que en vez de repetir el nominal “the doctrine of natural kind” y “thought” –cuyos rasgos comparten con “The Kay-McDaniel Theory”– el escritor recurre al uso del pronombre “it”, que anafóricamente rescata su referencia en “the doctrine of natural kind” y en “thought”, respectivamente.

Por su parte, los ejemplos 4.14 y 4.15 muestran el uso de un nombre sustantivo “Our intuitions that objectivism is ‘just common sense’” cuya referencia está determinada por el determinante posesivo “our”, que sirve de basamento de dicho nominal en el discurso. Este nominal es más saliente desde el punto de vista cognitivo que el pronombre anafórico “they”.

El caso que resta analizar, es el ejemplificado por los casos 4.16 y 4.17 que siguen:

4.16 We suspect this results from the fact that basic objects are so obviously the "same object" to adults that a **task does not seem** to be a problem of categorization to an adult experimenter unless objects are taken from different basic level categories.

4.17 **A topic such as the logic of emotions would seem** on this view to be a contradiction in terms, since emotions, being devoid of conceptual content, would give rise to no inferences at all, or at least none of any interest.

Los rasgos correspondientes a “a task” y a “A topic such as the logic of emotions” son: [-

humano, -animado, -determinado, +singular].

Estos nominales son más relevantes desde el punto de vista cognitivo, así como también desde el comunicativo, que aquellos nominales con los mismos rasgos pero que son plurales, tales como muestran los 4.18 y 4.19:

4.18 One of the goals of this case study is to show that that is not the case, by actually working out cognitively based descriptions and explanations of subtle linguistic phenomena that **technical formal systems seem** not to be able to deal with.

4.19 **Metaphorically defined categories do not seem** to correspond to anything that exists independent of human conceptual systems.

El hecho de que los sujetos/ “traectores” destacados en negrita en los ejemplos 4.18 y 4.19 sean indefinidos implica que los mismos muestran un bajo grado de *saliencia cognitiva*, es decir, se hallan en la otra punta de un continuo que va de “Whorf” [+humano, +animado, +determinado, + singular] a “technical formal systems” y “Metaphorically defined categories”, que poseen los rasgos [-humano, -animado, -determinado, -singular]

En el apartado a continuación, observamos con detenimiento varios de los ejemplos de nuestro corpus a la luz de la PFO.<sup>19</sup>

## 4.2 La Perspectiva Funcional de la Oración

### Análisis del Grado de *Dinamismo Comunicativo*

Paso previo al análisis de las emisiones que contienen el predicado “seem” en los dos *perfilamientos* que nos propusimos analizar en este trabajo de investigación, dígame a) “Syntax seems not to be all about algorithms” y b) “It seems that Syntax is not all about algorithms”, refresquemos la memoria acerca de los puntos claves de la teoría lingüística de los lingüistas de Praga, de cuyas ideas y conceptos nos apropiamos para llevar a cabo dicho análisis.

Mathesius fue uno de los primeros lingüistas checoslovacos que propuso estudiar la *Perspectiva Funcional de la Oración (PFO)*. Su planteo básico es que para que la

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<sup>19</sup> Nos urge destacar un hecho que es fundamental para comprender el porqué de nuestra transcripción de párrafos completos del corpus seleccionado. La razón radica en el hecho crucial de que para poder dar cuenta del avance de la información en dichos textos precisábamos trabajar en extractos largos de lengua.

comunicación sea exitosa, los recursos léxicos y gramaticales de la lengua sirven a un propósito especial que les impone el hablante en el momento del discurso, es decir, en el acto mismo de la comunicación. A partir de las necesidades comunicativas del contexto, las palabras se cargan de significados particulares, y la *oración* –como unidad básica de análisis– se compone, por el lado gramatical, de un sujeto y un predicado, empero, desde el punto de vista de la *información*, se divide en *tema* y *rema*.<sup>20</sup>

Así mismo, Mathesius asevera que la *división actual* de la oración se opone a su *división formal*. Mientras que la *división formal* se refiere a la composición de la oración de elementos gramaticales, la *división actual* de la oración se refiere al modo del cual ésta se incorpora en el contexto real del que ha surgido.

En su artículo “On the interplay of prosodic and non-prosodic means of FSP” (p. 82), el lingüista Firbas define la *PFO* como “the distribution of various degrees of communicative dynamism (*CD*) over the element within a sentence, the distribution being effected by an interplay (co-operation) of the semantic and grammatical structures of the sentence under conditions created by a certain kind of contextual dependence.”<sup>21</sup>

Por regla general, los lingüistas checoslovacos conciben la *PFO* como una determinada perspectiva en la cual aparece la oración en el acto de la comunicación.

De todos los conceptos y nociones que plantean los lingüistas de Praga, de lo que más nos hemos valido, es de la noción de *Dinamismo Comunicativo (DC)* en relación a las Escalas de *Presentación* y de *Cualidad*: en la primera, hay una orientación al lector que es hacia delante; “It” es el elemento *presentador* del fenómeno, “seem” –la *transición propiamente dicha*– que no solamente modaliza, sino también introduce el fenómeno en el discurso– y por último el *fenómeno*: la cláusula finita complemento de “seem” que acarrea la *información nueva*.

La Escala de *Cualidad* es una indicación de que el lector ha de considerar lo dicho hasta entonces en el *contexto inmediatamente relevante*, es decir la información previamente mencionada. En dicha escala, el despliegue de ítems léxicos se desarrolla del siguiente modo: primero se halla el nominal o pronombre/determinante como el elemento *acarreador de una cualidad*. Luego sigue “seem”, que se constituye en la *transición*

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<sup>20</sup> Cabe destacar el importante hecho de que la obra de Mathesius no ha sido traducida al español ni al inglés, por eso lo hemos leído a través de otros estudiosos que han tomado los valiosísimos aportes de dicho lingüista.

<sup>21</sup> “On the interplay of prosodic and non-prosodic means of FSP”. The Prague School of Linguistics and Language Teaching. Londres, Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 82.

*propriadmente dicha* y es –a su vez– el elemento que indica que se le *adscribirá* una cualidad al nominal/pronombre/determinante. Por último, la *cualidad* en sí es manifestada por la semi-cláusula no finita complemento de “seem” en esta configuración.

Estos dos contextos son los que ejemplificamos y debatimos a continuación.

## 4.2.1 Escala de Presentación

### 4.2.1.1 Contexto de Carencia/ Completitud: *Presentatividad*

Vistos a la luz de la *Perspectiva Funcional de la Oración (PFO)*, y más precisamente en términos del *Dinamismo Comunicativo (DC)*, ejemplos tales como “It seems to me that Syntax is not all about algorithms” constituyen lo que la lingüista Borzi (1998) denomina contextos de *Carencia/ Completitud*, en este caso particular de *Presentatividad*.

Observamos aquí que la emisión inicia con un expletivo/*tema eterno* y –por ende, dicho elemento anticipador– se convierte en el elemento más dinámico dentro de la misma. Recordemos que, según dicha investigadora, hay ciertos elementos –en este caso un elemento *presentacional*– que actúan como marcas que le ofrece el emisor/ escritor al receptor/ lector para que éste último avance en el texto con el objetivo de hallar la información a la que no ha tenido acceso aún. “It” crea un contexto de *Carencia* en el que se pone de manifiesto intención del enunciador de marcar explícitamente su intención de indicarle a su interlocutor que lo nuevo, lo novedoso, lo que él tienen para agregar se encuentra más adelante en el contexto discursivo. Recordemos también que, el recurso a “seem”, está relacionado con la necesidad de modalizar el contenido proposicional de un *proceso* o una idea introducida en la cláusula finita declarativa que tiene la distribución sintáctica de complemento de dicho “semi-auxiliar”.

En ciertos casos, luego de la *transición propriadmente dicha* (constituida por “seems”), el emisor/ escritor decide introducirse en el contexto discursivo para hacer hincapié en el hecho de que lo que él va a presentar como *información nueva* es no solamente una mera especulación, sino también que dicha especulación es de su propia autoría. Si bien él no se compromete el cien por ciento con el contenido proposicional de la cláusula en cuestión, sí le indica a su interlocutor su punto de vista y su relación con dicho contenido. Así mismo, y como ya lo dijimos anteriormente, la frase preposicional “to me” es parte de la *transición propriadmente dicha*, ya que la misma indica que la *información nueva* es la especulación que

realiza el emisor y que la expresa en una cláusula declarativa finita. Habiendo llegado a este punto, hacia el final de la emisión en cuestión, podemos decir que también el lector ha arribado al momento en el cual él logra superar ese contexto de *Carencia*, así como también cerrar el proceso comunicativo presente en esta emisión.

Como podremos observar a lo largo del desarrollo y análisis de los casos del corpus, en algunos de los *perfilamientos* de este contexto de *Carencia/Completitud* de *Presentatividad* el emisor no se inmiscuye en el texto de manera explícita por intermedio de la frase preposicional “to me”, sino que se mantiene al margen.

Por otro lado, como asevera Langacker (1995) el *expletivo* “It” (“expletive” o “syntactic dummy”) no es una mera categoría sintáctica a la que recurrimos para llenar la posición de *sujeto gramatical*, sino más bien, “It” es un sujeto que posee un valor semántico particular que es el de presentar un *escenario abstracto* (“abstract setting”) –en contraposición a un *participante*– con un grado mínimo de especificidad. “It” es, a su vez, un *punto de referencia* que sirve para introducir un escenario donde ciertos participantes entran en relación entre sí. En definitiva, el recurrir al uso de “It” para introducir una emisión es para dicho lingüista una decisión con valor funcional.

Antes de pasar al análisis de los datos recogidos del corpus, queremos hacer hincapié en un punto que ya hemos mencionado y es que este *perfilamiento* (el *perfilamiento* b) es el menos frecuente. Es además la opción a la cual un usuario de una lengua recurre cuando por alguna razón no quiere comprometerse el cien por ciento con el valor de verdad del contenido proposicional proyectado por la emisión en cuestión. Ahora bien, para sustentar nuestra hipótesis de que al utilizar el *perfilamiento* b) el usuario de la lengua quiere desligarse del compromiso con la veracidad del mensaje en cuestión –y de alguna manera “lavarse las manos”– hemos de tomar en consideración tanto los datos lingüísticos que se encuentran en el *contexto inmediatamente relevante*, como –y en varios de los contextos, por sobre todas las cosas– considerar información extralingüística. Dicha información podemos hallarla en el *contexto de situación*, y en algunos casos más allá, en el *contexto de cultura*.

En el ensayo "The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages" publicado en 1923, como un suplemento de Ogden y Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning*, Malinowski expone por primera vez sus argumentos a favor de considerar la importancia de los *contextos de*

*situación y de cultura* en la construcción de *significados* en los *textos*. Dicho ensayo es, a su vez, utilizado por Halliday en 1985 para llamar la atención acerca de la preponderancia de los *contextos de situación y de cultura* a la hora de analizar cómo funciona un texto y qué se puede hacer a través de él. En dicho trabajo, Halliday afirma que existe "a theory of context before there was a theory of text". (Halliday, 1985, p. 5)

Por esta razón, hemos tenido que agregarle (con)texto a los apartados de los cuales habíamos tomado dichos extractos, ya que percibimos –en estos casos– que era necesario contar con más información y por ende más contenido lingüístico. Asimismo, tuvimos que recurrir a nuestro sentido común, y sobre todo a nuestro conocimiento del mundo para poder sostener nuestra hipótesis de que cada vez que un emisor/escritor presenta un *escenario* en el que el expletivo/*tema eterno* “It” encabeza una emisión y luego le sigue “seems” (tanto en los casos en los que aparece el *conceptualizador* expresamente por medio de “to me”, como en los que no lo hace) y luego una cláusula declarativa finita, el emisor se desliga o aparta del compromiso con el valor de verdad de la idea/proposición introducida en la cláusula finita.

A continuación destacamos en **negrita** seis de los diez casos de *Contextos de Carencia/ Completitud* del tipo de **Presentatividad** y analizamos cada uno de los casos en detalle.<sup>22</sup>

#### 4.20 Some Speculations.

The analysis given above was based on what Dixon's informants told him about their categorization system. They told him nothing about why animals were categorized with human males, nor why fire, water, and fighting were categorized in class II with human females. I would like to make some speculations about why I think the system is structured that way. But before I do, I would like to make a suggestion concerning Dixon's principles.

**It seems to me** that the *myth-and-belief principle* and the *important-property principle* amount pretty much to the same thing as the *domain-of-experience principle*. The *domain-of-experience principle* says that there are certain domains of experience that are significant for Dyirbal categorization. They have to be listed: fishing, fire, etc. These provide links in category chains. Thus, if fish are in class I, fishing implements are also in class I. One way to look at the *myth-and-belief principle* is that it is a special case of the *domain-of-experience principle*. It says that myths and beliefs are domains of experience that are relevant for categorization. Dixon's *important-property principle* can be looked at in this way as well. It was set up primarily to handle harmful or dangerous things. That is the only important property it works for. One could equally say that danger is an important domain of experience for Dyirbal categorization and that it is on the same list of relevant domains as

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<sup>22</sup> El análisis y la reflexión de los otros cuatro casos restantes se puede subsumir en estos seis casos que desarrollamos en detalle.



fishing, fire, and myths. Thus, all we would need to know is which domains of experience are relevant for categorization and then we would need specific knowledge of the domains.

Continuing this speculation, we could account for Dyirbal categorization in the following way:

The basic divisions are:

- I. *Bayi*: human males
- II. *Balan*: human females
- III. *Balam*: edible plants
- IV. *Ba/a*: everything else

Classes I and II would be in minimal contrast -male versus female- a standard contrast in categorization systems around the world. According to Dixon's analysis, classes I and II are not in minimal contrast, any more than I and III or II and III are. The importance of this will become clear shortly.

The *domain-of-experience* principle would then list those domains of experience relevant for categorization: fishing, fire, myths, beliefs, danger. This would have the following consequences:

- Since fish are in class I, fishing implements are in class I.
- Since storms and the rainbow are believed to be mythic men, they are in class I
- Since birds are believed to be female spirits, birds are in class II, except for those three species of willy-wagtails who are believed to be mythical men and are therefore in class I.
- Since crickets are believed to be "old ladies," they are in class II.
- Since the moon is believed to be the husband of the sun, the moon is in class I and the sun is in class II.
- Since fire is in the same domain of experience as the sun, fire is in class II with the sun.
- Those things that are believed to be instances of fire are in the same domain as fire: the stars, hot coals, matches, etc.

What we have done is suggest that the *domain-of-experience* principle is responsible for fire being in the same category as women. The links are: women (via myth) to the sun (via relevant domain of experience) to fire. By the same means, we can link danger and water. Fire is dangerous, and thus dangerous things are in the same category as fire. Water, which extinguishes fire, is in the same domain of experience as fire, and hence in the same category. It should be borne in mind that these are speculations of an outside analyst. Speakers of Dyirbal told Dixon nothing like this, neither pro nor con. Native speakers of a language are only sometimes aware of the principles that structure their language. Either this analysis is wrong, or the speakers aren't conscious of these structuring principles, or Dixon didn't ask the right questions. It is, at least in principle, an empirical issue, since this analysis makes somewhat different claims than Dixon's. This analysis suggests that fighting spears, stinging nettles, garfish, and matches should be less central members of category II than girls. Tests have been developed by Eleanor Rosch and others (Rosch 1977) to measure relative centrality of members in a category. However, it is not clear that such tests can be applied in any sensible way to older members of an aborigine tribe. Still, the speculation is more than idle speculation. It is an empirical matter. The issue can be stated as follows: Are women, fire, and dangerous things all equally central members of class II, with no motivating links among them? Or are women central members of the category, linked in some fashion to the more peripheral fire and danger? Schmidt's data on the breakdown of the system favor the latter

hypothesis. But, in addition, Schmidt found one direct piece of evidence—a speaker who consciously linked fire and danger to women:

buni [fire] is a lady. ban buni [class II fire]. You never say bayi buni [class I fire]. It's a lady. Woman is a destroyer. 'e destroys anything. A woman is a fire. [BM, 33 years, aboriginal male, Jambun]

Several things should be borne in mind about this statement. This is not a speaker of traditional Dyirbal; it is a younger member of the community, still fluent in the old language, but brought up primarily speaking English. There is no evidence one way or the other whether older speakers of the traditional language held such a belief. All it shows is that, for this speaker, there is a conceptual link of some kind between the presence of women in the category and the presence of fire and danger.

Our analysis makes another prediction as well. As the system breaks down one might expect distant links of the chain to break off. Schmidt cites one example where the entire fishing link breaks off and another where the entire danger link breaks off for a single speaker, while for other speakers the natural dangers branch alone breaks off. Under Dixon's analysis, in which human females and fighting (or harmfulness) are equally central, one might equally well expect human females to be assigned to another category. The analysis I suggest has as a consequence that the central subcategory -human females- would be the last to go. This, too, is an empirical question. There may well be speakers with intermediate systems which have kept everything in *balan* except human females. But given the end point of the change, with *balan* containing only human females, that is unlikely.

Under the analysis I am suggesting, human males and females would be central members of categories I and II, which would place these categories in a minimal contrast. This would explain some interesting subregularities. Under such an analysis one would expect exceptions to class I to go into class II—the minimally contrasting category. And conversely, one would expect exceptions to class II to go into class I. One would not expect exceptions in these categories to go into classes III or IV. This is exactly what happens. Animals are in class I, but exceptional animals (dogs, platypuses, bandicoots, echidnas) are in class II. Snakes are in class I, but chicken snakes and water pythons are in class II. Birds are in class II, as are dangerous things. Since dangerous things have to be marked by special categorization, dangerous birds (hawks) are marked as exceptional by being placed in class I. Given this analysis, one can even find a regularity in the exceptions.

One thing we have not addressed is why animals are for the most part in class I with human males. Dixon observes that there are no separate words for male versus female animals; that is, there is a word for kangaroo, and no separate word for female kangaroo. Kangaroo (*bayi yuri*) is in class I with most animals; if one wants to specify that a kangaroo is female, one must use the class II classifier (*balan yuri*). The reverse is true for exceptional animals. Dog is in class II (*balan guda*). If one wants to indicate that a certain dog is male, one must use the class I classifier (*bayi guda*). All this amounts to saying that animal names are unmarked for gender. The categorization system **seems** to be humans (male and female) versus edible plants versus inanimates. It seems to be a reasonable guess that if animals are going to go anywhere in a system like this, it will be with the humans rather than with the edible plants. And it would make sense that if the animals are unmarked for gender, they would be categorized with the unmarked human category, if there is one. In most languages that have classification by gender, the male category is unmarked. On the basis of such universal tendencies, it is not a surprise to find the animals categorized with the human males. However, all this is

speculation. Dixon (was unable to find any evidence that category I is unmarked relative to category II. It may be, but there is at present no positive evidence

Dixon did not want to speculate beyond his evidence, so he listed human males and animals as equally basic members of class I.

According to his analysis, bats are no more central to this category than are boys. This is, at least in principle, a testable matter. If I had to make a bet (a small bet. I would bet that boys are more central than bats. (pp. 98-102)

Desde la *PFO*, resulta importante destacar que en este caso, como parte de la *transición propiamente dicha*, hallamos al enunciador en todo su esplendor: es decir, no solamente marca su presencia al utilizar “It” como elemento funcional para indicar que él está por presentar un *escenario abstracto* en el que acontecen ciertas actividades llevadas a cabo por ciertos *participantes*, y la posibilidad de que en dicho escenario tengan lugar ciertos acontecimientos está modalizada por el predicado modal “seem”, sino que además – por medio de la frase preposicional “to me”– el enunciador se posiciona como sujeto *conceptualizador* manifiesto.

En relación a la *conceptualización* y *materialización* de este *perfilamiento*, según Langacker (1995), los predicados como “seem” (también “appear”, “tend”, “occur”, entre varios otros) hacen referencia pura y exclusivamente al *proceso* en sí mismo, modalizándolo, a saber, estableciendo cierto grado de probabilidad de que el *proceso* acontezca. En este tipo de situaciones, el *conceptualizador* (“conceptualizer”) está construido subjetivamente –es decir, fuera del escenario planteado por el *proceso* concreto en cuestión– y en forma genérica o generalizada, y por ende, no habría justificación alguna para que dicho *participante* sea el más saliente en este tipo de *perfilamiento*.<sup>23</sup>

Esto explica el porqué de la posibilidad de que predicados tales como “seem” no impongan restricciones en cuanto a los tipos de sujetos que pueden aceptar. Como ya mencionamos anteriormente, a esta capacidad de este tipo de predicados de poder tener en la posición de sujeto (y por ende, como “trajector”) cualquier tipo de sujeto Langacker (1995) la llama *transparencia*.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> En este caso particular, el *conceptualizador* sí se hace presente explícitamente, lo cual hace que la construcción sea más marcada. Ese es el caso de este ejemplo en particular.

<sup>24</sup> Nos parece relevante aclarar que el objetivo de Langacker (1995) en el trabajo que hemos tomado como punto de partida de este análisis de los *perfilamientos* del predicado “seem” a) y b) es desafiar la división tajante entre los predicados de *ascenso* (del tipo de “expect”), según la gramática generativa chomskiana, y los predicados de *control* (del tipo de “persuade”). Lo que él demuestra con esta minuciosa explicación es que lejos de pertenecer a grupos distintos de verbos, los mismos se hallan en puntos diferentes en un continuum. Los primeros muestran *transparencia*, es decir aceptan

El concepto de *trasparencia* de dicho lingüista está íntimamente relacionado con las nociones de *zona activa* y *discrepancia de perfilamiento*, que han sido presentadas y desarrolladas en el Capítulo 2.

Ahora bien, ¿de qué nos valemos en este caso particular para hipotetizar que al recurrir al *perfilamiento* b) el enunciador –en nuestro corpus George Lakoff– pretende no comprometerse el cien por ciento con el valor de verdad de la cláusula finita complemento de “seem”?

En primer lugar, cabe decir que lo que analiza Lakoff en el apartado de donde tomamos este caso lleva el título “Some speculations,” lo cual nos pone en alerta: no hay razones fehacientes para tomar lo allí planteado y desarrollado como conocimiento teórico unívoco o certero. Todo lo contrario.

Y este hecho es indicado por medio de varios y variados recursos lingüísticos que despliega el enunciador para reafirmar su postura respecto del contenido proposicional de la información que está presentando. Algunos de estos recursos son:

- ✓ La *cadena léxica* conformada por seis repeticiones del ítem léxico “speculation” comienza en el título mismo del apartado “Some speculations”, pasando por las siguientes repeticiones léxicas: “some speculations”, “this speculation”, “the speculation”, “idle speculation”, y por último “speculation”.
- ✓ *Predicados verbales* que indican de alguna manera *modalizaciones* en términos *epistémicos* –y por ende no asertivos– por medio de los cuales se presenta cierta información.

Uno de ellos es “suggest” en los siguientes contextos:

- “what we have done is *suggest* that the *domain-of-experience* principle is responsible for fire being in the same category as women.”
- “This analysis *suggests* that fighting spears, stinging nettles, garfish, and matches should be less central members of category II than girls.”
- “The analysis I *suggest* has as a consequence that the central subcategory -human females- would be the last to go.”
- “Under the analysis I *am suggesting*, human males and females would be central

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cualquier tipo de sujeto, los segundos imponen restricciones en el tipo de sujeto que puede ser “*trajector*” (por ejemplo, el sujeto de un verbo como “persuade” ha de ser un ente con volición, capaz de persuadir a otro ente racional y volitivo) Dicho razonamiento hemos tomado en consideración para poder dar cuenta de la posibilidad de recurrir a “It” en la estructura bajo análisis.

members of categories I and II, which would place these categories in a minimal contrast.”

También en la siguiente emisión hallamos el nominal “suggestion”: “But before I do, I would like to make a *suggestion* concerning Dixon's principles.”

Por último, el mismo escritor pone de manifiesto explícitamente que lo que él ha hecho a lo largo del apartado bajo análisis es una mera especulación de la investigación de la lengua Dyrbal realizada por otro lingüista –Dixon. En palabras de Lakoff: “It should be borne in mind that these are speculations of an outside analyst.”

#### 4.21 Propositional ICMs

By a *propositional* ICM, I mean one that does not use *imaginative devices*, i.e., metaphor, metonymy, or mental imagery. Each ICM has an *ontology* and a *structure*. The ontology is the set of elements used in the ICM. The structure consists of the properties of the elements and the relations obtaining among the elements. The elements in the ontology may be either basic-level concepts – entities, actions, states, properties, etc.– or they may be concepts characterized by cognitive models of other types.

*Propositional models* have an objectivist flavor to them, since they contain entities, with their properties and the relations holding among them. It must be recalled, however, that they are *cognitive* models, not slices of reality. The "entities" are mental entities, not real things. I believe that the common tendency to view the world in objectivist terms comes from the fact that many of our cognitive models are objectivist in this limited respect. **It seems to me** that when we understand our experience by projecting propositional models onto it, we are imposing an objectivist structure on the world. (p.285)

Nuestro análisis del ejemplo 4.20 de la *Escala de Presentación* desde las perspectivas del *Enfoque Cognitivo Prototípico* de Ronald Langacker y desde la *PFO* de Jan Firbas aplica de exacta manera para este caso.

Ahora bien, ¿qué indicios y qué conocimiento previo del mundo debemos contemplar para poder sustentar nuestra hipótesis de que hay en este contexto una pretensión por parte del enunciador de apartarse del compromiso con la veracidad del contenido proposicional de la cláusula declarativa finita complemento del predicado “seem”?

Una de las batallas que se propone librar el enunciador George Lakoff en su libro *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things* de 1987 es mostrar que la teoría objetivista clásica –que estaba en vigencia por esos años y contaba con una larga y prestigiosa trayectoria– acerca de la *categorización* del mundo en términos de condiciones suficientes y necesarias era errónea.

A lo largo de todo su libro, Lakoff presenta pruebas que recoge de varios experimentos científicos llevados a cabo dentro de la –por aquel entonces– incipiente corriente científica que se denominó *Ciencias Cognitivas*. Desde varias disciplinas que trabajaban mancomunadamente nutriéndose del aporte de todas y cada una de ellas se pudo probar, por ejemplo, que en vez de *condiciones necesarias y suficientes* los seres humanos categorizamos los objetos del mundo que nos rodea basándonos en características prototípicas de dichos objetos, y partiendo siempre de un *nivel básico de categoría* (“basic-level category”).

Resulta que de estos experimentos e ideas que empezaban a aparecer y tomaban fuerza a medida que más y más estudiosos e investigadores comenzaban a interesarse por estos otros aspectos de la *categorización* surgen una serie de trabajos de investigación que proponían una alternativa “en contra de” toda una larga tradición filosófica que, como tal, marcó el rumbo de los estudios del lenguaje durante más de doscientos años.

Para dicha tradición no sólo el “rational thought consists in the manipulation of abstract symbols,” sino también “such symbols get their meaning via correspondences with the world.” (Lakoff, 1987, Prefacio, p. XII)

Según Lakoff, desde la teoría clásica, el mundo está construido objetivamente, independiente de la comprensión de cualquier organismo. El racionalismo se percibe en la presunción más radical que clama que todo pensamiento racional se basa en la manipulación de símbolos abstractos a los que se les atribuye un significado por medio de correspondencias convencionales con los objetos del mundo exterior.

Ya en el mismo prefacio de su *Women Fire and Dangerous Things*, Lakoff confecciona una lista no exhaustiva de las singularidades de esta teoría (Lakoff, 1987, prefacio, pp. XII y XIII). De cada una de dichas particularidades se ocupa, intentando probar las vicisitudes y falencias de dicha teoría.

Por tanto, creemos que cuando, en el apartado que estamos analizando, Lakoff recurre al *perfilamiento* b) del predicado “seem” para comunicar que “when we understand our experience by projecting propositional models onto it, we are imposing an objectivist structure on the world”, dicha elección no constituye una mera coincidencia o algo azaroso, sino más bien tiene que ver con el objetivo comunicativo de apartarse de la responsabilidad de su postura polémica.

Enfatizamos el hecho de que resguardarse detrás del este *perfilamiento* b) – aún habiéndose manifestado él mismo explícitamente mediante la frase preposicional “to me”– es una estrategia comunicativa eficaz que pareciera estar en consonancia, no solamente con el *contexto inmediatamente relevante*, sino –y sobre todo– con los *contextos de situación y de cultura*.

#### 4.22 Anger, Lust, and Rape

We have shown that an emotion, anger, has a conceptual structure, and we have investigated various aspects of it. A deeper question now arises: How do such conceptual structures affect how we live our lives? To get some idea of how the emotional concepts function in our culture, let us consider an issue that has enormous social importance, but which most people would rather not think about: rape.

Not all cultures have a high incidence of rape. In some cultures, rape is virtually unknown. The high incidence of rape in America undoubtedly has many complex causes. I would like to suggest that the way we conceptualize lust and anger, together with our various folk theories of sexuality, may be a contributing factor.

Let us begin with an examination of our concept of lust. It is commonly thought that lust, as a sexual urge, is devoid of cognitive content and that there is not much to say about how lust, OR sexual desire, is understood. On the contrary, lust is a complex concept which is understood via a system of conceptual metaphors. Here are some examples that Zoltan Kövecses and I have discovered:

[...]

A particularly important fact about the collection of metaphors used to understand lust in our culture is that their source domains overlap considerably with the source domains of metaphors for anger. As we saw above, anger in America is understood in terms of HEAT, FIRE, WILD ANIMALS and INSANITY as well as a reaction to an external force.

[...]

One might suggest that these conceptual metaphors provide ways of passively understanding and talking about lust, but no more than that. What I would like to show is that, at the very least, it is possible for them to enter into reasoning. For this purpose, I will look in detail at the reasoning in a passage from Timothy Beneke's collection of interviews, *Men on Rape* (1982). The analysis of the passage was done jointly with Mark Johnson.

[...]

Here the overlap between lust and anger is even stronger. Our concept of anger carries with it the concept of revenge, as well as the idea of insane, heated, animal behavior. **In** this particular logic of rape, lust and anger go hand-in-hand.

In giving the overall logic of the passage, we have made explicit only *some* of the implicit metaphors and folk theories necessary to understand it. Little, if any, of this is explicit, and we are not claiming that we have presented anything like a conscious chain of deduction that the speaker has followed. Rather, we have tried to show the logic and structure that unconsciously lies behind the reality the speaker takes for granted.

There is an important, and somewhat frightening, sense in which his reality is ours as well. We may personally find his views despicable, but it is frightening how easy they are to make sense of. The reason that they seem to be so easily understood is that most, if not all, of them are deeply ingrained in American culture. All of the metaphors and folk theories we have discussed occur again and again in one form or another throughout Beneke's interviews. Moreover, **it seems** that these metaphors and folk theories are largely held by women as well as men. As Beneke's interviews indicate, women on juries in rape trials regularly view rape victims who were attractively dressed as "asking for it" or bringing it upon themselves and therefore deserving of their fate. Such women jurors are using the kind of reasoning we saw in the passage above.

Of course, not everyone's sense of reality is structured in terms of *all* the above metaphors and folk theories. And even if it were, not everyone would put them in the way outlined above. Nor does it follow that someone with such a sense of reality would act on it, as the speaker supposedly has not. What the analysis of the passage does seem to show is that American culture contains within it a sufficient stock of fairly common metaphors and folk theories which, when put together in the way outlined above, can actually provide what could be viewed as a "rationale" for rape. Furthermore, if these metaphors and folk theories were not readily available to us for use in understanding—that is, if they were not ours in some sense—the passage would be simply incomprehensible to us.

The metaphorical expressions that we use to describe lust are not mere words. They are expressions of metaphorical concepts that we use to understand lust and to reason about it. What I find sad is that we appear to have no metaphors for a healthy mutual lust. The domains we use for comprehending lust are HUNGER, ANIMALS, HEAT, INSANITY, MACHINES, GAMES, WAR, and PHYSICAL FORCES. (pp. 414-415)

Desde el punto de vista de la *PFO*, este caso se diferencia de los casos 4.20 y 4.21 en relación a dos aspectos muy particulares: en primer lugar, entre los elementos que se despliegan para conformar el *perfilamiento* b) en cuestión, se halla la conjunción coordinante copulativa “Moreover”, por medio de la cual el enunciador agrega su último argumento importante —extremadamente controversial y discutible. A estas conjunciones los



lingüistas de la *Escuela Lingüística de Praga* las llaman *transiciones*.

Por otra lado, una vez introducido “It”, que es el elemento con mayor grado de obviedad contextual de esta emisión, la *transición propiamente dicha* está constituida solamente por “seems”, con todas sus marcas de *Tiempo, Persona y Número*, empero no aparece esta vez el escritor introducido por la frase preposicional “to me”. Este hecho tiene una considerable repercusión a nivel cognitivo, debido a que el *conceptualizador* del *proceso* en cuestión no se hace presente en el *escenario*.

Estos dos datos –la presencia de “Moreover” como un elemento de *transición*, y la ausencia de “to me” que introduce al *conceptualizador* en escena– también corresponden a estrategias discursivas que de manera inconsciente (O NO) pone a funcionar el emisor para cumplir con sus cometidos comunicativos.

En este extenso apartado, que lleva el título “Anger, Lust, and Rape”, Lakoff pretende mostrar que en la lógica de la situación particular de las violaciones, las emociones de lujuria y enojo comparten varios de los *Dominios Fuentes* y, en muchos casos, estos dominios se superponen unos con otros.

Por ejemplo –menciona Lakoff (1987) en las páginas 411 y 412– “anger in America is understood in terms of HEAT, FIRE, WILD ANIMALS and INSANITY, as well as a reaction to an external force. Just as one can have *smoldering sexuality*, one can have *smoldering anger*. One can be *consumed with desire* and *consumed with anger*. One can be *insane with lust* and *insane with anger*. Your lust, as well as your anger, *can get out of hand*.”

Y agrega: “I believe that the connection between our conception of lust and our conception of anger is by no means accidental and has important social consequences.”

Con el objetivo de brindar sustento a esta hipótesis, Lakoff y Johnson (1980) llevan a cabo un estudio exhaustivo y muy fructífero dentro de las *Ciencias Cognitivas* en base a entrevistas realizadas por el periodista estadounidense Tymothy Beneke. Más en particular, estos lingüistas cognitivistas estudiaron relatos de violadores y, si bien no hallaron elementos explícitos en las líneas de pensamiento y asociación de los eventos narrados, sí pudieron rastrear y luego poner de manifiesto las cadenas de significados que subyacen a este tipo de relato y que forman parte del cúmulo de *metáforas* y *teorías folk* en relación el acto de violación en sí mismo y al momento previo a la consumación del acto que lleva al victimario a realizar semejante acto. Lo que Lakoff y Johnson tratan de probar en este

estudio de investigación es que las emociones asociadas a la lujuria y al miedo se superponen y se plasman de alguna u otra manera en el discurso hallado en dichos relatos.

Hacia el final del apartado –y habiendo ya desarrollado el análisis minucioso del relato en cuestión y presentado varios argumentos a favor de dicho análisis– Lakoff asevera lo siguiente: “Moreover, it seems that these metaphors and folk theories are largely held by women as well as men,” conclusión delicada, que necesita ser sustentada correctamente por el peso que tiene como tal.

Con todo: ¿De qué manera pergeña esta argumentación el enunciador? Recurriendo al *perfilamiento* b) para introducirla en el discurso del texto bajo análisis.

Esta postura es muy difícil de sostener ya que la misma tiene como implicatura que la mujer –que es siempre la víctima–, al igual que el hombre –que es el que infringe su fuerza física sobre su víctima con el objetivo único de satisfacer su deseo sexual– es también portadora de estas *metáforas* y *teorías folk* en relación con las violaciones y las emociones de lujuria y enojo.

Asimismo, el enunciador intenta sustentar su punto de vista proveyendo ejemplos concretos citados por otras fuentes que claman lo siguiente: “Women on juries in rape trials regularly view rape victims who were attractively dressed as ‘asking for it’ or bringing it upon themselves and therefore deserving of their fate. Such women jurors are using the kind of reasoning we saw in the passage above.”

Sin embargo, lo más interesante y llamativo de este extenso texto es que hacia el final del mismo el escritor recurre al *perfilamiento* a), de manera tal que podemos establecer un análisis contrastivo entre dicho *perfilamiento* y el recién descripto.

Retomando el hilo de nuestra visión del fenómeno, recordemos que nuestra propuesta es que toda vez que un emisor/enunciador utiliza el *perfilamiento* b) para proyectar algún tipo de mensaje, lo hace con el fin comunicativo de hacer avanzar rápidamente el flujo de la información hacia delante, como para que el lector recorra velozmente el TEMA, la *transición propiamente dicha* y luego halle la información nueva. Además, también proponemos que el recurso al *perfilamiento* b) se relaciona con la voluntad o necesidad del escritor de apartarse de la responsabilidad con el valor de verdad de la idea desplegada en la cláusula finita que –si bien tiene la distribución sintáctica de complemento del predicado “seem”, es decir se halla inmediatamente luego de dicho predicado en el orden lineal de la emisión– esta idea es en definitiva el *sujeto nocional* de la emisión en su totalidad. La misma no puede ocupar la posición canónica de sujeto en inglés, dígame precediendo al predicado verbal “seem”, y, por ser el inglés una lengua pobre en su sistema de flexión verbal, no admite sujetos tácitos. Es por dicha razón que los usuarios del inglés

recurren al expletivo/ *tema eterno* “It”, que según las gramáticas tradicionales es un mero elemento gramatical que cumple esta función: la de permitir que la oración sea gramatical.<sup>25</sup> Empero, como hemos ido mostrando a lo largo de este trabajo, “It” no es un simple elemento que meramente cumple la función sintáctica de concordar en los rasgos de *Persona* y *Número* con el predicado.

Debemos agregar también que en este tipo de *perfilamiento* no hay ningún *participante* dentro del *proceso* expresado en la cláusula declarativa finita que sea más saliente que los demás.

El *perfilamiento* a) es el más frecuente de los dos, por un elevado porcentaje. Creemos nosotros que dicha divergencia en cuanto a la frecuencia de uso de estas formas lingüísticas radica en el hecho de que el emisor/escritor, siempre que el contexto de situación se lo permita, se compromete cien por ciento con el contenido proposicional de las ideas que menciona o comunica. Por ende, elige y pone en la posición de sujeto/”trajector” –y por ende *tema*, el elemento más saliente del *proceso* en cuestión. Dicho *participante* –cuyo papel temático varía de acuerdo al *proceso*, y el mismo puede ser *agente*, *experimentante*, *fuerza*, e incluso *tema* – además está muy ligado al *contexto inmediatamente relevante*, es decir al texto que antecede y que le sigue al predicado “seem”.

El resultado de este orden lineal –que insistimos no es azaroso ni arbitrario– responde a *procesos cognitivos* y cometidos comunicativos de los que ya hemos dado cuenta anteriormente. Dicho despliegue de piezas léxicas crea un contexto de *Carencia/ Completitud* que se corresponde con ámbitos donde se encuentran elementos con *Alto Grado de Cohesión Discursiva*. Estos elementos, que se hallan fuertemente y ostensiblemente ligados al *contexto inmediatamente relevante*, y por eso son altamente cohesivos, son también muy dinámicos comunicativamente hablando.

No obstante esto, podemos observar varios aspectos en los que hemos de detenernos y prestarles particular atención.

El caso en cuestión es el siguiente: “What the analysis of the passage does seem to show is that American culture contains within it a sufficient stock of fairly common metaphors and

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<sup>25</sup> Por ejemplo, Quirk et. al. en su *A Comprehensive Grammar of English* (1985, p. 89) asevera lo siguiente: “The role of the anticipatory pronoun it in is essentially a structural one in the sense that **it carries virtually no information in itself**, but merely supplies the structural requirement for an initial subject. (Its semantic function, in so far as it has one, is merely to signal that the content of the subject is expressed in a later position in the same sentence.” (El resaltado es nuestro)

folk theories which, when put together in the way outlined above, can actually provide what could be viewed as a "rationale" for rape.”

Podemos apreciar en este último caso del *perfilamiento* a) mayor compromiso con el valor de verdad del mensaje proyectado. Dicho compromiso es señalado por medio de tres recursos lingüísticos valiosísimos característicos del medio escrito que le permiten a un usuario del idioma inglés hacer foco en ciertos trozos de información –recursos poco frecuentes en la oralidad, donde la prosodia es la responsable de suplir dicha necesidad discursivo-comunicativa.

Dichos recursos son la estructura *pseudo-escindida*, el auxiliar “do” –que en contextos afirmativos en inglés es usado solamente para indicar cierto énfasis– y el propio *perfilamiento* a), que –como ya planteamos anteriormente– involucra al *conceptualizador* del evento en cuestión desde una postura más comprometida con el valor de verdad de las ideas expuestas.

La pregunta que cabe hacernos es ¿qué dicen las gramáticas tradicionales acerca de estos recursos lingüísticos que nos permiten respaldar nuestra postura de que en este contexto comunicativo particular nos hallamos ante un contexto discursivo muy marcado y de alto compromiso con la emisión?

Quirk *et. al*, en su *A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language*, incluyen un apartado en el que presentan estructuras del tipo de las cláusulas *pseudo-escindidas* de la siguiente forma: “We now turn to devices for giving prominence [...] by more elaborate grammatical means, involving the division of sentences into two clauses, each with its own verb.”

Entre los ejemplos de este tipo de estructuras se halla la que transcribimos a continuación:

*What I shall ignore is his callousness.*

Por medio de este tipo de estructuras, el usuario de la lengua hace explícito aquello en lo que quiere que su interlocutor focalice su atención. De la misma manera, este tipo de estructuras crean el contexto lingüístico propicio para introducir el *climax* introducido recién en la cláusula en la posición de complemento del verbo copula “be”. (Quirk *et. al*, 1985, pp 1383-1384)

Por otra parte, el apartado en el que se desarrolla el tema de los auxiliares enfáticos tales como “do” en contextos afirmativos se denomina “Emphatic positive,” y la descripción de los mismos es hecha en los siguientes términos: “the use of the OPERATOR is to deny a negative which has been stated or implied.” (Quirk *et. al*, 1985, p. 124)

En nuestro caso, previo al momento en el que se presenta en el discurso el *perfilamiento* a), se hallan dos emisiones con valor negativo explícito:

- “Of course, **not** everyone's sense of reality is structured in terms of *all* the above metaphors and folk theories.”
- “And even if it were, **not** everyone would put them in the way outlined above. **Nor does** it follow that someone with such a sense of reality would act on it, as the speaker supposedly has not.”

Es en este contexto discursivo particular donde mejor se puede apreciar el contraste entre los *perfilamientos* a) y b) en los que el predicado “seem” es el protagonista.

Observemos el ejemplo a continuación:

4.23 The names that we have given to image schemas, and to image-schema transformations, are very much in keeping with the kind of symbolization that might be used in studies of computer vision. But the names are not the things named. This is shown by the naturalness of image-schema transformations relative to visual experience, as opposed to the arbitrariness of the names for those transformations. **It seems to me** that image-schema transformations are cognitively real; the pervasiveness of the kinds of relationships between senses of lexical items that those transformations characterize is a strong indicator of their cognitive reality. And the naturalness of these transformations relative to our visual experience suggests that image-schema transformations and the schemas they relate are not propositional in character (in the sense of the term used in computer vision studies). Rather, they are truly imagistic in character. (p. 444)

“The Nature of Image-Schema Transformations” es el título que lleva el apartado dentro del cual se halla el caso 4.23 (es decir el cuarto de la *Escala de Presentación*) en un Contexto de *Carencia/Completitud* del tipo *Presentatividad*.

Como lo hace a lo largo de todo el libro *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things* (1987), en este apartado especialmente, Lakoff polemiza con una corriente teórica en *Lingüística* que sostiene que la naturaleza de las transformaciones de los *Esquemas de Imágenes* son arbitrarias y que se parte de símbolos abstractos capaces de ser leídos o “interpretados” por una computadora.

Dichas teorías computacionales de la mente defienden la idea de que las escenas visuales pueden ser representadas por medio de símbolos interconectados en forma de red. Tanto los símbolos como las redes son arbitrarios. Del mismo modo, dichos símbolos y redes han de ser manipulados e interpretados de manera proposicional.

Es con esta postura arraigada en la *Lingüística* como ciencia formal-teórica con las que

Lakoff disiente y de las que este estudioso intenta distanciarse proveyendo argumentos contundentes que sustentan su visión del fenómeno desde otro ángulo totalmente diferente.

En dicha línea de investigación teórico-formal, se encuentra la llevada a cabo por Zenon Pylyshyn y colegas, sobre todo centrada en la visión. Dicho programa se conoce con el nombre de “FINST” o “Visual Indexing Theory”, la cual hipotetiza que existe un mecanismo preconceptual por medio del cual los objetos en una escena visual pueden ser identificados, rastreados y nombrados gracias a procesos cognitivos previos a la codificación, es decir, antes de que tengamos palabras para poder nombrarlos.<sup>26</sup>

Con todo, al momento de expresar dicho posicionamiento, Lakoff recurre al *perfilamiento* b) del predicado “seem”, el cual –como venimos hipotetizando– le permite además de hacer avanzar el mensaje hacia la meta comunicativa que está en el predicado, le habilita a distanciarse del valor de verdad de la proposición proyectada por la cláusula finita complemento de “seem”.

Nos parece un dato no menor el hecho de que –una vez más, como en los casos anteriores– el enunciador se vea “obligado” o “forzado” a respaldar fuertemente su posicionamiento respecto del tema de la interpretación y manipulación de los símbolos que captamos por medio del sentido de la visión, y en este caso lo hace aludiendo a dos hechos concretos que los presenta a modo de argumentos a su favor.

Inmediatamente después del *perfilamiento* b) bajo análisis, Lakoff presenta lo que interpretamos como su demostración de que los hechos son como él mismo los plantea:

-“the pervasiveness of the kinds of relationships between senses of lexical items that those transformations characterize is a strong indicator of their cognitive reality.”

-“And the naturalness of these transformations relative to our visual experience suggests that image-schema transformations and the schemas they relate are not propositional in character (in the sense of the term used in computer vision studies). Rather, they are truly imagistic in character.”

Dichos argumentos parecen ser irrefutables desde su teoría cognitivista, sustentada por experimentos empíricos y teóricos.

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<sup>26</sup> Con el fin de recabar información acerca de este programa de investigación consultamos el sitio web <https://ruccs.rutgers.edu/zenon>, el día 22 de julio.

Analicemos los ejemplos que siguen:

#### 4.24 y 4.25 The Kinesthetic Nature of Mental Imagery

Mental imagery, as we pointed out above, is not merely visual. And image schemas are kinesthetic in nature, that is, they have to do with the sense of spatial locations, movement, shape, etc., independent of any particular sensory modality. Evidence for this comes from mental imagery experiments conducted with congenitally blind people. Experiments of the sort done by Shepard, Kosslyn, and their co-workers have been replicated with the congenitally blind. The principal experiments have been reported on in Marmor and Zaback (1976), Carpenter and Eisenberg (1978), Zimler and Keenan (1983), and Kerr (1983). The basic result is this: When mental imagery experiments are run with the congenitally blind using touch instead of vision, the results are virtually the same as for sighted persons, except that people who can see perform the tasks faster.

Among the tasks used in these experiments were mental rotation and scanning tasks, both of which involve not just static images but continuous motion. **It seems to me** that the appropriate conclusion to draw from these experiments is that much of mental imagery is kinesthetic –that is, it is independent of sensory modality and concerns awareness of many aspects of functioning in space: orientation, motion, balance, shape judgments, etc. This includes image schemas, which are sufficiently general in character to be prime candidates for having a kinesthetic nature. If richer, more detailed images have been shown to be kinesthetic, then **it would seem** that schematic images could be kinesthetic as well. (p. 446)

El apartado en el cual se hallan los casos 4.24 y 4.25 del *perfilamiento* b) del predicado verbal “seem” se titula “The Kinesthetic Nature of Mental Imagery”, el cual –a su vez– se encuentra dentro de otro gran apartado que se denomina “Case Study 2.”

Nos resulta algo llamativo el hecho de que la mayoría de los casos de la *Escala de Presentación* se desplieguen hacia el final del libro *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things*, aunque quizás no debería sorprendernos que el escritor quiera, por un lado, brindarle signos explícitos a sus lectores de que para hallar lo novedoso de su mensaje, ellos han de continuar leyendo, sino también que dicho escritor quiera desligarse del compromiso con el valor de verdad de los mensajes proyectados en las cláusulas finitas que se distribuyen sintácticamente como complementos de los predicados “seem” bajo análisis. Esto ocurre sobre todo si –como lo hemos hecho en cada uno de los casos– profundizamos en aquellos aspectos del *contexto de situación* y *cultura* que pueden haber llevado al escritor a recurrir a este perfilamiento para cumplir con sus objetivos comunicativos.

Si nuestro razonamiento es correcto, cuánto más dificultoso es el probar una postura acerca de un tema controversial y/o polémico, más aumentan las chances de que el enunciador se valga del *perfilamiento* b) para introducir dicha postura en el discurso. Es esperable también

–como hemos visto en los análisis anteriores– que inmediatamente luego de dicha emisión, Lakoff despliegue una serie de argumentos de peso que le sirven de sustento de su postura.

Transcribimos a continuación, los casos 4.24 y 4.25:

“**It seems to me** that the appropriate conclusion to draw from these experiments is that much of mental imagery is kinesthetic –that is, it is independent of sensory modality and concerns awareness of many aspects of functioning in space: orientation, motion, balance, shape judgments, etc.”

–“If richer, more detailed images have been shown to be kinesthetic, then **it would seem** that schematic images could be kinesthetic as well.”

En estos dos ejemplos, lo que Lakoff intenta probar es que la *imaginería mental* es kinestésica y está mediada por la relación del cuerpo en su totalidad con el espacio y el tiempo –no constituye la *visión* el único medio por el cual aprehendemos el mundo que nos rodea.

Por el contrario, como muestran los resultados de un experimento que se realizó con personas no videntes de nacimiento y personas que sí poseen el sentido de la vista intacto, las diferencias entre estos grupos radicó en el hecho de que los segundos lograron cumplimentar las tareas propuestas en menor tiempo que los primeros.

Las conclusiones a las que se arribaron una vez culminado este experimento le sirven a Lakoff para reafirmar la siguiente postura: “As a cognitive linguist, I am mainly interested in that aspect of cognition that is unconscious, automatic, and apparently effort-free and independent of skill. Language has this character, as does everyday commonsense reasoning.”

Además de observar la manera cómo el *perfilamiento* b) le permite a Lakoff avanzar velozmente en el devenir discursivo del texto bajo análisis, la revisión en profundidad de estos casos nos permite corroborar el hecho de que es crucial estudiar la lengua considerando tanto el *contexto de situación*, como el de *cultura*.

Para cerrar este apartado, nos valemos de las siguientes palabras del lingüista sistémico-funcionalista Michael Halliday halladas en su libro *Halliday's Introduction to Systemic Functional Linguistics* de 2004: “The contextual potential of a community is its culture – what we call the **context of culture**, context, language and other semiotic systems following Malinowski. The context of culture is what the members of a community can mean in cultural terms; that is, we interpret culture as a system of higher-level meanings.” (Halliday, p. 33)



## 4.2.2 Escala de Calidad

### 4.2.2.1 Contexto de Carencia/ Completitud: *Alto Grado de Cohesión Discursiva*

A lo largo del desarrollo del análisis de nuestro corpus<sup>27</sup> percibimos que la gran mayoría de los casos bajo análisis correspondía al *perfilamiento* a) del predicado modal “seem” (“Syntax seems not to be all about algorithms”). A su vez, en tales casos observamos un elevado número de emisiones cuyo sujeto correspondía a un elemento altamente cohesivo a nivel discursivo.

Con el objetivo de dar cuenta del tipo de relación semántica que se establece en dichos contextos, hemos recurrido al valioso libro *Cohesion in English* de los lingüistas sistémico-funcionalistas Michael Halliday y Ruqaiya Hasan de 1976.

Cuando seleccionamos conscientemente –y no azarosamente– los marcos teóricos de la *Lingüística Cognitiva* de Ronald Langacker y el de la *Perspectiva Funcional de la Oración* de los lingüistas de Praga para estudiar un corpus de lengua en uso, vislumbramos en aquel entonces la necesidad de recurrir a otra perspectiva funcionalista y discursiva que nos aportara herramientas específicas que nos permitieran clasificar los elementos lingüísticos que se encargan de otorgarle *textura* a un texto, entendido éste como una unidad lingüística de significado que “funciona como una unidad en relación a su *ambiente* (‘environment’).” (Halliday y Hasan, 1976, p. 2)

Así mismo, incorporar los conceptos básicos de Halliday y Hasan que hallamos en el libro recién mencionado no nos resultó una tarea costosa –y mucho menos obstaculizante –ya que en definitiva dichos lingüistas sostienen y defienden una mirada funcional de la lengua que está en consonancia con la sostenida por las antes mencionadas aproximaciones lingüísticas teóricas.

Por otra parte, Borzi (1998) afirma que el texto es un *proceso* que consta de un *inicio*, un *medio* y un *fin*. Así también Halliday y Hasan aseveran que la lengua en general (y la *cohesión* en particular) es también un *proceso*, en el sentido de que la misma puede ser vista como la *instanciación* de las relaciones cohesivas entre ciertos elementos lingüísticos que tiene a su disposición un usuario de la lengua, y que él mismo despliega en un texto en

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<sup>27</sup> Recordemos que el corpus está constituido por cincuenta extractos más o menos extensos tomados del libro *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things* del lingüista cognitivista George Lakoff del año 1986.

tiempo real y de manera lineal. Por esta razón, los dos elementos que entran en esta relación se hallan siempre uno seguido del otro.<sup>28</sup>

Recordemos además que –según Halliday y Hasan– la *cohesión* “es un concepto semántico que hace referencia a las relaciones de significado dentro de un texto. Dichas relaciones son las que definen un texto como tal.” ( Halliday y Hasan, 1976, p.4)

Y agregan en la misma página: “la *cohesión* existe donde hay un elemento en el discurso cuya *interpretación* depende de otro elemento: uno presupone al otro.”

Estas relaciones cohesivas pueden ser de varios tipos:

1. **Referencia**
2. **Substitución**
3. **Elipsis**
4. **Conjunción**
5. **Cohesión Léxica**

De todas estas herramientas para construir textos, las que nos han resultado útiles a nuestros fines han sido la 1, la 4 y la 5. Las mismas son desarrolladas y ejemplificadas en los capítulos del libro *Cohesion in English* de manera minuciosa, por medio de la ejemplificación y la consecuente explicación.

Agruparemos los contextos de *Carencia/Compleitud* definidos por elementos de Alto Grado de Cohesión Discursiva recurriendo a dichas categorías lingüísticas.

En cuanto a la *PFO* lo que hemos visto es que cada vez que el emisor recurre a una emisión cuyo predicado es el verbo modal “seem” y la misma inicia con uno de estos elementos cohesivos, los mismos –al estar fuertemente ligados al *contexto inmediatamente relevante*– invitan al receptor a avanzar rápidamente hacia la meta comunicativa, que es la *información nueva* que se halla en la cláusula no finita complemento del predicado en cuestión.

Nos parece de particular relevancia mencionar el hecho de que estos elementos, que –insistimos– son altamente cohesivos a nivel del discurso, funcionan como una especie de trampolín que catapultan al receptor del mensaje del inicio del mismo pasando rápidamente por la *transición propiamente dicha* y directamente hacia la *cuálidad*, que es la *información nueva* que se encuentra en el *rema*. En todos estos contextos, la *Carencia* es subsanada una

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<sup>28</sup> Nos parece interesante mencionar al pasar que para Halliday (1976) la *anáfora* es la forma no marcada dentro de una relación cohesiva, y la *catáfora* es la forma marcada, ya que la misma ha de ser explícitamente destacada, en cambio la primera, no.

vez que el que recibe el mensaje completa la información que precisa para culminar el *proceso comunicativo*.

No está de más recordar que en este *Contexto de Carencia* la *Escala* que se pone de manifiesto es la de *Cualidad*, en la que el orden lineal de los ítems léxicos se despliega de esta forma: primero hallamos un *acarreador de una cualidad*, luego está “seem” –que constituye la *transición propiamente dicha*, y es por ende el elemento que indica que se le *adscribirá* una *cualidad* a un *nominal* o a un *pronombre/ determinante*– y por último la *cualidad*, que es en sí misma manifestada por la semi-cláusula no finita complemento de “seem” en esta configuración.

Resaltaremos en **negrita** las *cadena cohesivas* (“cohesive ties”) que se establecen entre el sujeto/ “trajector” de los *perfilamientos* de “seem” que estamos analizando y aquellos elementos que se hallan en el *contexto inmediatamente relevante* del texto en cuestión. Es preciso aclarar que lo que en definitiva nos interesa es la *relación cohesiva* entre el sujeto/ “trajector” en cuestión y los elementos que le anteceden en el discurso, ya que, lo que en última instancia queremos probar es que al momento de introducción de dicho sujeto en el discurso, el mismo está “in play” por haber sido introducido previamente. Es por dicho motivo que el mismo se convierte en el elemento más dinámico discursivamente hablando.

#### 4.2.2.2 Referencia

Analicemos los ejemplos a continuación:

4.26 This book attempts to bring together some of the evidence for the view that reason is embodied and imaginative –in particular, the evidence that comes from the study of the way people categorize. Conceptual systems are organized in terms of categories, and most, if not all of our thought involves those categories. The objectivist view rests on a theory of categories that goes back to the ancient Greeks and that even today is taken for granted as being not merely true, but obviously and unquestionably true. Yet **contemporary studies of the way human beings actually categorize things** suggest that categorization is a rather different and more complex matter.

What is most interesting to me about **these studies** is that **they seem** to provide evidence for the experientialist view of human reason and against the objectivist view. Taken one by one, such studies are things only scholars could care about, but taken as a whole, they have something magnificent about them: evidence that the mind is more than a mere mirror of nature or a processor of symbols, that it is not incidental to the mind that we have bodies, and that the capacity for understanding and meaningful thought goes beyond what any machine can do. (Prefacio , p.17)

4.27 **Typical examples** include cases like the following:

Robins and sparrows are typical birds. Apples and oranges are typical fruits. Saws and hammers typical tools.

Social stereotypes are usually conscious and subject to public discussion -and may even have names. However, the use of typical category members is usually unconscious and automatic. **Typical examples** are not the subject of public discussion, and **they seem not** to change noticeably during a person's lifetime. **They** are not used to define cultural expectations. **They** are used in reasoning, as Rips (1975) showed, in the case where subjects inferred that if the robins on a certain island got a disease, then the ducks would, but not the converse. Such examples are common. It is normal for us to make inferences from typical to nontypical examples. [...] (p.86)

En los casos 4.26 y 4.27 , el pronombre personal de 3ra persona del plural “they” se halla más ligado contextualmente que cualquier otro elemento dentro de las emisiones que los aloja en la posición de sujeto, y por eso los percibimos como elementos altamente dinámicos desde el punto de vista del discurso.

Tales ejemplos serán los que menor inferencia impliquen a la hora de resolver por parte del lector/receptor la pregunta de cuál es el *mensaje* que se quiere transmitir –a diferencia de cuál es el *significado* del mismo. Por ende, es el *perfilamiento* más *feliz*, es decir, el más integrado contextualmente. (García, 1988, p. 12) Es por dicha razón –también– el *perfilamiento* más frecuente.

Veamos otro ejemplo:

4.28 [...] In addition, Stross (1969), in a study of Tzeltal language acquisition, discovered that "the bulk of the child's first-learned plant names are generic names and that from this starting point he continues to differentiate nomenclaturally, while cognitively he continues to differentiate and generalize plants simultaneously." In other words, the basic-level (or generic) categories, which are in the middle of the taxonomic hierarchy, are learned first; then children work up the hierarchy generalizing, and down the hierarchy specializing. Thus, we can add the finding:

- Children learn the names for things at that level earlier. But perhaps the most remarkable finding of all was this:

- Folk categories correspond to scientific categories extremely accurately at this level, but not very accurately at other levels.

This says something very remarkable about **THE DOCTRINE OF NATURAL KIND TERMS**: For the Tzeltal, **this doctrine** works very well at the level of the genus, but not very well at other levels of classification, e.g., the intermediate, the species, and the variety levels.

But now if one considers philosophical discussions of natural kinds, it turns out that this is not such a surprising result after all. In the literature on natural kinds, one finds that the usual examples of natural kinds are animals like dog, cow, tiger, and substances like gold and water. As it happens, they are all basic-level categories! In short, the examples on which **the doctrine of natural kinds** was based were all basic level, which is the level of the genus among plants and animals. At least for the Tzeltal, **the doctrine** works well for the kinds of examples that philosophers had in mind when they espoused the doctrine. For other kinds of examples, **it** does not work very well.

But if **THE DOCTRINE OF NATURAL KIND TERMS** fits well for the Tzeltal at even one level of categorization, **it** still *seems* to be quite a remarkable result. It suggests that there is one psychologically relevant level at which THE CATEGORIES OF THE MIND FIT THE CATEGORIES OF THE WORLD. However, Berlin's research into the history of biological classification shows this result to be much less remarkable. Scientific classification in biology grew out of folk classification. And when Linnaeus classified the living things of the world, he specifically made use of psychological criteria in establishing the level of the genus. This comes across particularly clearly in A. J. Cain's 1958 essay "Logic and Memory in Linnaeus's System of Taxonomy" (1958). The heart of the Linnaean system was the genus, not the species. It is the genus that gives the general characteristics and the species that is defined in terms of differentiating characteristics. But what is a general characteristic? As Cain observes, "The Essential Character of a genus is that which gives some characteristic peculiar to it, if there is one such, which will instantly serve to distinguish it from all others in the natural order". This is a psychologically defined notion of an "essential character"; which characteristics can be instantly distinguished. (p. 34)

En este contexto, está claro que el párrafo es acerca de “the doctrine of natural kind terms”, y –por dicha razón– ese *nomina*, una vez introducido en el ámbito del discurso, se ancla en el mismo y constituye una cadena léxica que en un momento se corta, con la recurrencia al pronombre endofórico anafórico “it”. De ese modo, cuando el lector arriba al *tema* de la emisión bajo análisis, halla en este pronombre una indicación de continuar leyendo rápidamente, pasando velozmente por la *transición propiamente dicha* (manifiesta por medio de “seems”), para luego conocer la información que el escritor quiere o necesita aportar respecto del *tema* (“it”).

Analícemos estos otros ejemplos:

#### 4.29 Brown and Berlin: Glimpses of the Basic Level

The study of basic-level categories is usually traced to Roger Brown's classic paper, "How Shall a Thing Be Called?"(1958), and his textbook, *Social Psychology* (1965, pp. 317-21).

Brown observed that objects have **many names**: "**The dime in my pocket** is not only a dime. It is also **money**,

**a metal object, a thing**, and, moving to subordinates, it is **a 1952 dime**, in fact, **a particular 1952 dime with a unique pattern of scratches, discolorations, and smooth places**. The dog on the lawn is not only a dog but is also a boxer, a quadruped, an animate being". Brown also observed that of all the possible names for something in a category hierarchy, **a particular name**, at a particular level of categorization, "has a superior status." "While a dime can be called a coin or money or a 1952 dime, we somehow feel that **dime** is **its real name**. **The other categorizations** *seem* to be like achievements of the imagination" (Brown 1965, p. 320). **Such "real names,"** Brown observed, *seem* to be shorter and to be used more frequently. They also seem to correlate with nonlinguistic actions. (p. 31)

4.30 Naomi Quinn (personal communication) has observed, based on extensive research on American conceptions of marriage, that there are many kinds of ideal models for a marriage: **successful marriages, good marriages, strong marriages**, etc. *Successful* marriages are those where the goals of the spouses are fulfilled. *Good* marriages are those where both partners find the marriage beneficial. *Strong* marriages are those that are likely to last. **Such types of ideals** *seem* to be of great importance in culturally significant categories- categories where making judgments of quality and making plans are important. (p. 86)

Los casos 4.29 y 4.30 muestran un tipo particular de referencia: *referencia comparativa*. El recurso al determinante "such" es de extrema importancia, ya que se constituye en el *modificador* más altamente cohesivo dentro del texto bajo análisis. Halliday y Hasan (1976, p. 76) clasifican este tipo de pieza léxica dentro del grupo de los elementos *de referencia comparativa* y proponen que el mismo es un elemento que compara en términos de *identidad*.

En 4.29, el nombre sustantivo "Such 'real names'" es la suma de todos los nombres que se le han dado al "dime" –que han sido enumerados en el contexto precedente. En el segundo, "Such types of ideals" toma su referencia en "*successful marriages, good marriages, strong marriages, etc.*"

Es decir, una vez más hay una enumeración y, al momento en el cual estos nominales –cuyo basamento están constituidos por el determinante "such"– son establecidos en la posición de sujeto de la emisión, los mismos están definitivamente anclados en el contexto del discurso y proyectan *información dada o conocida*. Se convierten así en los elementos más dinámicos de las emisiones que los contienen, y hacen a su vez de índice para que el lector continúe rápidamente leyendo para hallar la *información nueva*, que se encuentra en los *remas* "to be shorter and to be used more frequently" y "to be of great importance in culturally significant categories- categories where making judgments of quality and making plans are important", respectivamente.

Veamos el ejemplo que sigue:

#### 4.31 Ekman

In research spanning more than two decades, Paul Ekman and his associates have studied in detail the physiological correlates of emotions (Ekman 1971; Ekman, Friesen, and Ellsworth 1972). In a major cross-cultural study of facial gestures expressing emotion, Ekman and his associates discovered that there were **basic emotions which seem** to correlate universally with facial gestures: happiness, sadness, anger, fear, surprise, and interest. Of all the subtle emotions that people feel and have words and concepts for around the world, only **these** have consistent correlates in facial expressions across cultures. [...]. (p.38)

En este caso, el *pronombre relativo* “which” es insertado en la posición temática de sujeto de la cláusula relativa “which seem to correlate universally with facial gestures: happiness, sadness, anger, fear, surprise, and interest.” El mismo toma su referencia endofórica y anafóricamente y la halla en el nominal inmediatamente precedente “basic emotions”. “Which” es en este contexto el elemento más dinámico en términos del avance de la información en este contexto discursivo particular.

Observemos este ejemplo:

4.32 Presupposition is one of the most interesting of linguistic and conceptual phenomena. The empirical study of presupposition blossomed in linguistics in the late 1960s, but was pretty much killed off by the mid-1970s, a victim of objectivist semantics and psychology. It was a case where an interesting empirical study became disreputable because it did not make sense in terms of the reigning theoretical assumptions of the times.

Let us consider a simple example of a presupposition.

(a) I regret that Harry left.

(b) I don't regret that Harry left.

(c) Harry left.

Normally, the speaker who says (a) or its negation, (b), is taking (c) for granted. In the 1960s there were two alternatives available for trying to account for this phenomenon.

LOGICAL PRESUPPOSITION:

Both (a) and its negation, (b), logically entail (c).

Logical entailment is defined in terms of truth in the world. Thus, whenever (a) or (b) is true in the world, (c) must be true in the world. This leads to problems for sentences like (d) I don't regret that Harry left -in fact, he didn't leave at all.

If the theory of logical presupposition were correct, then (d) should be a logical contradiction, since the first half entails the truth of (c) and the second half denies (c). But since (d) is not a logical contradiction, the theory of logical presupposition cannot hold for such cases.

The only other method of comprehending presupposition available at that time was pragmatic (or psychological) presupposition, which was a matter of the speaker's assumptions rather than any logical entailment.

PRAGMATIC PRESUPPOSITION:

P is a presupposition of sentence S if, whenever a speaker says S, he is committed to assuming P. This doesn't help very much with (d). **One might claim that the speaker was assuming (c) in the first half of the sentence and then changed his mind.** But *that doesn't seem* to be what's going on at all. (p.131)

En el caso 4.32, nos encontramos ante un caso de *referencia demostrativa*.

“That” se refiere anafóricamente a una idea completa que acaba de ser mencionada en el discurso precedente. Dicho elemento posee un alto grado de dinamismo comunicativo por estar claramente ligado al contexto de situación inmediato.

Podemos aseverar que en este caso, además del elemento de *Alto Grado de Cohesión Discursiva* “that”, se nos presenta un contexto de *Carencia por Contraste*, indicado por la conjunción adversativa “But”.

Analicemos este ejemplo:

#### 4.33 Clustering and Causation

Two of the themes that emerge from the research just discussed are the clustering of properties and the nonobjective, or interactional, character of properties relevant to human categorization. One of the most interesting of human categories from a philosophical point of view is the category of causes. Causation is represented in the grammar of most languages- and usually not just one kind of causation, but a variety of kinds. I have suggested elsewhere (Lakoff, 1977) that the category of kinds of causation shows prototype effects in the ways that they are represented in natural languages. These effects are relatively uniform across languages.

We can account for these effects if we assume that prototypical causation is understood in terms of **a cluster of interactional properties**. This hypothesis appears to account best for the relation between language and conceptual structure, as well as for the relationships among the varieties of causation. **The cluster seems** to define a prototypical causation, and non-prototypical varieties of causation seem to be best characterizable in terms of deviations from that cluster.

“The (cluster)” es el primer elemento en la emisión que estamos describiendo. “The” es –tradicionalmente– el *pronombre definido* por excelencia con referencia endofórica anafórica. En este ejemplo, en particular, “a cluster” es introducido por primera vez en la emisión “We can account for these effects if we assume that prototypical causation is understood in terms of **a cluster of interactional properties**” y –en consecuencia– está basamentado en el discurso a través del pronombre indefinido “a”.

Por su parte, Halliday (1976) define al artículo indefinido (“a”) como un elemento selectivo



que “(it) indicates that the item in question IS specific and identifiable; that somewhere the information necessary for identifying it is recoverable. Where is this information to be sought? Again, either in the situation or in the text. The reference is either exophoric or endophoric.” No está demás insistir en el hecho de que estos elementos son cohesivos solamente si la referencia es textual, si la referencia es situacional, no hay cohesión. (Halliday, 1976, p. 71)

#### 4.2.2.3 Reiteración

A continuación, transcribimos algunos casos en los cuales los *Contextos de Carencia/ Completitud* están puestos de manifiesto por ítems léxicos que establecen patrones cohesivos entre ciertas palabras o conjunto de palabras y los *temas /tópicos* que nos interesa analizar en términos de *Dinamismo Comunicativo (DC)*.

Según Halliday y Hasan (1976, p. 288), la *cohesión léxica* puede estar dada por REITERACIÓN (*repetición léxica, superordinado, sinónimo o nombre sustantivo general*) o COLOCACIÓN (“COLLOCATION”).

Comencemos con algunos ejemplos de *repetición léxica*:

4.34 Such cases can be accounted for intuitively by using fuzzy set union.

DARK-COOL = BLACK or GREEN or BLUE LIGHT-WARM = WHITE or RED or YELLOW COOL = GREEN or BLUE WARM = RED or YELLOW

Thus, Kay and McDaniel make the claim that basic color categories are a product of both neurophysiology and cognitively real operations that can be partially-modeled by fuzzy set intersection and union.

At present, this is the only plausible account we have of why the facts of basic color categories should be as they are. **The Kay-McDaniel theory** has important consequences for human categorization in general. It claims that colors are not objectively "out there in the world" independent of any beings. Color concepts are embodied in that focal colors are partly determined by human biology. Color categorization makes use of human biology, but color categories are more than merely a consequence of the nature of the world plus human biology. Color categories result from the world plus human biology plus a cognitive mechanism that has some of the characteristics of fuzzy set theory plus a culture-specific choice of which basic color categories there are.

**The Kay-McDaniel theory seems** to work well for characterizing the focal colors corresponding to basic color categories. But it does not work as well at the boundaries between colors. According to the Kay- McDaniel account, the boundaries, as well as the focal colors, should be uniform across languages. But this is simply not the case. The most detailed work on the detailed mapping of color categories, especially in non-focal areas, has

been done by MacLaury (in preparation). Among the test cases for **the Kay-McDaniel theory** are cases where a language does not have a separate color category for non-primary focal colors, like purple and orange, colors that, in the Kay-McDaniel account, are "computed" on the basis of fuzzy set theory plus the response curves for the primary colors. **The Kay-McDaniel theory** predicts that colors like purple and orange should be treated uniformly across languages and that they should always be on the boundaries between basic color categories in languages that do not have separate categories for them.

[...]

In Kay-McDaniel terms, this means that the fuzzy-set-theoretical functions that compute conjunctions and disjunctions for color categories are not exactly the same for all people; rather they vary in their boundary conditions from culture to culture. They are thus at least partly conventional, and not completely a matter of universal neurophysiology and cognition. What this requires is a revision of **the Kay-McDaniel theory** to permit **conceptual systems** for color to vary at the boundaries, by having the exact nature of the disjunction function be somewhat different in different systems. Such differences may not only be at the boundaries but at the focal peaks. **Kay and McDaniel's theory** implied that each binary disjunctive color category (e.g., COOL == BLUE or GREEN) should have two focal peaks (e.g., both focal blue and focal green). MacLaury has found cases where there is a cool category covering blue and green, but where there is a skewing effect such that the center of the category is at pure green alone or pure blue alone. Thus, in Kay-McDaniel terms, **conceptual systems seem** to have disjunction functions that take the blue and green response curves as input and yield an output curve with only one focal center. This would require a cognitive mechanism with more than just something akin to the operation of union in fuzzy set theory. (pp 29 – 30)

En este apartado, Lakoff hace un recorrido por una teoría de dos autores que estudiaron la *conceptualización* de los colores en algunas culturas. Dichos autores son Kay y Mc Daniel. Los *temas/tópicos/ información dada* en el contexto de este texto son, por tanto, *Kay y Mc Daniel, los colores, los sistemas conceptuales* que se ponen de manifiesto a la hora de captar los colores, entre otros.

Ahora bien, cuando focalizamos nuestra atención en los dos *perfilamientos* de “seem” aquí presentes caemos en la cuenta de que en lugar de recurrir a pronombres –como lo hizo en los ejemplos destacados y analizados en el apartado anterior–, el escritor utiliza *repeticiones léxicas* como sujetos: “The Kay-McDaniel theory” y “Conceptual systems,” respectivamente. Dichos sujetos están involucrados como *participantes* en los *procesos* de “to work well for characterizing the focal colors corresponding to basic color categories” y “to have disjunction functions that take the blue and green response curves as input and yield an output curve with only one focal center,” que constituyen los *remas* (es decir, la *información nueva*) de las emisiones que están en juego.

En términos discursivos, el hecho de que sean *repeticiones léxicas* y no *pronombres personales* hace una diferencia importante con respecto a nuestra variable [+**Dinamismo comunicativo**]: el mismo hecho de que se recurra a una *reiteración léxica* responde a una necesidad de retomar la referencia de un *nominal* que está más distante que en el caso de los *pronombres personales*, que, como ya vimos, encuentran su referencia en la emisión inmediatamente precedente. En este caso, si bien la referencia está también en el *contexto inmediatamente relevante*, el receptor/ lector del mensaje ha de realizar un proceso cognitivo y por ende de decodificación de *mensaje* un poco más dificultoso y costoso de lo que se quiere transmitir. Observamos aquí que en un continuum, dichas emisiones van a mostrar un menor grado de DC, y serán –en consecuencia– menos dinámicas discursivamente.

Veamos el siguiente ejemplo:

4.35 Thus the relevant notion of a "property" is not something objectively in the world independent of any being; it is rather what we will refer to as an interactional property—the result of our interactions as part of our physical and cultural environments given our bodies and our cognitive apparatus. Such interactional properties form clusters in our experience, and prototype and basic-level structure can reflect such clusterings.

[...]

Perhaps the best way of thinking about basic-level categories is that they are "human-sized." They depend not on objects themselves, independent of people, but on the way people interact with objects: the way they perceive them, image them, organize information about them, and behave toward them with their bodies. The relevant properties clustering together to define such categories are not inherent to the objects, but are interactional properties, having to do with the way people interact with objects.

Basic-level categories thus have different properties than **superordinate categories**. For example, **superordinate categories seem** not to be characterized by images or motor actions. For example, we have mental image of chairs –abstract images that don't fit any particular chair– and we have general motor actions for sitting in chairs. But if we go from the basic-level category CHAIR to the superordinate category FURNITURE, a difference emerges. We have no abstract mental images of furniture that are not images of basic-level objects like chairs, tables, beds, etc. [...] (p.51-52)

Transcribimos este ejemplo de *reiteración léxica*, ya que nos llama mucho la atención que la referencia de esta reiteración se halle exactamente en la emisión anterior. Es decir, nos sorprende el recurso a la *reiteración léxica*, cuando en este caso lo esperable hubiese sido recurrir al pronombre de tercera persona del plural “they” o al determinante comparativo “such”. Empero, como ya sabemos, los usuarios de la lengua se apropian de la

misma para sus cometidos comunicativos. Quizás en este caso, el escritor busca reforzar el contraste entre “basic-level categories” y “superordinate categories”. Entonces, nada más seguro que volver a conceptualizarlo y reverbalarlo.

Veamos otro ejemplo:

4.36 **First, it is claimed** that if two languages have radically different conceptual systems, then translation from one language to the other is impossible.

**Second, it is often claimed** that if translation is impossible, then speakers of one language cannot understand the other language.

**Third, it is often claimed** that if the languages have different conceptual systems, then someone who speaks one language will be unable to learn the other language because he lacks the right conceptual system.

Fourth, to confuse matters further, it is sometimes claimed that since people *can* learn radically different languages, those languages couldn't have different conceptual systems.

**Such claims *may seem*** to make sense if one recognizes only conceptual systems and not conceptualizing capacities. But the picture is different if one assumes that people share a general conceptualizing capacity regardless of what differences they may have in conceptual systems. Differences in conceptual systems do create difficulties for translation. Let us temporarily assume that such differences make translation impossible, pending a more realistic discussion below. What follows? It does *not* follow from the impossibility of *translation* that *understanding* is impossible. (p. 311)

En este caso, observamos una *reiteración* de un tipo muy particular: en lugar de “It is claimed that...”, la manera cómo se introducen “such claims” a lo largo del extracto bajo análisis, “such claims” es justamente una frase nominal, no verbal. Pero en inglés la palabra “claim” es tanto la forma infinitiva del verbo como el nominal, es decir son homónimas. Por otro lado, otros elementos que hacen a la textura de este texto es el uso de las conjunciones “First”, “Second” y “Third”. Dichas conjunciones de organización textual, son utilizadas en este texto para introducir varias ideas que han sido “clamadas” en relación a las lenguas y a la posibilidad de traducirlas. Además, hay paralelismo gramatical –otra manera de aportarle *cohesión* a un texto.

Observemos el ejemplo que sigue:

#### 4.37 Ekman

In research spanning more than two decades, Paul Ekman and his associates have studied in detail the physiological correlates of **emotions** (Ekman 1971; Ekman, Friesen, and Ellsworth 1972). In a major cross-cultural study of facial gestures expressing **emotion**, Ekman and his associates discovered that there were

**basic emotions** which *seem* to correlate universally with facial gestures: **happiness, sadness, anger, fear, surprise, and interest.** **Of all the subtle emotions that people feel and have words and concepts for around the world,** only these have consistent correlates in facial expressions across cultures.

Although Ekman was by no means a prototype theorist, his research fits prototype research in the following way. The seven basic emotions appear to have prototype status. There are many shades and varieties of happiness, sadness, anger, etc. These form categories of emotions. Rage and annoyance, for example, are in the anger category. **Basic happiness, anger, etc. –the emotions that correlate with the universal facial gestures seem** to function as central members of those categories. **These emotions** also appear to have basic-level status. **They** are readily recognizable by gestalt perception around the world. We have facial images and motor movements for **them** that represent the entire emotional category. (p.38)

Del caso 4.37 queremos destacar el hecho de que el sujeto “Basic happiness, anger, etc. –the emotions that correlate with the universal facial gestures” muestra además de una *reiteración léxica* (“Basic happiness, anger, etc.”), un nominal general (“the emotions”) cuya referencia está determinada por la cláusula relativa “that correlate with the universal facial gestures”. Entonces, lo que podemos observar aquí es una *reiteración léxica*, acompañada de un nominal general que engloba los objetos que participan en el escenario modalizado por el predicado “seem” – dicho nominal, a su vez está repetido, y reenfaticado. En el *contexto inmediatamente relevante* de esta oración, este *nombre sustantivo* complejo está en juego en todo el apartado. Por dicho motivo, insistimos en que es él el elemento con más poder comunicativo para hacer avanzar el texto en dirección recta, hacia delante.

Analicemos un último extracto:

#### 4.38 Whorf's Views

On the basis of arguments like those cited above, **Whorf** and relativism in general are widely assumed to have been discredited. But, as we have seen, there is no single relativism, but rather dozens, if not hundreds, of versions, depending on the stand one takes on various issues. All too often, arguments against **Whorf** are taken to be arguments against relativism in general. And arguments against **Whorf**, as we have just seen, may not be arguments against the position that **Whorf** advocated. Though **Whorf's view of relativism** is only one out of a great many, and though it has no privileged status from a scientific point of view, it does have a privileged *historical* status. For this reason, it would be useful to review where **Whorf** stood on the issues that we have discussed. **Whorf** was a complex thinker. It should be borne in mind throughout the following discussion that his stands on these issues by no means exhaust his views, nor convey their subtlety.

*Degree of Variation:* **Whorf** believed that conceptual systems could be radically different, but **he** did not believe that they could be totally different. That is, **Whorf** was not a total relativist. He did not believe that just

anything at all could occur in a language. Quite the opposite. His manuscript "Language: Plan and Conception of Arrangement" (**Whorf** 1956, pp. 125-33) is a remarkably detailed account of the constraints on the structure of language, including both formal and conceptual categories. **He** was interested in discovering the full range of what can occur in languages, but was just as interested, if one can judge from this work, in discovering the limits.

*Depth of Variation:* **Whorf** was not particularly interested in superficial conceptual differences. **He** was not concerned with vocabulary, specialized terminology, words for obscure concepts, and the like. **He** was concerned with fundamental concepts that **he** saw as going to the heart of our conceptual systems: space, time, causation, event structure, aspect, evidentiality, fundamental classifications of objects, and so on. **He** observed that these concepts were so fundamental that they were incorporated into the very grammars of languages. As such, they are the concepts used the most -and used unconsciously and automatically.

*Nature of Variation:* **Whorf** was not merely interested in how languages "carve up nature" -though **he** was interested in fineness of distinctions. **He** also recognized metaphorical thinking, the existence of language-particular sound symbolism, and the existence of metaphoric gesture, and **he** was concerned with the conceptualization of the internal reality of kinesthetic experience as well as with external reality.

*System Versus Capacity:* So far as I can tell, **Whorf** did not say anything of significance about conceptualizing capacities.

*Conceptual Organization:* The idea that conceptual systems can differ because of their organizations is implicit in Whorf's work.

*Monolithic System:* So far as I can tell, **Whorf seemed** to think conceptual systems were monolithic. This may have been one source of his concern that we may be "prisoners" of our languages: it is as though there were no room for alternatives *within* a language and a conceptual system.

*Locus of Variation:* **Whorf seemed** to view the actual linguistic forms-morphemes, words, grammatical constructions-as the locus of variation in conceptual systems. **He** spoke of *language* determining thought and action, and **he** spoke of *linguistic* relativity.

*Functional Embodiment:* This was one of Whorf's big issues: the nature of use mattered. **He** recognized that grammaticized concepts were used unconsciously and automatically, and **he** viewed differences in such concepts as differences in modes of thought.

*Commensurability:* Another of Whorf's major issues. His principal criteria, in arguing for incommensurability, were use, framing, and organization.

*Fact-Value:* **Whorf** was a relativist so far as the facts were concerned, and an objectivist with respect to values.

*Effect on Action:* **Whorf** was primarily responsible for bringing this issue to our attention. **He** argued strongly that radical differences in linguistic structure led to radical differences in thinking, and hence to corresponding differences in behavior.

*Control:* **Whorf did not seem** to believe that one had control over the most important parts of one's conceptual system -the grammaticized parts.

*Ethics:* Though Wharf was deeply concerned with ethical behavior, he did not, to my knowledge, write about the kind of philosophical ethical issues that his work has evoked. He would have been horrified to see his

"linguistic relativity" thesis lumped with a form of moral relativism that could be used to justify Nazism. Whorf was concerned with conceptual not moral relativism. He was not a total relativist and his actual views do not sanction total moral relativism. In fact, his work has the opposite force: it explicitly contradicts Nazi theories of Aryan superiority. (pp. 329-330)

Podemos aseverar que es en este apartado donde podemos probar más exitosamente nuestra hipótesis de que el *Alto Grado de Cohesión Discursiva* juega un rol fundamental en el avance del desarrollo de la información en un texto. En este caso “Whorf” está en juego desde el título mismo del apartado, y luego a lo largo y a lo ancho del desarrollo por parte del escritor del *relativismo conceptual* de Whorf propiamente dicho.

Por ende, en las instancias en las que el escritor recurre al predicado modal “seem”, el sujeto/”trajector”/ *tema* Whorf está totalmente ligado al *contexto inmediatamente relevante* y por ende constituye una suerte de trampolín que catapulta al lector a seguir buscando la información nueva (y por ende a superar ese contexto de *Carencia*) hacia el final de la emisión.

Veamos ahora algunos ejemplos en los que las cadenas cohesivas son establecidas por *nominales generales*:

4.39 On contemplation of the nature of many of our attributes listed by our subjects, however, it appeared that three types of attributes presented a problem for such a realistic view: (1) some attributes, such as "seat" for the object "chair," appeared to have names that showed them not to be meaningful prior to the knowledge of the object as chair; some attributes such as "large" for the object "piano" *seemed* to have meaning only in relation to categorization of the object in terms of a superordinate category-piano is large for furniture but small for other kinds of objects such as buildings; (3) some attributes such as "you eat on it" for the object "table" were functional attributes that *seemed* to require knowledge about humans, their activities, and the real world in order to be understood. That is, it appeared that the analysis of objects into attributes was a rather sophisticated activity that our subjects (and indeed a system of cultural knowledge) might be considered to be able to impose only after the development of a system of categories. (Rosch 1978, pp. 41-42)

Thus the relevant notion of a "property" is not something objectively in the world independent of any being; it is rather what we will refer to as an interactional property-the result of our interactions as part of our physical and cultural environments given our bodies and our cognitive apparatus. Such interactional properties form clusters in our experience, and prototype and basic-level structure can reflect such clusterings.

As Berlin has observed, interactional properties and the categories they determine seem objective in the case of properties of basic-level categories--categories like chair, elephant, and water. The reason is that, given our bodies, we perceive certain aspects of our external environment very accurately at the basic level, though not so accurately at other levels. As long as we are talking about properties of basic-level objects, interactional

properties will seem objective.

Perhaps the best way of thinking about basic-level categories is that they are "human-sized." They depend not on objects themselves, independent of people, but on the way people interact with objects: the way they perceive them, image them, organize information about them, and behave toward them with their bodies. The relevant properties clustering together to define such categories are not inherent to the objects, but are interactional properties, having to do with the way people interact with objects.

Basic-level categories thus have different properties than superordinate categories. For example, superordinate categories *seem* not to be characterized by images or motor actions. For example, we have mental image of chairs –abstract images that don't fit any particular chair– and we have general motor actions for sitting in chairs. But if we go from the basic-level category CHAIR to the superordinate category FURNITURE, a difference emerges. We have no abstract mental images of furniture that are not images of basic-level objects like chairs, tables, beds, etc.

Try to imagine a piece of furniture that doesn't look like a chair, or table, or bed, etc., but is more abstract. **People seem** not to be able to do so. Moreover, we do not have motor actions for interacting with furniture in general that are not motor actions for interacting with some basic-level object- chairs, tables, beds, etc. But superordinate categories do have other human-based attributes-like purposes and functions. (p.51-52)

En el caso 4.39, el *sustantivo general* "People" establece una cadena cohesiva con varias instancias del pronombre de 1ra persona "we", que podemos interpretarla como una referencia inclusiva, referida a los seres humanos en general. Cuando "People" es instalado en la posición temática de la emisión bajo análisis, su referencia ya es conocida, y, por dicha razón, hipotetizamos que su presencia es un indicio para el lector de lo que la información nueva, el aporte del escrito, es la que está luego, hacia el final de la emisión.

Analicemos otro ejemplo:

4.40 In addition, the complements of basic-level categories are not basic level. They do not have the kinds of properties that basic-level categories have. For example, consider non-chairs, that is, those things that are not chairs. What do they look like? Do **you** have a mental image of a general or an abstract non-chair? **People seem** not to. How do **you** interact with a non-chair? Is there some general motor action one performs with non-chairs? Apparently not. What is a non-chair used for? Do non-chairs have general functions? Apparently not. In the classical theory, the complement of a set that is defined by necessary and sufficient conditions is another set that is defined by necessary and sufficient conditions. But the complement of a basic-level category is not itself a basic-level category. (p. 52)

En el caso 4.40, el enunciador se dirige expresamente a su interlocutor utilizando la segunda persona (puede ser tanto singular o plural en inglés), lo cual no sorprende, ya que



estamos ante un contexto no asertivo en el cual dicho emisor le interroga a su interlocutor o interlocutores con el fin, asumimos, de hacerles reflexionar o interpelarlos en relación con esta realidad acerca de cómo categorizamos los objetos del mundo.

Es llamativo que en el mismo apartado haya este juego de cambios de roles discursivos que alguna intención comunicativa proyectan.

#### 4.41 Polysemy Based on Correspondences within an ICM

In other cases, a single idealized cognitive model can be the basis on which a collection of senses forms a single natural category expressed by a single lexical item. *Window* is a good example. In our cognitive model of a window there is both an opening in the wall and a glass-filled frame fitting into it. This correspondence provides motivation for using the same word to refer to both. In isolation, **an opening in the wall** doesn't have much if anything in common with **a glass-filled frame**. Independent of any knowledge about the way windows happen to work, there would be no objective reason to place these two very different kinds of things in the same category. **The fact that the opening in the wall and the glass-filled frame have been brought together to fit one another physically and to correspond to one another in the same cognitive model seems** to make them members of the same cognitive category-so much so that in sentences like the following the word window *doesn't seem* to distinguish between them.

How many windows are there in your living room?

Here 'window' *seems* to refer not to either the opening or the glass-filled frame, but to the combination. It takes sentences like the following to tease the senses of window apart. (P.417)

La frase *nominal* compleja “The fact that the opening in the wall and the glass-filled frame have been brought together to fit one another physically and to correspond to one another in the same cognitive model” conforma un resumen de lo expuesto hasta ese punto en el argumento. Toda esta frase o grupo *nominal* constituye un elemento de Alto Grado de Cohesión Discursiva y está ligado al contexto inmediatamente relevante precedente. Este es un caso más de cohesión léxica dada por un *nombre sustantivo general*.

En este ejemplo lo que nos llama la atención es la mayor complejidad léxico/gramatical de la cláusula que especifica o restringe la referencia de dicho sustantivo general. Aun así, el argumento implícito en dicha cláusula, es el resumen del tema que fue desarrollado a lo largo del apartado en cuestión.

Analícemos otro ejemplo:

4.42 First, the classical theory of categories is hopelessly inadequate for complex concepts.

Second, there is a correspondence between prototype effects and metonymically based reasoning. Such prototype effects can be accounted for by metonymic models, which are needed independently to account for what Rosch has called "reference point reasoning." Thus, prototype effects are not independent of reasoning.

Third, there do exist direct correlations between conceptual structure and prototype effects. They are of two types: cognitive models containing scales that define gradations of category membership and radial categories.

**The best way to account for prototype effects in general seems** to be through a theory of cognitive models. (p.152)

El sustantivo *general* es “way” en “The best way to account for prototype effects in general”, el cual resume una idea que el enunciador viene desarrollando a lo largo de este apartado. Sin embargo, dicho sustantivo ocurre en una estructura de comparación superlativa muy productiva en inglés.

Esta estructura nominal que –como ya dijimos– es superlativa y a su vez contiene una cláusula no finita que expande el significado de “way” forma parte del *contexto inmediatamente relevante*. Al arribar a la misma, el lector interpreta que lo dicho hasta entonces no es más que *información conocida o dada*. Lo nuevo o *novedoso* es lo que aporta el *rema*.

Veamos el caso que sigue:

4.43 Our basic-level concepts correspond to that pre-conceptual structure and are understood directly in terms of it. Basic-level concepts are much more richly structured than kinesthetic image schemas, which have only the grossest outlines of structure. Gestalts for general overall shapes (e.g., the shape of an elephant or a giraffe or a rose) are relatively rich in structure. Still, they occur pre-conceptually as gestalts, and although one can identify internal structure in them, the wholes *seem* to be psychologically more basic than the parts. In short, **the idea that all internal structure is of a building-block sort, with primitives and principles of combination does not seem** to work at the basic level of human experience. At this level, "basic" does not mean "primitive"; that is, basic-level concepts are not atomic building blocks without internal structure. The basic level is an intermediate level; it is neither the highest nor the lowest level of conceptual organization. Because of their gestalt nature and their intermediate status, basic-level concepts cannot be considered elementary atomic building blocks within a building-block approach to conceptual structure.

En el caso 4.43, la frase nominal compleja –en el sentido de que contiene una cláusula declarativa nominal que funciona como complemento del sustantivo abstracto ‘idea’– “the idea that all internal structure is of a building-block sort, with primitives and principles of combination” constituye un resumen de lo expuesto hasta ese punto en el argumento. El mismo constituye un elemento de *Alto Grado de Cohesión Discursiva* y está

ligado al *contexto inmediatamente relevante* precedente. Por ende, la *información nueva* la hallamos en la cláusula infinitiva “to work at the basic level of human experience”.

Nos resta ejemplificar los casos de *categorías superordinadas*, es decir aquellas categorías de nivel superior en un sistema de clasificación, y que agrupa categorías de nivel inferior, o más específicas. También el de los *sinónimos* y el de la *colocación*. Copiamos a continuación una serie de ejemplos y agregamos una breve explicación de los mismos.

Observemos el siguiente ejemplo:

#### 4.44 Brown and Berlin: Glimpses of the Basic Level

The study of basic-level categories is usually traced to Roger Brown's classic paper, "How Shall a Thing Be Called?"(1958), and his textbook, *Social Psychology* (1965, pp. 317-21).

Brown observed that objects have **many names**: "**The dime in my pocket** is not only a dime. It is also **money, a metal object, a thing**, and, moving to subordinates, it is a **1952 dime**, in fact, a **particular 1952 dime with a unique pattern of scratches, discolorations, and smooth places**. The dog on the lawn is not only a dog but is also a boxer, a quadruped, an animate being". Brown also observed that of all the possible names for something in a category hierarchy, **a particular name**, at a particular level of categorization, "has a superior status." "While a dime can be called a coin or money or a 1952 dime, we somehow feel that **dime** is **its real name**. **The other categorizations seem** to be like achievements of the imagination" (Brown 1965, p. 320). Such "real names," Brown observed, *seem* to be shorter and to be used more frequently. They also *seem* to correlate with nonlinguistic actions. (p. 31)

La frase “The other categorizations” generaliza las distintas formas de categorizar el “dime”: “money”, “a metal object”, “a thing” así como también “a particular 1952 dime with a unique pattern of scratches, discolorations, and smooth places”. Es una categoría de nivel superior a las demás ya conceptualizadas y nombradas anteriormente, y es por ende *información conocida*. Una vez que el lector atraviesa la zona de la *transición propiamente dicha* –explicitada por “seem”– arriba a lo nuevo, lo que aún no sabe y le resta por conocer.

#### 4.45 Dual Foundations

Empirical studies by such prototype theorists as Berlin, Rosch, Hunn, Mervis, B. Tversky, and others have isolated a significant level of human interaction with the external environment (the basic level), characterized by gestalt perception, mental imagery, and motor movements. At this level, people function most efficiently and successfully in dealing with discontinuities in the natural environment. It is at this level of physical experience that we accurately distinguish tigers from elephants, chairs from tables, roses from daffodils, asparagus from broccoli, copper from lead, etc. One level down, things are much more difficult. It is much

harder to distinguish one species of giraffe from another than to distinguish a giraffe from an elephant. Our capacity for basic-level gestalt perception is not tuned to make easy, clear-cut distinctions at such lower levels.

Our basic-level concepts correspond to that pre-conceptual structure and are understood directly in terms of it. Basic-level concepts are much more richly structured than kinesthetic image schemas, which have only the grossest outlines of structure. **Gestalts** for general overall shapes (e.g., the shape of an elephant or a giraffe or a rose) are relatively rich in structure. Still, they occur pre-conceptually as **gestalts**, and although one can identify internal structure in them, **the wholes seem** to be psychologically more basic than the parts. In short, the idea that all internal structure is of a building-block sort, with primitives and principles of combination *does not seem* to work at the basic level of human experience. At this level, "basic" does not mean "primitive"; that is, basic-level concepts are not atomic building blocks without internal structure. The basic level is an intermediate level; it is neither the highest nor the lowest level of conceptual organization. Because of their gestalt nature and their intermediate status, basic-level concepts cannot be considered elementary atomic building blocks within a building-block approach to conceptual structure.

At the basic level of physical experience, many of the principles of objectivism appear to work well. Our intuitions that objectivism is "just common sense" *seem*<sup>29</sup> to come from the pre-conceptual structure of our physical experience at the basic level. It is no accident that most of the examples used to justify objectivism come from this level of physical experience. (p. 270)

Este extracto contiene el ejemplo de sinonimia por excelencia: todos asociamos a las “gestalts” con “the wholes”. Se trata de rutinas discursivas que hacen predecible la ocurrencia de dichos sinónimos. Por eso es que sostenemos nuestra idea de que “the wholes” es un elemento altamente ligado contextualmente como para permitirnos a nosotros enfatizar el hecho de que el mismo es el elemento más dinámico en términos de avance informativo. “The wholes” es el *tema*; en el *rema* encontraremos lo que el enunciador quiere aportar acerca del mismo.

Analicemos este ejemplo:

#### 4.46 Acquisition

One of the most striking results about basic-level categorization concerns the acquisition of concepts by children. If the classical theory of categorization were correct, then there should be no more to categorization than what one finds in the logic of classes: hierarchical categorization based on shared properties of the

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<sup>29</sup> El contexto discursivo del cual extrajimos la frase nominal ‘Our intuitions that objectivism is "just common sense"’ se corresponde con otros ejemplos en los que el enunciador recapitula y expresa una relación especial entre un TEMA/TÓPICO (dicha recapitulación, que si bien está ligada contextualmente no corresponde a ninguno de los elementos que muestran explícitamente contextos de Carencia) y el REMA o *información nueva*.

Empero, la referencia de dicho grupo nominal es exofórica, es decir la hallamos fuera del texto particular donde encontramos este ejemplo. Por ende, este no es un elemento cohesivo, lo que explica el porqué de haber dejado de lado el análisis de este caso.

members of the categories. Before **the work of Rosch and Mervis** (Rosch et al. 1976), **research on child development** had not been informed by the idea of basic-level categorization. It had been concluded that, for example, three-year-old children had not mastered categorization, which was taken to be taxonomic categorization defined by the logic of classes. This conclusion was based on **the performance of children in "sorting tasks,"** where subjects are asked to "put together the things that go together." Rosch and her associates observed that **such studies** tended to involve categorization at the superordinate level.

**The stimuli** used in **sorting tasks** have tended to be of two types: If abstract (e.g., geometric forms varying in dimensions such as form, color, and size), they are typically presented in a set which has no structure (e.g., each attribute occurs with all combinations of all others); if representational (e.g., toy versions or pictures of real-world objects), **the arrays** are such that they can be grouped taxonomically only at the superordinate level. Thus, **the representational stimuli used in sorting tasks** are such that if the child were to sort the objects into those of like taxonomic category, he would have to put together such items as socks and shirt, dog and cow. Children do not seem to have been asked to sort together objects belonging to the same basic level category (e.g., several shoes or several dogs). We suspect this results from the fact that basic objects are so obviously the "same object" to adults that **a task does not seem** to be a problem of categorization to an adult experimenter unless objects are taken from different basic level categories. (Rosch et al. 1976, pp. 414-15) [p.48]

En el caso 4.46, las piezas léxicas resaltadas en negrita le aportan cohesión al texto por el mero hecho de que las mismas se relacionan semánticamente unas con otras en este texto particular.

La *colocación* responde a rutinas lingüísticas asociadas a prácticas que se replican en ciertos contextos discursivos particulares. No hay *reiteración* –como en los casos anteriores– sino que hay ciertas palabras o grupos de palabras que co-ocurren respecto de un tópico particular. Como resultado de dicha práctica, cuando el nombre sustantivo “a task” es usado en la posición de sujeto, el mismo representa lo *dado*: lo *nuevo* es lo que vendrá hacia el final de la emisión (“to be a problem of categorization to an adult experimenter unless objects are taken from different basic level categories.”)

### **4.2.3 Contexto de Carencia/ Completitud: *Contraste***

#### **4.2.3.1 *Conjunción***

En varios de los contextos discursivos en los que se plasma la *Escala de Calidad*, se pone de manifiesto un *contraste*, una *oposición*, o una *negación*. Dicho *contraste*, se da entre la información que viene siendo desarrollada y un elemento claramente contrastivo

como por ejemplo “on the other hand,” “Rather,” entre otros. En estos casos lo que advertimos es que además de un TEMA *tópico* (el *nominal* o *pronombre personal* en cuestión) el mismo va precedido o seguido por un TEMA *textual*. Como explica Halliday (2004), estas conjunciones adversativas establecen una relación de contextualización entre el mensaje de una cláusula y la porción textual precedente. Dicha relación es establecida por medio de la *cohesión* – es decir dichas conjunciones (coordinantes o subordinantes) crean una unión entre ciertos elementos que no es estructural gramatical, sino que se despliegan en forma individual en el mensaje y son parte del *tema*. (Halliday, 2004, p.157)

Ahora bien, como en toda *Escala de Calidad*, el nominal o pronombre/determinante (que en todos los casos que analizamos están estrechamente ligados al contexto) es la entidad a la que se le adscribe una *calidad* y él mismo es el elemento que acarrea mayor *dinamismo comunicativo*.

La *calidad* misma se halla en la cláusula no finita complemento del predicado “seem” y se constituye en la *información nueva* a la que el receptor/ lector tiene la intención de arribar a medida que progresa la información en el proceso comunicativo.

Entre el elemento más dinámico en la posición de *tema* y el *rema*, localizamos lo que dentro del marco teórico de la *PFO* se denomina *transición propiamente dicha* – que es el locus de TIEMPO, MODO, ASPECTO, entre otros rasgos sintáctico-semánticos.

Analicemos este ejemplo:

4.47 I am interpreting Austin as making an implicit psychological claim about categorization. In the very act of pointing out and analyzing the differences among the senses, Austin is presupposing that these senses form a natural collection for speakers-so natural that the senses have to be differentiated by an analyst. No such analysis would be needed for true homonyms, say, bank (where you put your money) and bank (of a river), which are not part of a natural collection (or category) of senses. In pointing out the existence of a small number of mechanisms by which senses are related to one another, Austin is implicitly suggesting that those mechanisms are psychologically real (rather than being just the arbitrary machinations of a clever analyst). He is, after all, trying to explain why people naturally use the same words for different senses. His implicit claim is that these mechanisms are principles which provide a "good reason" for grouping the senses together by the use of the same word. What I have referred to as "metonymy" is just one such mechanism.

From metonymy, Austin turns to what Johnson and I (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) refer to a metaphor, but which Austin, following Aristotle, terms "analogy."

When A:B::X: Y then A and X are often called by the same name, e.g., the foot of a mountain and the foot of a

list. Here there is a good reason for calling the things both "feet" but are we to say they are "similar"? Not in any ordinary sense. We may say that the relations in which they stand to B and Y are similar relations. Well and good: but A and X are not the relations in which they stand. (Pp. 71-72)

Austin isn't explicit here, **BUT what 1. seems** to be going on is that both mountains and lists are being structured in terms of a metaphorical projection of the human body onto them. (pp. 19 - 20)

“What” se constituye en el elemento más saliente en el proceso descrito por “to be going on” y por ende es también el “trajector” tanto de dicho proceso como de otro perfilamiento que se le superpone: aquel encabezado por “seem”, que es un predicado que no impone restricciones a sus posibles sujetos, dando lugar así al fenómeno de *transparencia*.

Cabe recordar, a su vez, que “what”—que ha sido tradicionalmente llamado ‘pronombre relativo sin antecedente’— es parte de una cláusula *pseudo-escindida*, estructura que ya es en sí misma inherentemente marcada. Ahora bien, este pronombre muestra referencia endofórica catafórica, ya que la misma es hallada en la proposición “that both mountains and lists are being structured in terms of a metaphorical projection of the human body onto them”, y por ende está [-ligado contextualmente]

Hemos de destacar también el hecho de que la conjunción adversativa “but” crea un contexto de *Carencia* el cual el receptor/ lector ha de superar avanzando en el texto, no solamente para dar con la *información nueva*, sino también —en este caso— para hallar la referencia de “what” catafóricamente.

Observemos el próximo ejemplo:

#### 4.48 Mother

An example is the concept *mother*. According to the classical theory, it should be possible to give clear necessary and sufficient conditions for mother that will fit all the cases and apply equally to all of them. Such a definition might be something like: a woman who has given birth to a child. But as we will see, no such definition will cover the full range of cases. Mother is a concept that is based on a complex model in which a number of individual cognitive models combine, forming a cluster model. The models in the cluster are:

- The birth model: The person who gives birth is the mother. The birth model is usually accompanied by a genetic model, although since the development of egg and embryo implants, they do not always coincide.
- The genetic model: The female who contributes the genetic material is the mother.
- The nurturance model: The female adult who nurtures and raises a child is the mother of that child.
- The marital model: The wife of the father is the mother.

- The genealogical model: The closest female ancestor is the mother.

The concept *mother* normally involves a complex model in which all of these individual models combine to form a cluster model. There have always been divergences from this cluster; stepmothers have been around for a long time. But because of the complexities of modern life, the models in the cluster have come to diverge more and more. Still, many people feel the pressure to pick one model as being the right one, the one that "really" defines what a mother is. But although one might try to argue that only one of these characterizes the "real" concept of *mother*, the linguistic evidence does not bear this out. As the following sentences indicate, there is more than one criterion for "real" motherhood:

1. I was adopted and I don't know who my real mother is.
2. I am not a nurturant person, so I don't think I could ever be a real mother to any child.
3. My real mother died when I was an embryo, and I was frozen and later implanted in the womb of the woman who gave birth to me.
4. I had a genetic mother who contributed the egg that was planted in the womb of my real mother, who gave birth to me and raised me.
5. By genetic engineering, the genes in the egg my father's sperm fertilized were spliced together from genes in the eggs of twenty different women. I wouldn't call any of them my real mother.

My real mother is the woman who bore and raised me, even though I don't have any single genetic mother.

In short, more than one of these models contributes to the characterization of a real mother, and anyone of them may be absent from such a characterization. **STILL, the very idea that there is such a thing as a real mother 2. seems** to require a choice among models where they diverge. It would be bizarre for someone to say:

I have four real mothers: the woman who contributed my genes, the woman who gave birth to me, the woman who raised me, and my father's current wife.

When the cluster of models that jointly characterize a concept diverge, there is still a strong pull to view one as the most important. This is reflected in the A particularly interesting case of metonymy occurs in giving answers to questions. It is common to give an answer that evokes the information requested, and there **seem** to be language-particular metonymic models used to do so. Take, for example, the case described by Rhodes (1977), a linguist who does fieldwork on Ojibwa, a Native American language of central Canada. As part of his fieldwork, he asked speakers of Ojibwa who had come to a party how they got there. He got answers like the following (translated into English):

- I started to come.

- I stepped into a canoe.

- I got into a car.

He figured out what was going on when he read Schank and Abelson's *Scripts, Plans, Goals, and Understanding* (1977). Going somewhere in a vehicle involves a structured scenario (or in our terms, an ICM):



Precondition: You have (or have access to) the vehicle.

Embarcation: You get into the vehicle and start it up.

Center: You drive (row, fly, etc.) to your destination.

Finish: Presupposition is one of the most interesting of linguistic and conceptual phenomena. The empirical study of presupposition blossomed in linguistics in the late 1960s, but was pretty much killed off by the mid-1970s, a victim of objectivist semantics and psychology. It was a case where an interesting empirical study became disreputable because it did not make sense in terms of the reigning theoretical assumptions of the times.

Let us consider a simple example of a presupposition.

(a) I regret that Harry left.

(b) I don't regret that Harry left.

(c) Harry left.

Normally, the speaker who says (a) or its negation, (b), is taking (c) for granted.

In the 1960s there were two alternatives available for trying to account for this phenomenon.

#### LOGICAL PRESUPPOSITION:

Both (a) and its negation, (b), logically entail (c).

Logical entailment is defined in terms of truth in the world. Thus, whenever (a) or (b) is true in the world, (c) must be true in the world. This leads to problems for sentences like (d) I don't regret that Harry left -in fact, he didn't leave at all.

If the theory of logical presupposition were correct, then (d) should be a logical contradiction, since the first half entails the truth of (c) and the second half denies (c). But since (d) is not a logical contradiction, the theory of logical presupposition cannot hold for such cases.

The only other method of comprehending presupposition available at that time was pragmatic (or psychological) presupposition, which was a matter of the speaker's assumptions rather than any logical entailment.

#### PRAGMATIC PRESUPPOSITION:

P is a presupposition of sentence S if, whenever a speaker says S, he is committed to assuming P.

This doesn't help very much with (d). One might claim that the speaker was assuming (c) in the first half of the sentence and then changed his mind. **BUT that 3.doesn't seem** to be what's going on at all. (p.131)

Let us take a case like the following, taken from Fillmore (1982b, 1984).

- (e) John is thrifty.
- (J) John isn't thrifty.
- (g) Spending as little money as possible is good.
- (h) John is stingy.
- (i) John isn't stingy.
- (j) Spending as little money as possible is not good.

Here (g) is taken for granted in both (e) and (f), and (j) is taken for granted in both (h) and (i). Now consider (k).

- (k) John isn't stingy, he's thrifty.

According to the theory of pragmatic presupposition, the speaker should be assuming a contradiction -(g) and (J), since the first half of (k) presupposes (g) while the second half presupposes (j). For such cases, neither logical nor pragmatic presupposition will work. For a superb discussion of many such cases, see Horn 1985; Horn refers to the phenomenon as "metalinguistic negation."

Fillmore (1984) has observed that a theory of presupposition based on the theory of ICMs can account for examples like (k). The reason is that RCMs are cognitive models that are idealized. They do not have to fit the world and they can be used by speakers to suggest how to, or not to, understand a given situation. Fillmore suggests that thrifty is defined relative to an ICM in which (g) holds, and that stingy is defined relative to an ICM in which (j) holds. Negation, Fillmore suggests, can either "accept" an ICM (that is, take that ICM for granted) or "reject" that ICM (that is, it can negate the applicability of the ICM evoked by the negated word). In (k), the negation is operating to reject the ICM associated with stingy. That is, the speaker is suggesting that the ICM evoked by stingy isn't the right way to look at the situation, while the ICM evoked by thrifty is.

This solution will also work for (d) above. Assume that regret is defined with respect to an ICM in which the object complement of regret holds; in this case it would be (c) above. Recall that (c) holds in the ICM, not in the world. In sentence (d) above, the negation is functioning not merely to negate regret, but to indicate the inapplicability of the ICM evoked by regret.

En "STILL, the very idea that there is such a thing as a real mother *seems* to require a choice among models where they diverge," el *contraste* está dado no solamente por la conjunción adversativa "Still", sino también por el adverbio intensificador "very" que –en este contexto discursivo– está poniendo énfasis en el nominal "idea" más la cláusula nominal declarativa complemento de "idea", que se constituye en el *tema* de la emisión bajo análisis. La *Carencia* es subsanada una vez que el receptor/ lector arriba al final de la *cualidad* introducida en el discurso por la cláusula no finita "to require a choice among models where they diverge."

En “**BUT that doesn't seem** to be what's going on at all” podemos observar dos aspectos relevantes. Por un lado, la conjunción adversativa “But” habilita un contexto de *Carencia* por *contraste* que crea una expectativa en el receptor/lector y lo invita a continuar leyendo para completar la información que aún no posee. Por otro lado, “that” –*demonstrativo referencial*– es en sí un elemento de *Alto Grado de Cohesión Discursiva*, el cual toma su referencia de endofórica y anafóricamente: “that” se refiere a toda la idea anteriormente mencionada en el contexto del texto.

Veamos el ejemplo que sigue:

4.49 Philosophy matters. It matters more than most people realize, because philosophical ideas that have developed over the centuries enter our culture in the form of a world view and affect us in thousands of ways. Philosophy matters in the academic world because the conceptual frameworks upon which entire academic disciplines rest usually have roots in philosophy –roots so deep and invisible that they are usually not even noticed. This is certainly true in my own field, linguistics, where the classical theory of categories and certain attendant philosophical assumptions have been taken so much for granted that alternative assumptions seem unthinkable. One of my purposes is to show that the classical theory of categories is inadequate for the study of natural language as well as other aspects of the mind and that new philosophical assumptions are required in order to make sense of linguistic phenomena and other aspects of cognition.

The classical theory of categories has not evolved in a vacuum. It has developed side by side with some of the most widespread philosophical views in the West. And **ALTHOUGH** it is possible to hold the classical theory of categories without being committed to those philosophical views, a) **THE REVERSE does not seem** to be true. b) **The philosophical views we will be discussing seem** to require the classical theory of categories. If the classical theory of categories falls, those philosophical views fall with it. (p.157)

En este apartado, podemos observar en el caso 4.49 a) un doble contraste. En el ejemplo bajo análisis, hallamos además de la conjunción concesiva “although” –que hace evidente el contexto de *Carencia* por *Contraste*–, encontramos también cierto contraste entre dos ideas: “it is possible to hold the classical theory of categories without being committed to those philosophical views,” y “the reverse” (hecho o idea).

En 4.49 b) , el *contraste* es más sutil, ya que el mismo no está marcado expresamente por una conjunción. Empero, sí hay una aclaración –expresada en la relativa restrictiva de contacto “we will be discussing”– que nos lleva a concluir que lo que Lakoff va a discutir son ciertas ideas filosóficas, y no otras.

Observemos el ejemplo a continuación:

4.50 Is *fish* a natural kind or not? What about *zebra*? What kinds of properties are *really*, that is objectively, essential-the cladists' (shared derived characters) or the pheneticists' (those that characterize overall similarity). If each answer has *some* scientific validity, then any *one* answer misses a truth. If both kinds of criteria have some claim on reality, then **the philosophical concept of a natural kind** does not accord with our scientific understanding of the natural world. **Rather, natural kind seems** to be part of our folk conception of the world, not part of any scientific conceptual system that there will ultimately be general agreement on. As we saw, the concept *natural kind* plays an absolutely crucial role in objectivist metaphysics. Yet any objectivist notion of natural kind will miss some scientific criterion for categorization.

There is an obvious escape route here than an objectivist might reasonably attempt-saying that one scientific view is right and the other wrong. Let us look closely at exactly what that would entail. The most remarkable consequence is that the objectivist metaphysician who wants to keep the familiar natural kinds in biology must give up the theory of evolution! But that is perhaps the best supported scientific theory of our time. (p.187)

El ejemplo 4.50 el contraste está marcado expresamente por la conjunción adversativa “Rather”, que expresamente indicada un contraste entre “The philosophical concept of a natural kind” y “natural kind” como concepto ‘folk’.

Analicemos este otro ejemplo:

#### 4.51 Review

We have shown that the expressions that indicate anger in American English are not a random collection but rather are structured in terms of an elaborate cognitive model that is implicit in the semantics of the language. This indicates that anger is not just an amorphous feeling, but rather that it has an elaborate cognitive structure. However, very significant problems and questions remain.

First, there are aspects of our understanding of anger that our methodology cannot shed any light on. Take, for example, the range of offenses that cause anger and the corresponding range of appropriate responses. Our methodology reveals nothing in this area.

Second, study of the language as a whole gives us no guide to individual variation. We have no idea how close any individual comes to the model we have uncovered, and we have no idea how people differ from one another.

Third, our methodology does not enable us to say much about the exact psychological status of the model we have uncovered. How much of it do people really use in comprehending anger? Do people base their actions on this model? Are people aware of the model? How much of it, if any, do people consciously believe? And most intriguingly, does the model have any effect on what people feel?

**Certain things, HOWEVER, do seem** to be clear. Most speakers of American English seem to use the expressions we have described consistently and make inferences that appear, so far as we can tell, to be

consistent with our model. We make this claim on the basis of our own intuitive observations, though to really establish it, one would have to do thorough empirical studies. If we are right, our model has considerable psychological reality, but how much and what kind remains to be determined. The fact that our analysis meshes so closely with the physiological study done by the Ekman group suggests that emotional concepts are embodied, that is, that the actual content of the concepts are correlated with bodily experience.

En el caso 4.51, el contraste está marcado por varios elementos. En primer lugar, la frase nominal general y no específica “Certain things” contrasta con “However, very significant problems and questions remain” –idea que encabeza un listado de problemas y cuestiones no resueltas aún en el ámbito de la investigación lingüística.

Otra marca de contraste es “However”, una de las conjunciones adversativas por excelencia. Por último, y este hecho mencionaremos nada más al pasar, el uso del auxiliar “do”, que en este contexto en inglés se utiliza solamente para indicar énfasis.

Además, es muy interesante destacar que para arribar a la *información nueva* hemos de traspasar los límites de la oración, y buscar más allá de la marca establecida por el punto y aparte para hallarla.

Tenemos la expectativa de que el análisis profundo que realizamos y expusimos de los casos que seleccionamos sirva para mostrar que sí hay una diferencia entre decir o escribir “Syntax seems not be all about algorithm” e “It seems that Syntax is not all about algorithms.” Esperamos también haber podido dar cuenta de que dicha diferencia radica en la puesta en juego tanto de *procesos cognitivos* que intervienen en la configuración de los *perfilamientos* a) y b), como en las *intenciones comunicativas* de los enunciadores involucrados.

## CAPÍTULO 5

### CONCLUSIONES GENERALES Y PROYECCIONES DE LA INVESTIGACIÓN

#### 5.1 Conclusiones Generales

Habiendo concluido nuestro arduo trabajo de redacción de nuestra tesis para obtener el título de magíster en lingüística en el marco de la Maestría en Lingüística de la Universidad Nacional de La Plata, y habiendo analizado nuestro corpus a partir de los marcos teóricos de la *Gramática Cognitiva* de Ronald Langacker y de la Escuela de Lingüística de Praga –en especial el de la *Perspectiva Funcional de la Oración* del lingüista Jan Firbas y de los valiosos aportes de la lingüista Claudia Borzi respecto de la noción de *Dinamismo Comunicativo*, hemos arribado a las siguientes conclusiones generales:

En primer lugar, al haber estudiado ciertos fenómenos lingüísticos a la luz de teorías acerca de la lengua que, por un lado, contemplan cuáles y de qué índole son los *procesos cognitivos* que tienen lugar cada vez que un emisor construye una estructura lingüística, y por el otro lado analizan qué recursos están disponibles y cómo se desarrolla el *avance de la información* en un contexto de comunicación concreto que implica la interacción de hablantes/escritores y oyentes/lectores reales, logramos probar nuestra hipótesis general de que entre los perfilamientos a) “Syntax seems not to be all about algorithms” y b) “It seems that Syntax is not all about algorithms” no existe solamente una diferencia en términos de principios teóricos apriorísticos y absolutos. Muy por el contrario, cuando un escritor/hablante recurre a a) o a b) en cierto contexto real de uso lo hace –consciente o inconscientemente– en base a ciertos *procesos cognitivos* que se activan al momento en que usuarios particulares de una lengua entran en interacción comunicativa los unos con los otros. Además, tal elección responde a necesidades comunicativas de dichos usuarios que precisan insertar –de cierto modo u otro– marcas o índices con el objetivo de ir progresivamente mostrándole a sus interlocutores hacia dónde han de dirigirse para hallar la información que los mismos desean o necesitan aportar.

Como señala Lyons en su libro de 1977 (p. 588) la *descontextualización* es una herramienta lingüística perfectamente legítima cuando separamos lo que denominamos *oraciones del sistema* de las *emisiones* (“utterances”) de la lengua. Empero, hemos de recordar que la primera es una *idealización* y que a partir de la misma no podemos estudiar un fenómeno lingüístico de manera completa y eficaz. Ahora bien, si lo que pretendemos es describir,

analizar y dar cuenta de fenómenos lingüísticos auténticos, dicha *descontextualización* ha de ser reducida a lo mínimo.

En segundo lugar, logramos:

- I) Probar –partiendo de enfoques lingüísticos de corte cognitivo y funcionalista– que entre emisiones tales como “Syntax seems not to be all about algorithms” y “It seems that Syntax is not all about algorithms” existen diferencias que sobrepasan los límites de la Sintaxis oracional.
- II) Poder hacer aportes significativos y concretos con el fin de que los procesos de enseñanza y aprendizaje de la gramática del inglés en las carreras de Profesorado, Traductorado y Licenciatura en inglés de la Universidad Nacional de La Plata reciban el aporte de marcos teóricos de otra índole.

Si nuestra meta es que este trabajo de investigación impacte en dicho ámbito, nos pareció que podría ser de gran aporte pensar y diseñar una clase de gramática del inglés, partiendo de los marcos teóricos y metodológicos elegidos para desarrollar nuestra tesis. Dicho aporte, lo hallamos en el apartado que sigue.

Por último, tuvimos el deleite de estudiar la lengua viva, en uso, y pudimos constatar que sí hay intencionalidad en la elección tanto de los ítem léxicos que seleccionamos para transmitir nuestros mensajes, así como también de la manera cómo decidimos desplegarlos en una hoja de papel, o en una emisión oral. Lograr ver y comprender el porqué ocurre lo que ocurre y cómo ocurren estos fenómenos en la vida cotidiana nos fue muy gratificante y fructífero para poder también enfocarnos en nuestra labor docente en lo que verdaderamente vale la pena enseñar: que la lengua varía y lo hace porque hay hablantes y escritores que tienen interlocutores oyentes y lectores con los que quieren relacionarse y entablar cierta comunicación. Detrás de todo esto, hay un contexto *verbal*, uno de *situación* y uno más amplio aún que es el contexto de *cultura*, que engloba todo y que hace que cada estrecho de lengua sea único e irrepetible.

## **5.2 Proyecciones de la investigación**

Propuesta pedagógica para el desarrollo del tema del predicado “seem” en dos de sus *perfilamientos* más productivos en inglés.

Este apartado está constituido por una propuesta pedagógica a los fines de mostrar cómo podría encararse –es decir, enseñarse y aprender– el tema de predicados tales como

“seem” desde enfoques cognitivistas-funcionalistas de la lengua. Una ventaja de esta forma de revisar este tópico, creemos, es que al proponer que lo que es crucial a la hora de estudiar estos *perfilamientos* es el *contexto real de uso* dentro del cual los hallamos, podemos observar, para luego mostrar (y de paso aprender para qué se usan, para luego usarlas) cuáles son los *procesos cognitivos* que entran en juego a la hora de recurrir a un perfilamiento o al otro. Podemos, además, ver cómo el creador de un texto le provee a su interlocutor marcas, índices para que el mismo avance en el dinamismo comunicativo, y de tal forma dicho enunciador pueda cumplir sus objetivos comunicativos.

Para diseñar esta propuesta pedagógica recurrimos a materiales didácticos de varios autores. En primer lugar, como se puede apreciar si observamos las *tareas* propuestas para el desarrollo de la clase, la *manera* cómo las mismas se secuencian, el *tema* de la clase y el *objetivo* principal de la misma –que los alumnos trabajen con lengua en uso en un contexto comunicativo– los enfoques didácticos por los que hemos optado proponen que los procesos de enseñanza y aprendizaje partan de las necesidades e intereses de los propios alumnos.

Nuestra propuesta está permeada por una serie de aspectos didácticos que han sido tomados de IBCC (*Instrucción Basada en Contenidos Críticos*)<sup>30</sup>, y ABT (*Aprendizaje Basado en Tareas*)<sup>31</sup>. Así mismo, nos servimos de los lineamientos de la *Pedagogía del Género*<sup>32</sup> que ha sido especialmente diseñada y luego implementada en contextos áulicos con el objetivo de enseñar y aprender a escribir o a producir cierto tipo de texto, es decir cierto *género* discursivo – en nuestro caso particular, un texto argumentativo oral.

## 5. 2.1 Profiling through the use of the modal predicate “seem”: a cognitivist-functional approach

### 1. Pre task: Introduction to the different ways of profiling scenarios featuring the predicate “seem”

When we study language from a *cognitivist* perspective, we focus on three aspects which necessarily work in tandem, namely, **language**, **cognition** and **experience**. When we also add a *functionalist* perspective to this analysis, all we do is consider seriously the **users** of the language, as well as the **context** in which language is

<sup>30</sup> Nos resultó muy interesante e iluminadora la postura y propuesta de la pedagoga e investigadora japonesa Ryuko Kubota quien propone repensar y re-examinar críticamente las prácticas docentes y las teorías que guían dichas prácticas en las aulas donde se enseña y aprende inglés como lengua extranjera

<sup>31</sup> Para citar un autor, mencionamos a Rod Ellis cuyo artículo “Designing a Task-Based Syllabus” de 2003 nos fue de gran ayuda.

<sup>32</sup> Algunos de los pedagogos de la *Pedagogía del Género* que nos gustaría destacar son Hayland (2007) y Dirgeyasa (2017).



used, and such users' **intentions** and **choices** at the time of *communicating*.

If we consider pair oppositions such as "It seems that Syntax is not all about algorithms" and "Syntax seems not to be all about algorithms" we can perceive – at first sight– that the differences between the two goes beyond purely formal principles, such as the *economy principle*, which merely posits aprioristically that the first structure is more 'economic' and 'elegant' than the second one, since – instead of applying *movement*, which is a very arduous operation– the structure in question features *merger*, a costless operation from a mental procedural viewpoint. However, what is it that actually matters at the time of studying a real piece of language produced by real people in a real context?

- **Read the following passages taken from speeches by different US politicians and find instances of the predicate "seem". Then put them in the chart below according to the kind of *profiling* involved.**

#### **McCarthy-Welch Exchange**

*"Have You Left No Sense of Decency?"*

*delivered 9 June 1954 during the Army-McCarthy Hearings in Washington, D.C.*

Mr. Welch: Senator, I think it hurts you, too, sir.

Senator McCarthy: I'd -- I'd like to finish this. I know Mr. Cohn would rather not have me go into this. I intend to, however. And Mr. -- Mr. Welch talks about any "sense of decency." It seems that Mr. Welch is pained so deeply, he thinks it's improper for me to give the record, the Communist front record, of the man whom he wanted to foist upon this committee. But it doesn't pain him at all -- there's no pain in his chest about the attempt to destroy the reputation and the -- take the jobs away from the young men who are working on my committee. And Mr. Welch, if -- if I have said anything here which is untrue, then tell me.

#### **Kennedy-Souter Exchange**

*United States Supreme Court Oral Arguments*

*delivered 11 December 2000*

KENNEDY: On the first, it seems to me essential to the Republican theory of government that the constitutions of the United States and the states are the basic charter. And to say that the legislature of the state is unmoored from its own constitution and it can't use its courts and it can't use its executive agency -- even you, your side, concedes it can use a state agency -- it seems to me a holding which has grave implications for our republican theory of government.

[...]SOUTER: That's right, there is no timetable there, so that seems to undercut your timetable argument once you get into the contest phase from the protest phase.

[...]SOUTER: It may well be, and I, you know, I will grant you, for the sake of argument, that there would be a sound interpretive theory that in effect would coordinate these two

statutes, 166 and 168, in a way that the Florida Supreme Court has not done; but that's a question of Florida Supreme Court statutory construction. And unless you can convince us, it seems to me, that in construing 168, which is what we're concerned with now, and its coordination or a lack of coordination with 166, the Florida Supreme Court has simply passed the bounds of legitimate statutory construction, then I don't see how we can find an Article II violation.

[... ]SOUTER: But you go to the opposite extreme and say, it seems to me, that they can't look, as Justice Stevens suggested, to a statute which deals with certainly a closely analogous subject at a near stage.

And it seems to me that you, in effect, go to the opposite extreme that you're excoriating the Florida Supreme Court for, and say they can't interpret at all.

[... ]REHNQUIST: Mr. Boies, there are really two parts to that sentence of Section 5. One is the law in effect at the time, and the other is, "finally determined six days before the date for choosing electors."

Do you think the Florida court meant to acknowledge -- it seems to me since it's cited generally, they must have acknowledged both of those provisions.

SCALIA: ... not sure that you and Justice Kennedy are disagreeing on very much. It seems to me you acknowledge that if the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of this law were not a reasonable interpretation, just not one that would pass normal judicial muster, then it would be just like the legislature writing a new law. But your contention here is that this is a reasonable interpretation of Florida law.

[... ]KENNEDY: My concern is that the contest period, as we've been talking about, requires the studying of standards, judicial review and by reason of, what I take it to be your earlier position in the litigation, this period has been truncated by 19 days causing the time frame of which we're also conscious, making it difficult for appellate review. And it seems to me -- and we're getting back to the beginning of this, that the legislature could not have done that by a statute without it being a new law, and that neither can the Supreme Court, without it being a new law, a new scheme, a new system for recounting at this late date. I'm very troubled by that.

[... ]O'CONNOR: But you think then there is no appellate review in the Supreme Court of what a circuit court does?

OLSON: Certainly, the legislature did not have to provide appellate review

O'CONNOR: Well, but it (REFERENCIAL) seemed, apparently, to just include selection of electors in the general election law provisions. It assumed that they'd all be lumped in together somehow. They didn't break it out.

[... ]

O'CONNOR: I'm sorry. You are responding as though there were no special burden to show some deference to legislative choices in this one context.

Not when courts review laws generally, for general elections, but in the context of selection of presidential electors, isn't there a big red flag up there, "Watch Out"?

BOIES: I think there is in a sense, Your Honor. And I think the Florida Supreme Court was grappling with that.

O'CONNOR: You think it did it properly?

BOIES: I think it did do it properly.

O'CONNOR: That's, I think, a concern that we have. And I did not find, really, a response by

the Florida Supreme Court to this court's remand in the case a week ago. It just seemed to kind of bypass it and assume that all those changes in deadlines were just fine, and they'd go ahead and adhere to them. And I found that

**Hilary Clinton**

*I Philadelphia, Hillary Clinton Accepts the Democratic Nomination  
Democratic National Convention  
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania  
Thursday, July 28, 2016*

The choice is clear, my friends. Every generation of Americans has come together to make our country freer, fairer, and stronger. None of us ever have or can do it alone. I know that at a time when so much seems to be pulling us apart, it can be hard to imagine how we'll ever pull together. But I'm here to tell you tonight – progress is possible. I know. I know because I've seen it in the lives of people across America who get knocked down and get right back up.

**John McCain**

*to the republican national convention  
4<sup>th</sup> September 2008 (after being chosen by his political party members as candidate for the presidency of the USA)*

I know some of you have been left behind in the changing economy and it often seems your government hasn't even noticed. Government assistance for unemployed workers was designed for the economy of the 1950s. That's going to change on my watch. My opponent promises to bring back old jobs by wishing away the global economy. We're going to help workers who've lost a job that won't come back, find a new one that won't go away.

**Barack Obama**

*Commencement Address at Knox College  
delivered 4 June 2005, Galesburg, Illinois*

It won't be easy, but it can be done. It can be our future. We have the talent and the resources and the brainpower. But now we need the political will. We need a national commitment.

And we need you.

Now, no one can force you to meet these challenges. If you want, it will be pretty easy for you to leave here today and not give another thought to towns like Galesburg and the challenges they face. There is no community service requirement in the real world; no one's forcing you to care. You can take your diploma, walk off this stage, and go chasing after the big house, and the nice suits, and all the other things that our money culture says you can buy.

But I hope you don't. Focusing your life solely on making a buck shows a poverty of ambition. It asks too little of yourself. You need to take up the challenges that we face as a nation and make them your own, not because you have an obligation to those who are less fortunate, although you do have that obligation. Not because you have a debt to all of those who helped you get to where you are, although you do have that debt. Not because you have an obligation to those who are less fortunate, although you do have that obligation. You need to take on the challenge because you

have an obligation to yourself. Because our individual salvation depends on collective salvation. Because it's only when you hitch your wagon to something larger than yourself that you will realize your true potential. And if we're willing to share the risks and the rewards this new century offers, it will be a victory for each of you, and for every American.

You're wondering how you'll do this. The challenges seem to be so big. And it seems to me that it is so difficult for one person to make a difference.

But we know it can be done. Because where you're sitting, in this very place, in this town, it's happened before.

**PROFILING “seem”**

<b>Configuration a) Nominal/ Pronoun/Determiner + seem [conjugated]+ infinitival “to” clause</b>	<b>Configuration b) It+ seems+ [TO ME] that... (Declarative Noun clause)</b>
✓	✓
✓	✓
✓	✓
✓	✓
✓	✓

**2. Core/Main Task:**

**2.1 Analysing the cognitive processes –as well as the communicative goals of real people in real contexts of situation.**

**2.1 Intuitive analysis: Say it in your own words which different scenarios are presented in each of the cases featuring the predicate “seem”.**

Use the following sentences as prompts to guide your reflection:

- Which is the subject/ “trajectory” in each of the examples?
- Why do you think such nominal has been chosen as such?
- What do you think the predicate “seem” conveys in each case?
- Which cognitive processes underlie configurations a) and b)?
- When is there more ‘certainty’ or ‘commitment’ on the part of the writer with the truth-value of the propositions/ ideas involved?

- In which of the two *configurations* the THEME/ subject is more dynamic in terms of *Communicative Dynamism*? Why is that so?

**2.2 Theoretical concepts applied to language :**

**In groups, choose one of the passages and analyse each of the *configuration(s)* featuring “seem”.**

Consider the following theoretical concepts:

- ✓ *Discrepancy of profiling*
- ✓ *Transparency*
- ✓ *Metonymy*
- ✓ *Communicative Dynamism*
- ✓ *Presentational and Quality Scales*
- ✓ *Scarceness/ Completion* contexts: Presentational, High degree of Contextual Cohesion (Reference and Lexical Cohesion) and Contrast.

***Development of your analysis***


**3. Post Task: A SPECIAL CASE**

**In the text below, one of the configurations containing “seem” is highlighted. Such structure would exceed the limits of a formal aprioristic theory of language. Why do you think we posit this? How would you account for such peculiarities in terms of Cognitive Grammar and the analysis of texts carried out by the linguists of the Prague School?**

**Antonin Scalia**  
 On Realism and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment  
 delivered 2 January 2016, Archbishop Rummel High School, Metairie, Louisiana

[...] Well, I wanted to come back -- remember what I told you to think about. “Some men see things as they are and say ‘why,’ I dream things that never were and say ‘why not.’”

That seems to be what my Court does [inaudible at 28:01].

Now, what you ought to know before you embrace that wonderful motto...many think that it is a "knockoff" -- I think that's the modern term for unattributed copy -- of a line from a relatively obscure play of George Bernard Shaw. Well, you can judge for yourselves. Shaw's line, contained in a play called *Back to Methuselah*, goes as follows: "You see things; and you say 'Why?' But I dream things that never were; and I say why not."8

**Shaw, it seems, had the good sense to know that this motto is a tempting but not really a sound guide for human action.** You see, in *Back to Methuselah*, the lines were spoken by a serpent and addressed to a woman named Eve.

#### 4. Bibliography

In order for you to solve the tasks in this lesson, you should consult the following papers beforehand:

- Borzi C. (1998) El papel del Dinamismo Comunicativo en el avance textual, *Lingüística Española Actual* XX/2:239-254.
- Firbas, J. (1992) *Functional Sentence Perspective in Written and Spoken Communication*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 14-134
- Langacker, R. (1995) Raising and Transparency en Pelyvás, P. (1995) *A Reader in Cognitive Grammar for Students of English*, Kézirat, pp. 109-161

#### 5.2.2 Resolución de las tareas propuestas como parte de la clase recién presentada

##### RESPUESTAS SUGERIDAS

**Profiling through the use of the modal predicate “seem”: a cognitivist-functionalist approach**

**Pre task: Introduction to the different ways of profiling scenarios featuring the predicate “seem”**

When we study language from a *cognitivist* perspective, we focus on three aspects which necessarily work in tandem, namely, **language**, **cognition** and **experience**. When we also add a *functionalist* perspective to this analysis, all we do is consider seriously the **users** of the language, as well as the **context** in which language is used, and such users' **intentions** and **choices** at the time of *communicating*. If we consider pair oppositions such as “It seems that Syntax is not all about algorithms” and “Syntax seems not to be all about algorithms” we can perceive –

at first sight– that the differences between the two goes beyond purely formal principles, such as the *economy principle*, which merely posits aprioristically that the first structure is more ‘economic’ and ‘elegant’, since –instead of applying *movement*, which is a very arduous operation– the structure in question features *merger*, a costless operation from a mental procedural viewpoint. However, what is it that actually matters at the time of studying a real piece of language produced by real people in a real context?

- **Read the following passages taken from speeches by different US politicians and find instances of the predicate “seem”. Then put them in the chart below according to the kind of *profiling* involved.**

#### **McCarthy-Welch Exchange**

*"Have You Left No Sense of Decency?"*

*delivered 9 June 1954 during the Army-McCarthy Hearings in Washington, D.C.*

Mr. Welch: Senator, I think it hurts you, too, sir.

Senator McCarthy: I'd -- I'd like to finish this. I know Mr. Cohn would rather not have me go into this. I intend to, however. And Mr. -- Mr. Welch talks about any "sense of decency." It seems that Mr. Welch is pained so deeply, he thinks it's improper for me to give the record, the Communist front record, of the man whom he wanted to foist upon this committee. But it doesn't pain him at all -- there's no pain in his chest about the attempt to destroy the reputation and the -- take the jobs away from the young men who are working on my committee. And Mr. Welch, if -- if I have said anything here which is untrue, then tell me.

#### **Kennedy-Souter Exchange**

*United States Supreme Court Oral Arguments*

*delivered 11 December 2000*

KENNEDY: On the first, it seems to me essential to the Republican theory of government that the constitutions of the United States and the states are the basic charter.

And to say that the legislature of the state is unmoored from its own constitution and it can't use its courts and it can't use its executive agency -- even you, your side, concedes it can use a state agency -- it seems to me a holding which has grave implications for our republican theory of government.

[...] SOUTER: That's right, there is no timetable there, so that seems to undercut your timetable argument once you get into the contest phase from the protest phase.

[...] SOUTER: It may well be, and I, you know, I will grant you, for the sake of argument, that there would be a sound interpretive theory that in effect would coordinate these two statutes, 166 and 168, in a way that the Florida Supreme Court has not done; but that's a question of Florida Supreme Court statutory construction. And unless you can convince us, it seems to me, that in construing 168, which is what we're concerned with now, and its coordination or a lack of coordination with 166, the Florida Supreme Court has simply

passed the bounds of legitimate statutory construction, then I don't see how we can find an Article II violation.

[...]SOUTER: But you go to the opposite extreme and say, it seems to me, that they can't look, as Justice Stevens suggested, to a statute which deals with certainly a closely analogous subject at a near stage.

And it seems to me that you, in effect, go to the opposite extreme that you're excoriating the Florida Supreme Court for, and say they can't interpret at all.

[...]REHNQUIST: Mr. Boies, there are really two parts to that sentence of Section 5. One is the law in effect at the time, and the other is, "finally determined six days before the date for choosing electors."

Do you think the Florida court meant to acknowledge -- it seems to me since it's cited generally, they must have acknowledged both of those provisions.

SCALIA: ... not sure that you and Justice Kennedy are disagreeing on very much. It seems to me you acknowledge that if the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of this law were not a reasonable interpretation, just not one that would pass normal judicial muster, then it would be just like the legislature writing a new law. But your contention here is that this is a reasonable interpretation of Florida law.

[...]KENNEDY: My concern is that the contest period, as we've been talking about, requires the studying of standards, judicial review and by reason of, what I take it to be your earlier position in the litigation, this period has been truncated by 19 days causing the time frame of which we're also conscious, making it difficult for appellate review. And it seems to me -- and we're getting back to the beginning of this, that the legislature could not have done that by a statute without it being a new law, and that neither can the Supreme Court, without it being a new law, a new scheme, a new system for recounting at this late date. I'm very troubled by that.

[...]O'CONNOR: But you think then there is no appellate review in the Supreme Court of what a circuit court does?

OLSON: Certainly, the legislature did not have to provide appellate review

O'CONNOR: Well, but it (REFERENCIAL) seemed, apparently, to just include selection of electors in the general election law provisions. It assumed that they'd all be lumped in together somehow. They didn't break it out.

[...]

O'CONNOR: I'm sorry. You are responding as though there were no special burden to show some deference to legislative choices in this one context.

Not when courts review laws generally, for general elections, but in the context of selection of presidential electors, isn't there a big red flag up there, "Watch Out"?

BOIES: I think there is in a sense, Your Honor. And I think the Florida Supreme Court was grappling with that.

O'CONNOR: You think it did it properly?

BOIES: I think it did do it properly.

O'CONNOR: That's, I think, a concern that we have. And I did not find, really, a response by the Florida Supreme Court to this court's remand in the case a week ago.

It just seemed to kind of bypass it and assume that all those changes in deadlines were just fine, and they'd go ahead and adhere to them. And I found that



**Hilary Clinton**

*I Philadelphia, Hillary Clinton Accepts the Democratic Nomination  
Democratic National Convention  
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania  
Thursday, July 28, 2016*

The choice is clear, my friends. Every generation of Americans has come together to make our country freer, fairer, and stronger. None of us ever have or can do it alone. I know that at a time when so much seems to be pulling us apart, it can be hard to imagine how we'll ever pull together. But I'm here to tell you tonight – progress is possible. I know. I know because I've seen it in the lives of people across America who get knocked down and get right back up.

**John McCain**

*to the republican national convention  
4<sup>th</sup> September 2008 (after being chosen by his political party members as candidate for the  
presidency of the USA)*

I know some of you have been left behind in the changing economy and it often seems your government hasn't even noticed. Government assistance for unemployed workers was designed for the economy of the 1950s. That's going to change on my watch. My opponent promises to bring back old jobs by wishing away the global economy. We're going to help workers who've lost a job that won't come back, find a new one that won't go away.

**Barack Obama**

*Commencement Address at Knox College  
delivered 4 June 2005, Galesburg, Illinois*

It won't be easy, but it can be done. It can be our future. We have the talent and the resources and the brainpower. But now we need the political will. We need a national commitment.

And we need you.

Now, no one can force you to meet these challenges. If you want, it will be pretty easy for you to leave here today and not give another thought to towns like Galesburg and the challenges they face. There is no community service requirement in the real world; no one's forcing you to care. You can take your diploma, walk off this stage, and go chasing after the big house, and the nice suits, and all the other things that our money culture says you can buy.

But I hope you don't. Focusing your life solely on making a buck shows a poverty of ambition. It asks to little of yourself. You need to take up the challenges that we face as a nation and make them your own, not because you have an obligation to those who are less fortunate, although you do have that obligation. Not because you have a debt to all of those who helped you get to where you are, although you do have that debt. Not because you have an obligation to those who are less fortunate, although you do have that

obligation. You need to take on the challenge because you have an obligation to yourself. Because our individual salvation depends on collective salvation. Because it's only when you hitch your wagon to something larger than yourself that you will realize your true potential. And if we're willing to share the risks and the rewards this new century offers, it will be a victory for each of you, and for every American.

You're wondering how you'll do this. The challenges seem to be so big. And it seems to me that it is so difficult for one person to make a difference.

But we know it can be done. Because where you're sitting, in this very place, in this town, it's happened before.

**PROFILING “seem”**

<b>Configuration a) It+ seems+ [TO ME] that... (Declarative Noun clause)</b>	<b>Configuration b) Nominal+ seem [conjugated]+ infinitival “to” clause</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ <b>It seems that</b> Mr. Welch is pained so deeply, he thinks it's improper for me to give the record, the Communist front record, of the man whom he wanted to foist upon this committee.</li> <li>✓ <b>it seems to me</b> essential to the Republican theory of government <b>that</b> the constitutions of the United States and the states are the basic charter.</li> <li>✓ -- <b>it seems to me</b> a holding which has grave implications for our republican theory of government.</li> <li>✓ <b>it seems to me, that</b> in construing 168, which is what we're concerned with now, and its coordination or a lack of coordination with 166, the Florida Supreme Court has simply passed the bounds of legitimate statutory construction, then I don't see how we can find an Article II violation.</li> <li>✓ <b>it often seems</b> your government hasn't even noticed.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ <b>that seems to</b> undercut your timetable argument once you get into the contest phase from the protest phase.</li> <li>✓ <b>It just seemed to</b> kind of bypass it and assume that all those changes in deadlines were just fine, and they'd go ahead and adhere to them.</li> <li>✓ I know that at a time when <b>so much seems to</b> be pulling us apart, it can be hard to imagine how we'll ever pull together.</li> <li>✓ the challenges seem to be so big.</li> <li>✓ <b>They seem to</b> be so difficult for one person to make a difference.</li> </ul>

**3. Core/Main Task:**

**2.1 Analysing the cognitive processes –as well as the communicative goals of real people in real contexts of situation.**

**2.1 Intuitive analysis: Say it in your own words which different scenarios are presented in each of the cases featuring the predicate “seem”**

Use the following sentences as prompts to guide your reflection: (SS' own answers)

- Which is the subject/ “trajectory” in each of the examples?
- Why do you think such nominal has been chosen as such?
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## 2.2 Theoretical concepts applied to language :

**In groups, choose one of the passages and analyse each of the configuration(s) featuring “seem”.**

Consider the following theoretical concepts:

- ✓ *Discrepancy of profiling*
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### ***Development of your analysis***

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But we know it can be done. Because where you're sitting, in this very place, in this town, it's happened before.

### SS' possible analysis

In this speech, the ex-president of the US, Barak Obama, addresses Americans on the issue of their participation on a national cause: the setting up of laboratories, companies, factories, etc., to do research and to create true sources of employment. But above all, Obama is encouraging Americans to take active part in these issues by voting his party in the next elections.

The *challenges* Obama refers to is the main topic developed throughout his whole speech. So, by the time he says “The challenges seem to be so big”, he chooses as the trajector “the challenges” because this nominal is the most salient participant cognitively speaking in a scenario in which something happens: “the challenges BE so big”. In this scene, which describes a state –more than a process–, “The challenges” metonymically represents the whole situation, and thus, is placed first as the subject of the sentence/utterance.

The notions *Discrepancy of profiling* and *transparency* are to do with the fact that predicates such as “seem” do not impose any restrictions on the kinds of nominal that may occupy the subject position. Moreover, the scene is profiled by a conceptualizer who places himself off the stage, as it were.

When it comes to the following sentence “And it seems to me that it is so difficult for one person to make a difference”, the profiling is quite different. Here, not only does the conceptualizer choose the third person singular pronoun “it”, but he also introduces himself resorting to the propositional phrase “to me”, by means of which he is overtly involved in the conceptualization of such scenario.

We should keep in mind that according to Langacker (1995), the functional word “it” is much more than a mere subject filler or grammatical subject. On the contrary, “it” is considered a semantic element used to introduce the viewpoint of the speaker/ writer in such a way that they can also wash their hands off the matter.

As for the *communicative dynamism* found in this passage, comparing the two ways of profiling these situations, we may ascertain that in the first example, “the challenges” constitutes an instance of *Lexical cohesion* by *Repetition* of this same lexical item. So, the reference of “the challenge” is in play, that is to say, it is present in the *immediate relevant context* at the time it is introduced in the example under analysis. On the other hand, in the second example, “it” is by far the most dynamic element communicatively speaking, since it invites the reader/hearer to move forwards as quickly as possible to get to know what is new from the point of view of the speaker/writer. Thus, the speaker/writer fulfills his communicative goal.

The former example is embedded in a context of *scarceness/completion* where there is a highly cohesive element (“The challenges”); the latter constitutes a *presentational context* introduced by the *eternal theme* it, where “seems” (together with “to me”) constitutes the **transition proper** and the *that clause* introduces the property.

#### 4. Post Task: A SPECIAL CASE

In the text below, one of the configurations containing “seem” is highlighted. Such structure would exceed the limits of a formal aprioristic theory of language.

Why do you think we posit this?

How would you account for such peculiarities in terms of Cognitive Grammar and the analysis of texts carried out by the linguists of the Prague School?

##### Antonin Scalia

On Realism and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment  
delivered 2 January 2016, Archbishop Rummel High School, Metairie, Louisiana

[...] Well, I wanted to come back -- remember what I told you to think about. “Some men see things as they are and say ‘why,’ I dream things that never were and say ‘why not.’” That seems to be what my Court does [inaudible at 28:01].

Now, what you ought to know before you embrace that wonderful motto...many think that it is a "knockoff" -- I think that's the modern term for unattributed copy -- of a line from a relatively obscure play of George Bernard Shaw. Well, you can judge for yourselves. Shaw's line, contained in a play called Back to Methuselah, goes as follows: “You see things; and you say 'Why?' But I dream things that never were; and I say why not.”<sup>8</sup>

**Shaw, it seems, had the good sense to know that this motto is a tempting but not really a sound guide for human action.** You see, in Back to Methuselah, the lines were spoken by a serpent and addressed to a woman named Eve.

SS' own answers

### 5.3 Reflexiones acerca de la puesta en práctica de esta Propuesta Pedagógica

La puesta en práctica de esta clase tendría el gran beneficio de que los alumnos de la Universidad Nacional de La Plata adquirirían herramientas que les permitirían fehacientemente comprender la lengua en uso, sea la que ellos usan, sea la que leen o escuchan de otras personas. Apropiarse de una lengua otra no es meramente saber las reglas gramaticales, sino que además es saber cómo se usa la lengua en contextos reales de uso, y tener la perspicacia de saber cómo la usan otros: usuarios nativos y no nativos también.

Una mirada crítica de la lengua es muy valiosa y valorada y tiene mucho que ver con los principios y objetivos básicos de la UNLP.

En el sitio web de la UNLP <https://unlp.edu.ar/pensar/lineamientos-generales-9652>, hallamos la siguiente cita:

La universidad debe ser hoy un espacio para tener ideas y discutirlos, alejada del pensamiento único, promotora del pensamiento diverso, original y propio; caracterizada por estar llena de inquietudes, rechazos, audacias, escrúpulos y esperanzas que custodian el comportamiento ético, transparente, republicano y democrático de sus miembros.

Creemos fervientemente que un acercamiento a la gramática del inglés de corte funcionalista-cognitivist que complemente los principios básicos de la gramática generativista chomskiana puede ser de gran aporte para la comunidad educativa en su conjunto.

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## ANEXO 1

### CORPUS

1. This book attempts to bring together some of the evidence for the view that reason is embodied and imaginative –in particular, the evidence that comes from the study of the way people categorize. Conceptual systems are organized in terms of categories, and most, if not all of our thought involves those categories. The objectivist view rests on a theory of categories that goes back to the ancient Greeks and that even today is taken for granted as being not merely true, but obviously and unquestionably true. Yet contemporary studies of the way human beings actually categorize things suggest that categorization is a rather different and more complex matter.

What is most interesting to me about these studies is that they 1. seem to provide evidence for the experientialist view of human reason and against the objectivist view. Taken one by one, such studies are things only scholars could care about, but taken as a whole, they have something magnificent about them: evidence that the mind is more than a mere mirror of nature or a processor of symbols, that it is not incidental to the mind that we have bodies, and that the capacity for understanding and meaningful thought goes beyond what any machine can do.

(prefacio P 17)

2. I am interpreting Austin as making an implicit psychological claim about categorization. In the very act of pointing out and analyzing the differences among the senses, Austin is presupposing that these senses form a natural collection for speakers-so natural that the senses have to be differentiated by an analyst. No such analysis would be needed for true homonyms, say, bank (where you put your money) and bank (of a river), which are not part of a natural collection (or category) of senses. In pointing out the existence of a small number of mechanisms by which senses are related to one another, Austin is implicitly suggesting that those mechanisms are psychologically real (rather than being just the arbitrary machinations of a clever analyst). He is, after all, trying to explain why people naturally use the same words for different senses. His implicit claim is that these mechanisms are principles which provide a "good reason" for grouping the senses together by the use of the same word. What I have referred to as "metonymy" is just one such mechanism.

From metonymy, Austin turns to what Johnson and I (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) refer to as metaphor, but which Austin, following Aristotle, terms "analogy."

When A:B::X: Y then A and X are often called by the same name, e.g., the foot of a mountain and the foot of a list. Here there is a good reason for calling the things both "feet" but are we to say they are "similar"? Not in any ordinary sense. We may say that the relations in which they stand to B and Y are similar relations. Well and good: but A and X are not the relations in which they stand. (Pp. 71-72)

Austin isn't explicit here, but what 2. seems to be going on is that both mountains and lists are being structured in terms of a metaphorical projection of the human body onto them. (pp. 19 - 20)

### 3. Berlin and Kay

The next major contribution of cognitive anthropology to prototype theory was the color research of Brent Berlin and Paul Kay. In their classic, *Basic Color Terms* (Berlin and Kay 1969), they took on the traditional view that different languages could carve up the color spectrum in arbitrary ways. The first regularity they found was in what they called basic color terms. For a color term to be basic,

- It must consist of only one morpheme, like green, rather than more than one, as in dark green or grass-colored.

- The color referred to by the term must not be contained within another color. Scarlet is, for example, contained within red.

- It must not be restricted to a small number of objects. Blond, for example, is restricted to hair, wood, and perhaps a few other things.

- It must be common and generally known, like yellow as opposed to saffron.

Once one distinguishes basic from non-basic color terms, generalizations appear.

- Basic color terms name basic color categories, whose central members are the same universally. For example, there is always a psychologically real category RED, with focal red as the best, or "purest," example.

- The color categories that basic color terms can attach to are the equivalents of the English color categories named by the terms black, white, red, yellow, green, blue, brown, purple, pink, orange and gray.

- Although people can conceptually differentiate all these color categories, it is not the case that all languages make all of those differentiations. Many languages have fewer basic categories. Those categories include unions of the basic categories; for example, BLUE +

GREEN, RED +ORANGE + YELLOW, etc. When there are fewer than eleven basic color terms in a language, one basic term, or more, names such a union.

- Languages form a hierarchy based on the number of basic color terms they have and the color categories those terms refer to.

Some languages, like English, use all eleven, while others use as few as two. When a language has only two basic color terms, they are black and white –which might more appropriately be called cool (covering black, blue, green, and gray) and warm (covering white, yellow, orange, and red). When a language has three basic color terms, they are black, white, and red. When a language has four basic color terms, the fourth is one of the following: yellow, blue, or green. The possibilities for four-color-term languages are thus: black, white, red, yellow; black, white, red, blue; and -black, white, red, green. And so on, down the following hierarchy:

-black, white red yellow, blue, green brown

-purple, pink, orange, gray

What made it possible for Berlin and Kay to find these regularities was their discovery of focal colors. If one simply asks speakers around the world to pick out the portions of the spectrum that their basic color terms refer to, there seem to be no significant regularities. The boundaries between the color ranges differ from language to language. The regularities appear only when one asks for the best example of a basic color term given a standardized chart of 320 small color chips. Virtually the same best examples are chosen for the basic color terms by speakers in language after language. For example, in languages that have a basic term for colors in the blue range, the best example is the same focal blue for all speakers no matter what language they speak. Suppose a language has a basic color term that covers the range of both blue and green; let us call that color grue. The best example of grue, they claim, will not be turquoise, which is in the middle of the blue-to-green spectrum. Instead the best example of grue will be either focal blue or focal green. The focal colors therefore allow for comparison of terms across languages.

The existence of focal colors shows that color categories are not uniform. Some members of the category RED are better examples of the category than others. Focal red is the best example. Color categories thus have central members. There is no general principle, however, for predicting the boundaries from the central members. They seem to vary, somewhat arbitrarily, from language to language. (p. 26)

4. Such cases can be accounted for intuitively by using fuzzy set union.

DARK-COOL = BLACK or GREEN or BLUE LIGHT-WARM = WHITE or RED or YELLOW  
COOL = GREEN or BLUE WARM = RED or YELLOW

Thus, Kay and McDaniel make the claim that basic color categories are a product of both neurophysiology and cognitively real operations that can be partially-modeled by fuzzy set intersection and union.

At present, this is the only plausible account we have of why the facts of basic color categories should be as they are. The Kay-McDaniel theory has important consequences for human categorization in general. It claims that colors are not objectively "out there in the world" independent of any beings. Color concepts are embodied in that focal colors are partly determined by human biology. Color categorization makes use of human biology, but color categories are more than merely a consequence of the nature of the world plus human biology. Color categories result from the world plus human biology plus a cognitive mechanism that has some of the characteristics of fuzzy set theory plus a culture-specific choice of which basic color categories there are.

The Kay-McDaniel theory 4. seems to work well for characterizing the focal colors corresponding to basic color categories. But it does not work as well at the boundaries between colors. According to the Kay- McDaniel account, the boundaries, as well as the focal colors, should be uniform across languages. But this is simply not the case. The most detailed work on the detailed mapping of color categories, especially in non-focal areas, has been done by MacLaury (in preparation). Among the test cases for the Kay-McDaniel theory are cases where a language does not have a separate color category for non-primary focal colors, like purple and orange, colors that, in the Kay-McDaniel account, are "computed" on the basis of fuzzy set theory plus the response curves for the primary colors. The Kay-McDaniel theory predicts that colors like purple and orange should be treated uniformly across languages and that they should always be on the boundaries between basic color categories in languages that do not have separate categories for them.

But MacLaury has found cases where purple is entirely within the cool color range (a single color with focal points at blue and green) and other cases where purple is on the boundary between cool and red. He has also found cases where brown is subsumed by yellow and other cases where it is subsumed by black. (p.29)

That is, what we call "brown" falls within the range of a category with a center at pure yellow in some languages, and it falls within the range of a category with a center at pure black in other languages.

In Kay-McDaniel terms, this means that the fuzzy-set-theoretical functions that compute conjunctions and disjunctions for color categories are not exactly the same for all people; rather they vary in their boundary conditions from culture to culture. They are thus at least partly conventional, and not completely a matter of universal neurophysiology and cognition. What this requires is a revision of the Kay-McDaniel theory to permit conceptual systems for color to vary at the boundaries, by having the exact nature of the disjunction function be somewhat different in different systems. Such differences may not only be at the boundaries but at the focal peaks. Kay and McDaniel's theory implied that each binary disjunctive color category (e.g., COOL == BLUE or GREEN) should have two focal peaks (e.g., both focal blue and focal green). MacLaury has found cases where there is a cool category covering blue and green, but where there is a skewing effect such that the center of the category is at pure green alone or pure blue alone. Thus, in Kay-McDaniel terms, conceptual systems 5. seem to have disjunction functions that take the blue and green response curves as input and yield an output curve with only one focal center. This would require a cognitive mechanism with more than just something akin to the operation of union in fuzzy set theory. (pp 29 – 30)

#### 5. Brown and Berlin: Glimpses of the Basic Level

The study of basic-level categories is usually traced to Roger Brown's classic paper, "How Shall a Thing Be Called?" (1958), and his textbook, *Social Psychology* (1965, pp. 317-21). Brown observed that objects have many names: "The dime in my pocket is not only a dime. It is also money, a metal object, a thing, and, moving to subordinates, it is a 1952 dime, in fact, a particular 1952 dime with a unique pattern of scratches, discolorations, and smooth places. The dog on the lawn is not only a dog but is also a boxer, a quadruped, an animate being". Brown also observed that of all the possible names for something in a category hierarchy, a particular name, at a particular level of categorization, "has a superior status." "While a dime can be called a coin or money or a 1952 dime, we somehow feel that dime is its real name. The other categorizations 6. seem to be like achievements of the imagination" (Brown 1965, p. 320). Such "real names," Brown observed, 7. seem to be shorter and to be used more frequently. They also 8. seem to correlate with nonlinguistic actions. (p. 31)

6. In addition, Stross (1969), in a study of Tzeltal language acquisition, discovered that "the bulk of the child's first-learned plant names are generic names and that from this starting point he continues to differentiate nomenclaturally, while cognitively he continues

to differentiate and generalize plants simultaneously." In other words, the basic-level (or generic) categories, which are in the middle of the taxonomic hierarchy, are learned first; then children work up the hierarchy generalizing, and down the hierarchy specializing. Thus, we can add the finding:

- Children learn the names for things at that level earlier. But perhaps the most remarkable finding of all was this:

- Folk categories correspond to scientific categories extremely accurately at this level, but not very accurately at other levels.

This says something very remarkable about THE DOCTRINE OF NATURAL KIND TERMS: For the Tzeltal, this doctrine works very well at the level of the genus, but not very well at other levels of classification, e.g., the intermediate, the species, and the variety levels.

But now if one considers philosophical discussions of natural kinds, it turns out that this is not such a surprising result after all. In the literature on natural kinds, one finds that the usual examples of natural kinds are animals like dog, cow, tiger, and substances like gold and water. As it happens, they are all basic-level categories! In short, the examples on which the doctrine of natural kinds was based were all basic level, which is the level of the genus among plants and animals. At least for the Tzeltal, the doctrine works well for the kinds of examples that philosophers had in mind when they espoused the doctrine. For other kinds of examples, it does not work very well.

But if THE DOCTRINE OF NATURAL KIND TERMS fits well for the Tzeltal at even one level of categorization, it still seems to be quite a remarkable result. It suggests that there is one psychologically relevant level at which THE CATEGORIES OF THE MIND FIT THE CATEGORIES OF THE WORLD. However, Berlin's research into the history of biological classification shows this result to be much less remarkable. Scientific classification in biology grew out of folk classification. And when Linnaeus classified the living things of the world, he specifically made use of psychological criteria in establishing the level of the genus. This comes across particularly clearly in A. J. Cain's 1958 essay "Logic and Memory in Linnaeus's System of Taxonomy" (1958). The heart of the Linnaean system was the genus, not the species. It is the genus that gives the general characteristics and the species that is defined in terms of differentiating characteristics. But what is a general characteristic? As Cain observes, "The Essential Character of a genus is that which gives some characteristic peculiar to it, if there is one such, which will instantly serve to distinguish it from all others in the natural order" (p. 148). This is a psychologically defined



notion of an "essential character"; which characteristics can be instantly distinguished. (p 34)

#### 7. Ekman

In research spanning more than two decades, Paul Ekman and his associates have studied in detail the physiological correlates of emotions (Ekman 1971; Ekman, Friesen, and Ellsworth 1972). In a major cross-cultural study of facial gestures expressing emotion, Ekman and his associates discovered that there were basic emotions [Relativa Restrictiva] that 10. seem to correlate universally with facial gestures: happiness, sadness, anger, fear, surprise, and interest. Of all the subtle emotions that people feel and have words and concepts for around the world, only these have consistent correlates in facial expressions across cultures.

Although Ekman was by no means a prototype theorist, his research fits prototype research in the following way. The seven basic emotions appear to have prototype status. There are many shades and varieties of happiness, sadness, anger, etc. These form categories of emotions. Rage and annoyance, for example, are in the anger category. Basic happiness, anger, etc.-the emotions that correlate with the universal facial gestures- 11. seem to function as central members of those categories. These emotions also appear to have basic-level status. They are readily recognizable by gestalt perception around the world. We have facial images and motor movements for them that represent the entire emotional category. (p.38)

#### 8. Acquisition

One of the most striking results about basic-level categorization concerns the acquisition of concepts by children. If the classical theory of categorization were correct, then there should be no more to categorization than what one finds in the logic of classes: hierarchical categorization based on shared properties of the members of the categories. Before the work of Rosch and Mervis (Rosch et al. 1976), research on child development had not been informed by the idea of basic-level categorization. It had been concluded that, for example, three-year-old children had not mastered categorization, which was taken to be taxonomic categorization defined by the logic of classes. This conclusion was based on the performance of children in "sorting tasks," where subjects are asked to "put together the things that go together." Rosch and her associates observed that such studies tended to involve categorization at the superordinate level.

The stimuli used in sorting tasks have tended to be of two types: If abstract (e.g., geometric forms varying in dimensions such as form, color, and size), they are typically presented in a

set which has no structure (e.g., each attribute occurs with all combinations of all others); if representational (e.g., toy versions or pictures of real-world objects), the arrays are such that they can be grouped taxonomically only at the superordinate level. Thus, the representational stimuli used in sorting tasks are such that if the child were to sort the objects into those of like taxonomic category, he would have to put together such items as socks and shirt, dog and cow. CHIL DREN do not 12. seem to have been asked to sort together objects belonging to the same basic level category (e.g., several shoes or several dogs). We suspect this results from the fact that basic objects are so obviously the "same object" to adults that a task 13. does not seem to be a problem of categorization to an adult experimenter unless objects are taken from different basic level categories.

(Rosch et al. 1976, pp. 414-15) [p.48]

9. The names that we have given to image schemas, and to image-schema transformations, are very much in keeping with the kind of symbolization that might be used in studies of computer vision. But the names are not the things named. This is shown by the naturalness of image-schema transformations relative to visual experience, as opposed to the arbitrariness of the names for those transformations. It 14. seems to me that image- schema transformations are cognitively real; the pervasiveness of the kinds of relationships between senses of lexical items that those transformations characterize is a strong indicator of their cognitive reality. And the naturalness of these transformations relative to our visual experience suggests that image-schema transformations and the schemas they relate are not propositional in character (in the sense of the term used in computer vision studies). Rather, they are truly imagistic in character. (p.44)

10. When research on basic objects and their prototypes was initially conceived (Rosch et al. 1976), I thought of such attributes as inherent in the real world. Thus, given an organism that had sensory equipment capable of perceiving attributes such as wings and feathers, it was a fact in the real world that wings and feathers co-occurred. The state of knowledge of a person might be ignorant of (or indifferent or inattentive to) the attributes or might know the attributes but be ignorant concerning their correlation. Conversely, a person might know of the attributes and their correlational structure but exaggerate that structure, turning partial into complete correlations (as when attributes true of only many members of a category are thought of as true of all members). However, the environment was thought to constrain categorizations in that human knowledge could not provide correlational structure

where there was none at all. For purposes of the basic object experiments, perceived attributes were operationally defined as those attributes listed by our subjects. Shape was defined as measured by our computer programs. WE thus 15. seemed to have our system grounded comfortably in the real world. (pp. 50-51)

11. On contemplation of the nature of many of our attributes listed by our subjects, however, it appeared that three types of attributes presented a problem for such a realistic view: (1) some attributes, such as "seat" for the object "chair," appeared to have names that showed them not to be meaningful prior to the knowledge of the object as chair; (2) some attributes such as "large" for the object "piano" 16. seemed to have meaning only in relation to categorization of the object in terms of a superordinate category-piano is large for furniture but small for other kinds of objects such as buildings; (3) some attributes such as "you eat on it" for the object "table" were functional attributes that [Relativa restrictiva] 17. seemed to require knowledge about humans, their activities, and the real world in order to be understood. That is, it appeared that the analysis of objects into attributes was a rather sophisticated activity that our subjects (and indeed a system of cultural knowledge) might be considered to be able to impose only after the development of a system of categories. (Rosch 1978, pp. 41-42)

Thus the relevant notion of a "property" is not something objectively in the world independent of any being; it is rather what we will refer to as an interactional property-the result of our interactions as part of our physical and cultural environments given our bodies and our cognitive apparatus. Such interactional properties form clusters in our experience, and prototype and basic-level structure can reflect such clusterings.

As Berlin has observed, interactional properties and the categories they determine A) seem objective in the case of properties of basic-level categories--categories like chair, elephant, and water. The reason is that, given our bodies, we perceive certain aspects of our external environment very accurately at the basic level, though not so accurately at other levels. As long as we are talking about properties of basic-level objects, interactional properties will B) seem objective.

Perhaps the best way of thinking about basic-level categories is that they are "human-sized." They depend not on objects themselves, independent of people, but on the way people interact with objects: the way they perceive them, image them, organize information about them, and behave toward them with their bodies. The relevant properties clustering together

to define such categories are not inherent to the objects, but are interactional properties, having to do with the way people interact with objects.

Basic-level categories thus have different properties than superordinate categories. For example, superordinate categories 18. seem not to be characterized by images or motor actions. For example, we have mental image of chairs –abstract images that don't fit any particular chair– and we have general motor actions for sitting in chairs. But if we go from the basic-level category CHAIR to the superordinate category FURNITURE, a difference emerges. We have no abstract mental images of furniture that are not images of basic-level objects like chairs, tables, beds, etc.

Try to imagine a piece of furniture that doesn't look like a chair, or table, or bed, etc., but is more abstract. People 19. seem not to be able to do so. Moreover, we do not have motor actions for interacting with furniture in general that are not motor actions for interacting with some basic-level object- chairs, tables, beds, etc. But superordinate categories do have other human-based attributes-like purposes and functions. (p.51-52)

12. In addition, the complements of basic-level categories are not basic level. They do not have the kinds of properties that basic-level categories have. For example, consider non-chairs, that is, those things that are not chairs. What do they look like? Do you have a mental image of a general or an abstract non-chair? PEOPLE 20. seem not to. How do you interact with a non-chair? Is there some general motor action one performs with non- chairs? Apparently not. What is a non-chair used for? Do non-chairs have general functions? Apparently not.

In the classical theory, the complement of a set that is defined by necessary and sufficient conditions is another set that is defined by necessary and sufficient conditions. But the complement of a basic-level category is not itself a basic-level category. (p. 52)

### 13. Clustering and Causation

Two of the themes that emerge from the research just discussed are the clustering of properties and the nonobjective, or interactional, character of properties relevant to human categorization. One of the most interesting of human categories from a philosophical point of view is the category of causes. Causation is represented in the grammar of most languages- and usually not just one kind of causation, but a variety of kinds. I have suggested elsewhere (Lakoff, 1977) that the category of kinds of causation shows prototype

effects in the ways that they are represented in natural languages. These effects are relatively uniform across languages.

We can account for these effects if we assume that prototypical causation is understood in terms of a [Referencia indefinida] cluster of interactional properties. This hypothesis appears to account best for the relation between language and conceptual structure, as well as for the relationships among the varieties of causation. The [Referencia definida. 1er caso!] cluster 21. seems to define a [Referencia indefinida-singular] prototypical causation, and non-prototypical varieties of causation [Referencia indefinida-plural] 22. seem to be best characterizable in terms of deviations from that cluster.

Prototypical causation appears to be direct manipulation, which is characterized most typically by the following cluster of interactional properties:

- a) There is an agent that does something.
- b) There is a patient that undergoes a change to a new state.
- c) Properties a and b constitute a single event; they overlap in time and space; the agent comes in contact with the patient.
- d) Part of what the agent does (either the motion or the exercise of will) precedes the change in the patient.
- e) The agent is the energy source; the patient is the energy goal; there is a transfer of energy from agent to patient.
- f) There is a single definite agent and a single definite patient. (p.54)
- g) The agent is human.
- h) The agent wills his action.
- i) The agent is in control of his action.
- j) The agent bears primary responsibility for both his action and the change.
- k) The agent uses his hands, body, or some instrument.
- l) The agent is looking at the patient, the change in the patient is perceptible, and the agent perceives the change.

14. Perhaps the most striking confirmation of the Bates-MacWhinney hypothesis comes from Van Oosten's study of the uses of the passive in English. Van Oosten picked out passive sentences as they occurred in transcribed conversation and compiled a list of all the uses. The list C) seemed random. She then compared her list of uses of the passive with her list of the properties of prototypical agents and topics. What she noticed was a remarkable

correlation. According to the Bates-MacWhinney hypothesis, the subjects of simple active sentences should be capable of displaying all the properties of agents and topics.

## 15. Mother

An example is the concept mother. According to the classical theory, it should be possible to give clear necessary and sufficient conditions for mother that will fit all the cases and apply equally to all of them. Such a definition might be something like: a woman who has given birth to a child. But as we will see, no such definition will cover the full range of cases. Mother is a concept that is based on a complex model in which a number of individual cognitive models combine, forming a cluster model. The models in the cluster are:

- The birth model: The person who gives birth is the mother.

The birth model is usually accompanied by a genetic model, although since the development of egg and embryo implants, they do not always coincide.

- The genetic model: The female who contributes the genetic material is the mother.

- The nurturance model: The female adult who nurtures and raises a child is the mother of that child.

- The marital model: The wife of the father is the mother.

- The genealogical model: The closest female ancestor is the mother.

The concept mother normally involves a complex model in which all of these individual models combine to form a cluster model. There have always been divergences from this cluster; stepmothers have been around for a long time. But because of the complexities of modern life, the models in the cluster have come to diverge more and more. Still, many people feel the pressure to pick one model as being the right one, the one that "really" defines what a mother is. But although one might try to argue that only one of these characterizes the "real" concept of mother, the linguistic evidence does not bear this out. As the following sentences indicate, there is more than one criterion for "real" motherhood:

1. I was adopted and I don't know who my real mother is.

2. I am not a nurturant person, so I don't think I could ever be a real mother to any child.

3. My real mother died when I was an embryo, and I was frozen and later implanted in the womb of the woman who gave birth to me.

4. I had a genetic mother who contributed the egg that was planted in the womb of my real mother, who gave birth to me and raised me.

5. By genetic engineering, the genes in the egg my father's sperm fertilized were spliced together from genes in the eggs of twenty different women. I wouldn't call any of them my real mother. My real mother is the woman who bore and raised me, even though I don't have any single genetic mother.

In short, more than one of these models contributes to the characterization of a real mother, and anyone of them may be absent from such a characterization. Still, the very idea that there is such a thing as a real mother 23. seems to require a choice among models where they diverge. It would be bizarre for someone to say:

- I have four real mothers: the woman who contributed my genes, the woman who gave birth to me, the woman who raised me, and my father's current wife.

When the cluster of models that jointly characterize a concept diverge, there is still a strong pull to view one as the most important. This is reflected in the institution of dictionaries. Each dictionary, by historical convention, must list a primary meaning when a word has more than one. (p.75-76)

16. A particularly interesting case of metonymy occurs in giving answers to questions. It is common to give an answer that evokes the information requested, and there D) seem to be language-particular metonymic models used to do so. Take, for example, the case described by Rhodes (1977), a linguist who does fieldwork on Ojibwa, a Native American language of central Canada. As part of his fieldwork, he asked speakers of Ojibwa who had come to a party how they got there. He got answers like the following (translated into English):

- I started to come.

- I stepped into a canoe.

- I got into a car.

He figured out what was going on when he read Schank and Abelson's *Scripts, Plans, Goals, and Understanding* (1977). Going somewhere in a vehicle involves a structured scenario (or in our terms, an ICM):

Precondition: You have (or have access to) the vehicle.

Embarkation: You get into the vehicle and start it up.

Center: You drive (row, fly, etc.) to your destination.

Finish: You park and get out.

End point: You are at your destination. (p.78)

17. Typical examples include cases like the following:

Robins and sparrows are typical birds. Apples and oranges are typical fruits. Saws and hammers typical tools.

Social stereotypes are usually conscious and subject to public discussion -and may even have names. However, the use of typical category members is usually unconscious and automatic. Typical examples are not the subject of public discussion, and they 24. seem not to change noticeably during a person's lifetime. They are not used to define cultural expectations. They are used in reasoning, as Rips (1975) showed, in the case where subjects inferred that if the robins on a certain island got a disease, then the ducks would, but not the converse. Such examples are common. It is normal for us to make inferences from typical to nontypical examples. If a typical man has hair on his head, we infer that atypical men (all other things being equal) will have hair on their heads. Moreover, a man may be considered atypical by virtue of not having hair on his head. There is nothing mysterious about this. An enormous amount of our knowledge about categories of things is organized in terms of typical cases. We constantly draw inferences on the basis of that kind of knowledge. And we do it so regularly and automatically that we are rarely aware that we are doing it. (p.86)

18. Naomi Quinn (personal communication) has observed, based on extensive research on American conceptions of marriage, that there are many kinds of ideal models for a marriage: successful marriages, good marriages, strong marriages, etc. Successful marriages are those where the goals of the spouses are fulfilled. Good marriages are those where both partners find the marriage beneficial. Strong marriages are those that are likely to last. Such types of ideals 25. seem to be of great importance in culturally significant categories- categories where making judgments of quality and making plans are important. (p. 86)

#### 19. Some Speculations.

The analysis given above was based on what Dixon's informants told him about their categorization system. They told him nothing about why animals were categorized with human males, nor why fire, water, and fighting were categorized in class II with human females. I would like to make some speculations about why I think the system is structured that way. But before I do, I would like to make a suggestion concerning Dixon's principles. It 26. seems to me that the myth-and-belief principle and the important- property principle amount pretty much to the same thing as the domain- of-experience principle. The domain-of-experience principle says that there are certain domains of experience that are significant for Dyirbal categorization. They have to be listed: fishing, fire, etc. These provide links in



category chains. Thus, if fish are in class I, fishing implements are also in class I. One way to look at the myth-and-belief principle is that it is a special case of the domain-of-experience principle. It says that myths and beliefs are domains of experience that are relevant for categorization. Dixon's important-property principle can be looked at in this way as well. It was set up primarily to handle harmful or dangerous things. That is the only important property it works for. One could equally say that danger is an important domain of experience for Dyirbal categorization and that it is on the same list of relevant domains as fishing, fire, and myths. Thus, all we would need to know is which domains of experience are relevant for categorization and then we would need specific knowledge of the domains. Continuing this speculation, we could account for Dyirbal categorization in the following way:

The basic divisions are:

- I. Bayi: human males
- II. Balan: human females
- III. Balam: edible plants
- IV. Ba/a: everything else

Classes I and II would be in minimal contrast -male versus female- a standard contrast in categorization systems around the world. According to Dixon's analysis, classes I and II are not in minimal contrast, any more than I and III or II and III are. The importance of this will become clear shortly.

The domain-of-experience principle would then list those domains of experience relevant for categorization: fishing, fire, myths, beliefs, danger. This would have the following consequences:

- Since fish are in class I, fishing implements are in class I.
- Since storms and the rainbow are believed to be mythic men, they are in class I
- Since birds are believed to be female spirits, birds are in class II, except for those three species of willy-wagtails who are believed to be mythical men and are therefore in class I.
- Since crickets are believed to be "old ladies," they are in class II.
- Since the moon is believed to be the husband of the sun, the moon is in class I and the sun is in class II.
- Since fire is in the same domain of experience as the sun, fire is in class II with the sun.
- Those things that are believed to be instances of fire are in the same domain as fire: the stars, hot coals, matches, etc. What we have done is suggest that the domain-of-experience principle is responsible for fire being in the same category as women. The links are: women

(via myth) to the sun (via relevant domain of experience) to fire. By the same means, we can link danger and water. Fire is dangerous, and thus dangerous things are in the same category as fire. Water, which extinguishes fire, is in the same domain of experience as fire, and hence in the same category. It should be borne in mind that these are speculations of an outside analyst. Speakers of Dyirbal told Dixon nothing like this, neither pro nor con. Native speakers of a language are only sometimes aware of the principles that structure their language. Either this analysis is wrong, or the speakers aren't conscious of these structuring principles, or Dixon didn't ask the right questions. It is, at least in principle, an empirical issue, since this analysis makes somewhat different claims than Dixon's. This analysis suggests that fighting spears, stinging nettles, garfish, and matches should be less central members of category II than girls. Tests have been developed by Eleanor Rosch and others (Rosch 1977) to measure relative centrality of members in a category. However, it is not clear that such tests can be applied in any sensible way to older members of an aborigine tribe. Still, the speculation is more than idle speculation. It is an empirical matter. The issue can be stated as follows: Are women, fire, and dangerous things all equally central members of class II, with no motivating links among them? Or are women central members of the category, linked in some fashion to the more peripheral fire and danger? Schmidt's data on the breakdown of the system favor the latter hypothesis. But, in addition, Schmidt found one direct piece of evidence—a speaker who consciously linked fire and danger to women:

buni [fire] is a lady. ban buni [class II fire]. You never say bayi buni [class I fire]. It's a lady. Woman is a destroyer. 'e destroys anything. A woman is a fire. [BM, 33 years, aboriginal male, Jambun]

Several things should be borne in mind about this statement. This is not a speaker of traditional Dyirbal; it is a younger member of the community, still fluent in the old language, but brought up primarily speaking English. There is no evidence one way or the other whether older speakers of the traditional language held such a belief. All it shows is that, for this speaker, there is a conceptual link of some kind between the presence of women in the category and the presence of fire and danger.

Our analysis makes another prediction as well. As the system breaks down one might expect distant links of the chain to break off. Schmidt cites one example where the entire fishing link breaks off and another where the entire danger link breaks off for a single speaker, while for other speakers the natural dangers branch alone breaks off. Under Dixon's analysis, in which human females and fighting (or harmfulness) are equally central, one

might equally well expect human females to be assigned to another category. The analysis I suggest has as a consequence that the central subcategory -human females- would be the last to go. This, too, is an empirical question. There may well be speakers with intermediate systems which have kept everything in balance except human females. But given the end point of the change, with balance containing only human females, that is unlikely.

Under the analysis I am suggesting, human males and females would be central members of categories I and II, which would place these categories in a minimal contrast. This would explain some interesting subregularities. Under such an analysis one would expect exceptions to class I to go into class II-the minimally contrasting category. And conversely, one would expect exceptions to class II to go into class I. One would not expect exceptions in these categories to go into classes III or IV. This is exactly what happens. Animals are in class I, but exceptional animals (dogs, platypuses, bandicoots, echidnas) are in class II. Snakes are in class I, but chicken snakes and water pythons are in class II. Birds are in class II, as are dangerous things. Since dangerous things have to be marked by special categorization, dangerous birds (hawks) are marked as exceptional by being placed in class I. Given this analysis, one can even find a regularity in the exceptions.

One thing we have not addressed is why animals are for the most part in class I with human males. Dixon observes that there are no separate words for male versus female animals; that is, there is a word for kangaroo, and no separate word for female kangaroo. Kangaroo (bayi yuri) is in class I with most animals; if one wants to specify that a kangaroo is female, one must use the class II classifier (balan yuri). The reverse is true for exceptional animals. Dog is in class II (balan guda). If one wants to indicate that a certain dog is male, one must use the class I classifier (bayi guda). All this amounts to saying that animal names are unmarked for gender. The categorization system 27. seems to be humans (male and female) versus edible plants versus inanimates. It 28. seems to be a reasonable guess that if animals are going to go anywhere in a system like this, it will be with the humans rather than with the edible plants. And it would make sense that if the animals are unmarked for gender, they would be categorized with the unmarked human category, if there is one. In most languages that have classification by gender, the male category is unmarked. On the basis of such universal tendencies, it is not a surprise to find the animals categorized with the human males. However, all this is speculation. Dixon (was unable to find any evidence that category I is unmarked relative to category II. It may be, but there is at present no positive evidence. Dixon did not want to speculate beyond his evidence, so he listed human males and animals as equally basic members of class I.

Dixon did not want to speculate beyond his evidence, so he listed human males and animals as equally basic members of class I.

According to his analysis, bats are no more central to this category than are boys. This is, at least in principle, a testable matter. If I had to make a bet (a small bet. I would bet that boys are more central than bats.

20. The Minsky-Putnam proposals appear to be capable in principle of accounting for the same range of prototype effects as propositional ICMs. They could probably be elaborated to duplicate Fillmore's bachelor analysis. They would thus be able to account for simple prototype effects. They do not, however, appear to be capable of accounting for most of the prototype effects we have discussed. They seem, at least on the face of it, to be inadequate to the task of describing the full range of effects that arise from metonymic models. And they are incapable of describing radially structured categories. (p.117)

21. Though Barwise's principles of veridicality and substitution do not hold unproblematically in the way they were intended, they are not altogether wrong. They seem to follow from our commonsense folk theory of 'seeing, which might be represented as an idealized cognitive model of seeing. (p.128)

22. The point is this: Situation semantics cannot account for the semantics of perception. The reason is that it is an objectivist semantics -that is, it only takes account of the world external to the perceiver. But perception has to do with the interaction between the perceiver and the world external to him. The appropriate domain for the logic of seeing is cognitive, not objectivist. ICMs are idealized models used by perceivers, and they seem to be appropriate as domains for the logic of human concepts like seeing. Though Barwise's principles do not hold in general, they do seem to hold for a semantics that uses ICMs that structure mental spaces (see Book II below). This suggests to me that the general study of human concepts should proceed using a cognitive semantics of this sort. (p.130)

23. Presupposition is one of the most interesting of linguistic and conceptual phenomena. The empirical study of presupposition blossomed in linguistics in the late 1960s, but was pretty much killed off by the mid-1970s, a victim of objectivist semantics and psychology. It was a case where an interesting empirical study became disreputable because it did not make sense in terms of the reigning theoretical assumptions of the times.

Let us consider a simple example of a presupposition.

- (a) I regret that Harry left.
- (b) I don't regret that Harry left.
- (c) Harry left.

Normally, the speaker who says (a) or its negation, (b), is taking (c) for granted. In the 1960s there were two alternatives available for trying to account for this phenomenon.

#### LOGICAL PRESUPPOSITION:

Both (a) and its negation, (b), logically entail (c).

Logical entailment is defined in terms of truth in the world. Thus, whenever (a) or (b) is true in the world, (c) must be true in the world. This leads to problems for sentences like (d) I don't regret that Harry left -in fact, he didn't leave at all.

If the theory of logical presupposition were correct, then (d) should be a logical contradiction, since the first half entails the truth of (c) and the second half denies (c). But since (d) is not a logical contradiction, the theory of logical presupposition cannot hold for such cases.

The only other method of comprehending presupposition available at that time was pragmatic (or psychological) presupposition, which was a matter of the speaker's assumptions rather than any logical entailment.

#### PRAGMATIC PRESUPPOSITION:

P is a presupposition of sentence S if, whenever a speaker says S, he is committed to assuming P.

This doesn't help very much with (d). One might claim that the speaker was assuming (c) in the first half of the sentence and then changed his mind. But that 33. doesn't seem to be what's going on at all. (p.131)

Let us take a case like the following, taken from Fillmore (1982b, 1984).

- (e) John is thrifty.
- (J) John isn't thrifty.
- (g) Spending as little money as possible is good.
- (h) John is stingy.
- (i) John isn't stingy.
- (j) Spending as little money as possible is not good.

Here (g) is taken for granted in both (e) and (f), and (j) is taken for granted in both (h) and (i). Now consider (k).

(k) John isn't stingy, he's thrifty.

According to the theory of pragmatic presupposition, the speaker should be assuming a contradiction -(g) and (J), since the first half of (k) presupposes (g) while the second half presupposes (j). For such cases, neither logical nor pragmatic presupposition will work. For a superb discussion of many such cases, see Horn 1985; Horn refers to the phenomenon as "metalinguistic negation."

Fillmore (1984) has observed that a theory of presupposition based on the theory of ICMs can account for examples like (k). The reason is that RCMs are cognitive models that are idealized. They do not have to fit the world and they can be used by speakers to suggest how to, or not to, understand a given situation. Fillmore suggests that thrifty is defined relative to an ICM in which (g) holds, and that stingy is defined relative to an RCM in which (j) holds. Negation, Fillmore suggests, can either "accept" an ICM (that is, take that ICM for granted) or "reject" that ICM (that is, it can negate the applicability of the ICM evoked by the negated word). In (k), the negation is operating to reject the ICM associated with stingy. That is, the speaker is suggesting that the ICM evoked by stingy isn't the right way to look at the situation, while the ICM evoked by thrifty is.

This solution will also work for (d) above. Assume that regret is defined with respect to an ICM in which the object complement of regret holds; in this case it would be (c) above. Recall that (c) holds in the ICM, not in the world. In sentence (d) above, the negation is functioning not merely to negate regret, but to indicate the inapplicability of the ICM evoked by regret.

24. However, my observation that the distinction was necessary was not in the service of supporting the semantics-pragmatics distinction; my purpose was to provide a counterexample. Here is the relevant passage:

But hedges do not merely reveal distinctions of degree of category membership. They can also reveal a great deal more about meaning. Consider:

(6) a. Esther Williams is a fish.

b. Esther Williams is a regular fish.

(6a) is false, since Esther Williams is a human being, not a fish. (6b), on the other hand, would seem to be true, since it says that Esther Williams swims well and is at home in water. Note that (6b) does not assert that Esther Williams has gills, scales, fins, a tail, etc. In fact, (6b) presupposes that Esther Williams is not literally a fish and asserts that she has certain other characteristic properties of a fish. Bolinger (1972) has suggested that regular

picks out certain "metaphorical" properties. We can see what this means in an example like (7).

(7) a. John is a bachelor. b. John is a regular bachelor.

(7b) would not be said of a bachelor. It might be said of a married man who acts like a bachelor -dates a lot, feels unbounded by marital responsibilities, etc. In short, regular 35. seems to assert the connotations of "bachelor", while presupposing the negation of the literal meaning. (Lakoff 1972, pp. 197-98)

Edward Smith (personal communication) has remarked that this passage started him on a line of research that he has pursued ever since. What interested him was the distinction between definitional and incidental properties. The passage had provided counterevidence to the objectivist view of this distinction, which absolutely requires that "semantics" be kept independent of "pragmatics"; that is, definitional properties are completely independent of incidental properties. The use of the hedge regular violates this condition, since it makes use of incidental properties in semantics. Kay (1979) has argued that the definitional-incidental distinction is not objectively correct, but rather part of our folk theory of language. The hedge regular makes use of this folk theory. If Kay's argument is correct, then the semantics-pragmatics and definitional-incidental distinctions are invalidated in an even deeper way than I first suggested.

SMITH 36. seems not to have been aware that this example was in conflict with the theory of semantics in which the classical theory of categorization is embedded. He drew from the distinction a way to keep the classical theory of categories, while still accounting for prototype effects. His idea was that the definitional properties fit the classical theory and that the incidental properties gave rise to prototype effects. This idea is developed in more detail in a classic paper by Osherson and Smith (1981). It E) may seem ironic that a passage providing counterevidence to the classical view should provide the impetus for a defense of that view. (p.138)

25. First, the classical theory of categories is hopelessly inadequate for complex concepts.

Second, there is a correspondence between prototype effects and metonymically based reasoning. Such prototype effects can be accounted for by metonymic models, which are needed independently to account for what Rosch has called "reference point reasoning." Thus, prototype effects are not independent of reasoning.

Third, there do exist direct correlations between conceptual structure and prototype effects. They are of two types: cognitive models containing scales that define gradations of category membership and radial categories.

The best way to account for prototype effects in general 37. seems to be through a theory of cognitive models. (p.152)

26. Philosophy matters. It matters more than most people realize, because philosophical ideas that have developed over the centuries enter our culture in the form of a world view and affect us in thousands of ways. Philosophy matters in the academic world because the conceptual frameworks upon which entire academic disciplines rest usually have roots in philosophy –roots so deep and invisible that they are usually not even noticed. This is certainly true in my own field, linguistics, where the classical theory of categories and certain attendant philosophical assumptions have been taken so much for granted that alternative assumptions F) seem unthinkable. One of my purposes is to show that the classical theory of categories is inadequate for the study of natural language as well as other aspects of the mind and that new philosophical assumptions are required in order to make sense of linguistic phenomena and other aspects of cognition.

The classical theory of categories has not evolved in a vacuum. It has developed side by side with some of the most widespread philosophical views in the West. And although it is possible to hold the classical theory of categories without being committed to those philosophical views, the reverse 38. does not seem to be true. The philosophical views we will be discussing 39. seem to require the classical theory of categories. If the classical theory of categories falls, those philosophical views fall with it. (p.157)

27. There is a certain range of everyday experiences with physical objects that make such metaphysical assumptions G) seem natural and inescapable. There is a table next to me. It has a top and is brown. I am an entity and so is the table. Having a top is a property of the table, as is being brown. "Next to" is a relation between me and the table. All this fits objectivist metaphysics. If the table had no top at all, it wouldn't be a table; it would be a different kind of object. But if I painted it red, it would still be table –in fact, it would be the same table. This fits essentialist meta- physics. Having a top 40. seems to be an essential property of a table, while being brown is an incidental property. (p. 175)



28. In summary, intensions are commonly taken as models of objectivist concepts. Technically, intensions are functions from points of reference (abstract entities) to extensions. Since a function is definable in terms of sets of pairs, and pairs are definable in terms of sets, and extensions are definable in terms of abstract entities and sets, an intension is a purely set-theoretical construction. A major issue that we will be discussing below is whether such set-theoretical models of concepts are adequate to account for the facts of human categorization. As should be obvious, such models of concepts make no use of any experiential aspects of human cognition. That is, intensions have nothing in them corresponding to human perceptual abilities, imaging capacities, motor abilities, etc. In this respect, they fit the requirements of objectivist cognition. If objectivist cognition is wrong, if gestalt perception, mental images and motor abilities do play a role in our conceptual system, then intensions are not the right kinds of mathematical tools for modeling human concepts. Studies of natural categorization 41. seem to lead to this conclusion. (p. 179)

29. Generative linguistics seeks to find a class of such systems that is both rich enough and restricted enough to account for the formal properties of natural languages. Generative linguistics claims that some collection of algorithmic devices—devices that manipulate symbols without recourse to their meaning or to any general cognitive capacity—will constitute the human language capacity. The entire framework requires that categorization be set-theoretical in nature. And any discussion of general cognitive capacities is simply beside the point, as is any discussion of empirical disconfirmation by reference to any general properties of cognition. Phenomena that do not fit must be, by definition, due to influences outside the linguistic system.

It 42. seems extremely unlikely that human beings do not make use of general cognitive capacities in language. It is bizarre to assume that language ignores general cognitive apparatus, especially when it comes to something as basic as categorization. Considering that categorization enters fundamentally into every aspect of language, it would be very strange to assume that the mind in general used one kind of categorization and that language used an entirely different one. But strange as such an assumption is, it is a standard assumption behind mainstream contemporary linguistics. We will be challenging that assumption below, by arguing that the classical theory of categorization is as wrong for language as it is for the rest of the mind. (p. 182)

30. Is fish a natural kind or not? What about zebra? What kinds of properties are really, that is objectively, essential-the cladists' (shared derived characters) or the pheneticists' (those that characterize overall similarity). If each answer has some scientific validity, then any one answer misses a truth. If both kinds of criteria have some claim on reality, then the philosophical concept of a natural kind does not accord with our scientific understanding of the natural world. Rather, natural kind 43. seems to be part of our folk conception of the world, not part of any scientific conceptual system that there will ultimately be general agreement on. As we saw, the concept natural kind plays an absolutely crucial role in objectivist metaphysics. Yet any objectivist notion of natural kind will miss some scientific criterion for categorization.

There is an obvious escape route here than an objectivist might reasonably attempt-saying that one scientific view is right and the other wrong. Let us look closely at exactly what that would entail. The most remarkable consequence is that the objectivist metaphysician who wants to keep the familiar natural kinds in biology must give up the theory of evolution! But that is perhaps the best supported scientific theory of our time. (p.187)

31. But empirical studies of human categorization, on the one hand, and the world, on the other, suggest that no adequate justification will ever be forthcoming. Here are some reasons:

Let's start with the world:

Studies in evolutionary biology suggest that living things do not fall neatly into natural kinds as defined by simplistic set-theoretical taxonomic definitions.

Biology is simply more complicated than that. Moreover, colors do not exist as neat set-theoretical divisions of the physical world external to beings with visual systems-in fact, they do not exist at all external to beings with visual systems.

- As for the mind, human conceptual categories have a structure that does not appear to be adequately characterized by primitive symbols or complex strings of them.

-And there does not appear to be any sort of direct relationship between the mind and the world of the sort hypothesized in model theory. Color categories exist in the mind, but simply do not correspond to anything like set-theoretical entities in the world. Radial categories, like mother in English, balan in Dyirbal, and nehcihsiihA· in Fox, do not correspond to sets in the world characterized by shared properties. Metaphorically defined categories do not 44. seem to correspond to anything that exists independent of human conceptual systems. And perception, which is often

taken as characterizing the links between the mind and world, is not veridical; it does not even preserve the number of entities, since people can see one light moving when there are two lights flashing. (pp. 224-225)

32. The question of whether there is an independent syntax for natural language comes down to the question of whether the metaphorical definition that defines the enterprise of generative grammar is a reasonable way to comprehend natural language. Intuitively the idea that a natural language is made up of uninterpreted symbols is rather strange. The primary purposes of language are to frame and express thoughts and to communicate, not to produce sequences of uninterpreted sounds. If thought is independent of language (as it 45. seems, at least in part, to be), and if language is a way of framing and expressing thought so that it can be communicated, then one would expect that many (not necessarily all) aspects of natural language syntax would be dependent in at least some way on the thoughts expressed. Indeed, evidence for this is presented in case study 3 below. (p. 228)

### 33. What's Wrong with the Naturalist Defense

The naturalist defense is intended to rule out rampant indeterminacy of reference. By Lewis's own admission, it will still permit moderate indeterminacy of reference.

The reason is that for each degree of naturalness, reference-switching can occur among properties at that degree. All that is ruled out is reference-switching across degrees of naturalness. But as we pointed out above, even moderate indeterminacy is enough to guarantee inconsistency with requirement 2. The reason is that moderate indeterminacy will permit a "moderate" number of violations of requirement 2; there will still be a moderate number of cases where the truth-conditional "meaning" of the whole will be preserved, while the "meanings" of the parts are changed to something completely irrelevant. The resulting theory, whatever it is a theory of, will not be a theory of meaning that satisfies the objectivists' own requirements. A "moderate" number, incidentally, 46. would seem to be in the hundreds of thousands or more. But even one such example would leave objectivist semantics with an inconsistency.

Though this is sufficient to counter the naturalist defense, some further problems with it ought to be noticed.

First, it 47. ) seems rather farfetched that nature would conveniently provide such a neat, objectively correct sorting-out of properties along a linear naturalness scale. That is an

extreme assumption for even the most rabid physicalists. Imagine trying to convince a working physicist that there ought to be a theory of physics that characterizes such a scale. If the physical universe includes such a scale, then physicists ought to be in the business of characterizing the entire scale theoretically. After all, if Lewis is right, the existence of such a naturalness scale would be one of the most remarkable properties of the physical universe. But frankly, I can't imagine Lewis finding any takers. (p. 243)

Putnam's theorem, strictly speaking, concerns the assignment of reference all at once. Lewis observes, correctly, that people don't operate that way. They learn what refers to what a bit at a time. Though he is vague on the subject, LEWIS 48. seems to be suggesting something like adding a temporal dimension to model theory, and some small upper limit on how many references can be fixed at anyone time. Thus reference can be fixed gradually along the temporal dimension, and future reference can be fixed relative to past fixings of reference. Such a gradualist approach would prevent the assignment of reference all at once and would make future reference assignments dependent upon past ones. This, Lewis claims, would eliminate rampant indeterminacy. (p. 245)

#### 34. Why No Defense H) Seems Possible

WE 49. seem to have the following situation:

- Model theory cannot eliminate moderate indeterminacy of reference. (LEWIS 50. seems to admit that there can be no such "saving constraint.")
- Even moderate indeterminacy of reference leads to a violation of requirement 2.
- Therefore, model theory cannot be a theory of meaning, if meaning is defined in terms of truth (or situations).
- Furthermore, nothing (e.g., "character") can be added to the truth- conditional definition of meaning to avoid this result. (p. 252)

#### 35. Dual Foundations

Empirical studies by such prototype theorists as Berlin, Rosch, Hunn, Mervis, B. Tversky, and others have isolated a significant level of human interaction with the external environment (the basic level), characterized by gestalt perception, mental imagery, and motor movements. At this level, people function most efficiently and successfully in dealing with discontinuities in the natural environment. It is at this level of physical experience that we accurately distinguish tigers from elephants, chairs from tables, roses from daffodils, asparagus from broccoli, copper from lead, etc. One level down, things are much more

difficult. It is much harder to distinguish one species of giraffe from another than to distinguish a giraffe from an elephant. Our capacity for basic-level gestalt perception is not tuned to make easy, clear-cut distinctions at such lower levels.

Our basic-level concepts correspond to that pre-conceptual structure and are understood directly in terms of it. Basic-level concepts are much more richly structured than kinesthetic image schemas, which have only the grossest outlines of structure. Gestalts for general overall shapes (e.g., the shape of an elephant or a giraffe or a rose) are relatively rich in structure. Still, they occur pre-conceptually as gestalts, and although one can identify internal structure in them, the wholes<sup>51</sup> seem to be psychologically more basic than the parts. In short, the idea that all internal structure is of a building-block sort, with primitives and principles of combination,<sup>52</sup> does not seem to work at the basic level of human experience. At this level, "basic" does not mean "primitive"; that is, basic-level concepts are not atomic building blocks without internal structure. The basic level is an intermediate level; it is neither the highest nor the lowest level of conceptual organization. Because of their gestalt nature and their intermediate status, basic-level concepts cannot be considered elementary atomic building blocks within a building-block approach to conceptual structure. At the basic level of physical experience, many of the principles of objectivism appear to work well. Our intuitions that objectivism is "just common sense"<sup>53</sup> seem to come from the pre-conceptual structure of our physical experience at the basic level. It is no accident that most of the examples used to justify objectivism come from this level of physical experience. (p. 270)

36. Thus, our three questions get answered in the following way:

1. The SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema is one of the most common structures that emerges from our constant bodily functioning. This schema has all the qualifications a schema should have to serve as the source domain of a metaphor. It is (a) pervasive in experience, (b) well-understood because it is pervasive, (c) well-structured, (d) simply structured, and (e) emergent and well-demarcated for these reasons. In fact, characteristics a-d provide some criteria for what it means for a structure to "emerge" naturally as a consequence of our experience.

There is an experiential correlation between the source domain (movement along a path to a physical location) and the target domain (achievement of a purpose). This correlation makes the mapping from the source to the target domain natural.

The cross-domain correlations in the experiential pairing (for example, desired state with final location) determine the details of the metaphorical mapping (for example, desired state maps onto final location).

There are many structural correlations in our experience. Not all of them motivate metaphors, but many do. When there is such a motivation, the metaphor I) seems natural. The reason it J) seems natural is that the pairing of the source and target domains is motivated by experience, as are the details of the mapping. (p.278)

37. Propositional models have an objectivist flavor to them, since they contain entities, with their properties and the relations holding among them. It must be recalled, however, that they are cognitive models, not slices of reality. The "entities" are mental entities, not real things. I believe that the common tendency to view the world in objectivist terms comes from the fact that many of our cognitive models are objectivist in this limited respect. It 54. seems to me that when we understand our experience by projecting propositional models onto it, we are imposing an objectivist structure on the world. (p.285)

38. Tahitians, Levy found, not only do not have a word for sadness, THEY 55. seem to have no concept of it and, correspondingly, no ritualized behavior for dealing with depression or bereavement. They appear to experience sadness and depression, but have no way to cope with it. They categorize sadness with sickness, fatigue, or the attack of an evil spirit. (p. 310)

39. First, it is claimed that if two languages have radically different conceptual systems, then translation from one language to the other is impossible.

Second, it is often claimed that if translation is impossible, then speakers of one language cannot understand the other language.

Third, it is often claimed that if the languages have different conceptual systems, then someone who speaks one language will be unable to learn the other language because he lacks the right conceptual system.

Fourth, to confuse matters further, it is sometimes claimed that since people can learn radically different languages, those languages couldn't have different conceptual systems.

Such claims 56. may seem to make sense if one recognizes only conceptual systems and not conceptualizing capacities. But the picture is different if one assumes that people share a general conceptualizing capacity regard- less of what differences they may have in

conceptual systems. Differences in conceptual systems do create difficulties for translation. Let us temporarily assume that such differences make translation impossible, pending a more realistic discussion below. What follows? It does not follow from the impossibility of translation that understanding is impossible. (p. 311)

#### 40. The Commensurability Issue

Whorf, who was largely responsible for popularizing issues concerning relativism, claimed that the conceptual systems of languages could be so radically different that they could not "be calibrated," that there was no common measure, no common standard by which they could be compared. Since Whorf, the question of whether conceptual systems are incommensurable has surfaced repeatedly, especially in the philosophy of science, where Kuhn (1970) and Feyerabend (1975) have argued that scientific theories are incommensurable. Such claims have made relativism even more controversial, and a good deal of heat, if not light, has been generated on the incommensurability issue.

The problem with much of this discussion is that there are several kinds of commensurability, and commentators are by no means clear about which kind is being discussed. As we shall see, conceptual systems that are commensurable by one criterion may be incommensurable by another. Here are the basic kinds of commensurability criteria:

Translation 57. seems to be the favored criterion of objectivist philosophers. Two conceptual systems are commensurable if each language can be translated into the other, sentence by sentence, preserving truth conditions. (p. 322)

#### 41. Whorf's Views

On the basis of arguments like those cited above, Whorf and relativism in general are widely assumed to have been discredited. But, as we have seen, there is no single relativism, but rather dozens, if not hundreds, of versions, depending on the stand one takes on various issues. All too often, arguments against Whorf are taken to be arguments against relativism in general. And arguments against Whorf, as we have just seen, may not be arguments against the position that Whorf advocated. Though Whorf's view of relativism is only one out of a great many, and though it has no privileged status from a scientific point of view, it does have a privileged historical status. For this reason, it would be useful to review where Whorf stood on the issues that we have discussed. Whorf was a complex thinker. It should be borne in mind throughout the following discussion that his stands on these issues by no means exhaust his views, nor convey their subtlety.

Degree of Variation: Whorf believed that conceptual systems could be radically different, but he did not believe that they could be totally different. That is, Whorf was not a total relativist. He did not believe that just anything at all could occur in a language. Quite the opposite. His manuscript "Language: Plan and Conception of Arrangement" (Whorf 1956, pp. 125-33) is a remarkably detailed account of the constraints on the structure of language, including both formal and conceptual categories. He was interested in discovering the full range of what can occur in languages, but was just as interested, if one can judge from this work, in discovering the limits.

Depth of Variation: Whorf was not particularly interested in superficial conceptual differences. He was not concerned with vocabulary, specialized terminology, words for obscure concepts, and the like. He was concerned with fundamental concepts that he saw as going to the heart of our conceptual systems: space, time, causation, event structure, aspect, evidentiality, fundamental classifications of objects, and so on. He observed that these concepts were so fundamental that they were incorporated into the very grammars of languages. As such, they are the concepts used the most -and used unconsciously and automatically.

Nature of Variation: Whorf was not merely interested in how languages "carve up nature" - though he was interested in fineness of distinctions. He also recognized metaphorical thinking, the existence of language-particular sound symbolism, and the existence of metaphoric gesture, and he was concerned with the conceptualization of the internal reality of kinesthetic experience as well as with external reality.

System Versus Capacity: So far as I can tell, Whorf did not say anything of significance about conceptualizing capacities.

Conceptual Organization: The idea that conceptual systems can differ because of their organizations is implicit in Whorf's work.

Monolithic System: So far as I can tell, WHORF 58. seemed to think conceptual systems were monolithic. This may have been one source of his concern that we may be "prisoners" of our languages: it is as though there were no room for alternatives within a language and a conceptual system.

Locus of Variation: WHORF 59. seemed to view the actual linguistic forms-morphemes, words, grammatical constructions-as the locus of variation in conceptual systems. He spoke of language determining thought and action, and he spoke of linguistic relativity.



Functional Embodiment: This was one of Whorf's big issues: the nature of use mattered. He recognized that grammaticized concepts were used unconsciously and automatically, and he viewed differences in such concepts as differences in modes of thought.

Commensurability: Another of Whorf's major issues. His principal criteria, in arguing for incommensurability, were use, framing, and organization.

Fact-Value: Whorf was a relativist so far as the facts were concerned, and an objectivist with respect to values.

Effect on Action: Whorf was primarily responsible for bringing this issue to our attention. He argued strongly that radical differences in linguistic structure led to radical differences in thinking, and hence to corresponding differences in behavior.

Control: WHORF 60. did not seem to believe that one had control over the most important parts of one's conceptual system -the grammaticized parts.

Ethics: Though Wharf was deeply concerned with ethical behavior, he did not, to my knowledge, write about the kind of philosophical ethical issues that his work has evoked. He would have been horrified to see his "linguistic relativity" thesis lumped with a form of moral relativism that could be used to justify Nazism. Whorf was concerned with conceptual not moral relativism. He was not a total relativist and his actual views do not sanction total moral relativism. In fact, his work has the opposite force: it explicitly contradicts Nazi theories of Aryan superiority. (pp. 329-330)

42. Such an experiment would show that the naming difference, and that difference alone, could affect performance in a nonlinguistic cognitive task. Thus, linguistic differences would be shown to affect nonlinguistic behavior.

Kay and Kempton were, in fact, able to devise such minimally different tasks. In both tasks, subjects were presented with a linear array of three color chips in the blue-to-green range. In each case, the leftmost chip was greenest, the rightmost chip was bluest, and the middle chip was in between. In both tasks, subjects were asked to tell which of the three chips was most different from the other two. This was a judgment, in effect, on whether the middle chip was closer in color to the leftmost or rightmost chip. The chips were chosen so that there was a "right" answer (see Kay and Kempton 1984 for details).

The chips were chosen to be close enough in color to make the task difficult-sufficiently difficult so that speakers would use anything they could use to help them make the choice. It

was hypothesized that English speakers would have a strategy available to help them that Tarahumara speakers would lack. Kay and Kempton referred to this as the "name strategy": We propose that faced with this situation the English-speaking subject reasons unconsciously as follows: "It's hard to decide here which one looks the most different. Are there any other kinds of clues I might use? Aha! A and B are both CALLED green while C is CALLED blue. That solves my problem; I'll pick C as the most different. (Kay and Kempton 1984, p. 72)

Moreover, the prediction is made that if the English speakers use the color names as part of the task, then the use of contrasting names should have the effect of accentuating the blue-green boundary; that is, colors near the boundary should be subjectively pushed apart by English speakers, but not by Tarahumara speakers. It is this distortion effect that the experiment tests for.

In task 1, subjects are shown all three chips and asked which is most different. As expected, English speakers showed systematic distortion at the blue-green boundary-"pushing" colors on the blue side more toward blue and colors on the green side more toward green. This systematic distortion occurred in 29 out of 30 cases. With Tarahumara speakers, the distortion was random -almost a perfect 50-50 split. Thus ENGLISH SPEAKERS did seem to be using the naming strategy. (p. 332)

#### 43. The Conceptualization of Feeling

Emotions are often considered to be feelings alone, and as such they are viewed as being devoid of conceptual content. As a result, the study of emotions is usually not taken seriously by students of semantics and conceptual structure. A topic such as the logic of emotions would seem on this view to be a contradiction in terms, since emotions, being devoid of conceptual content, would give rise to no inferences at all, or at least none of any interest.

I would like to argue that the opposite is true, that emotions have an extremely complex conceptual structure, which gives rise to a wide variety of nontrivial inferences. The work I will be presenting is based on joint research by myself and Zo Win Kovecses. Kovecses had suggested that the conceptual structure of emotions could be studied in detail using techniques devised by Mark Johnson and myself (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) for the systematic investigation of expressions that are understood metaphorically. English has an extremely large range of such expressions. What we set out to do was to study them systematically to see if any coherent conceptual structure emerged.

At first glance, the conventional expressions used to talk about anger (K) seem so diverse that finding any coherent system would (L) seem impossible. For example, if we look up anger in, say, Roget's University Thesaurus, we find about three hundred entries, most of which have something or other to do with anger, but the thesaurus doesn't tell us exactly what. Many of these are idioms, and they (M) seem too diverse to reflect any coherent cognitive model. Here are some sample sentences using such idioms. (p. 380)

#### 44. Review

We have shown that the expressions that indicate anger in American English are not a random collection but rather are structured in terms of an elaborate cognitive model that is implicit in the semantics of the language. This indicates that anger is not just an amorphous feeling, but rather that it has an elaborate cognitive structure. However, very significant problems and questions remain.

First, there are aspects of our understanding of anger that our methodology cannot shed any light on. Take, for example, the range of offenses that cause anger and the corresponding range of appropriate responses. Our methodology reveals nothing in this area.

Second, study of the language as a whole gives us no guide to individual variation. We have no idea how close any individual comes to the model we have uncovered, and we have no idea how people differ from one another.

Third, our methodology does not enable us to say much about the exact psychological status of the model we have uncovered. How much of it do people really use in comprehending anger? Do people base their actions on this model? Are people aware of the model? How much of it, if any, do people consciously believe? And most intriguingly, does the model have any effect on what people feel?

CERTAIN THINGS, however, (63) do seem to be clear. Most speakers of American English seem to use the expressions we have described consistently and make inferences that appear, so far as we can tell, to be consistent with our model. We make this claim on the basis of our own intuitive observations, though to really establish it, one would have to do thorough empirical studies. If we are right, our model has considerable psychological reality, but how much and what kind remains to be determined. The fact that our analysis meshes so closely with the physiological study done by the Ekman group suggests that emotional concepts are embodied, that is, that the actual content of the concepts are correlated with bodily experience.

45. There is an important, and somewhat frightening, sense in which his reality is ours as well. We may personally find his views despicable, but it is frightening how easy they are to make sense of. The reason that they 64. seem to be so easily understood is that most, if not all, of them are deeply ingrained in American culture. All of the metaphors and folk theories we have discussed occur again and again in one form or another throughout Beneke's interviews. Moreover, it 65. seems that these metaphors and folk theories are largely held by women as well as men. As Beneke's interviews indicate, women on juries in rape trials regularly view rape victims who were attractively dressed as "asking for it" or bringing it upon them- selves and therefore deserving of their fate. Such women jurors are using the kind of reasoning we saw in the passage above. (p. 414-415)

#### 46. Polysemy Based on Correspondences within an ICM

In other cases, a single idealized cognitive model can be the basis on which a collection of senses forms a single natural category expressed by a single lexical item. Window is a good example. In our cognitive model of a window there is both an opening in the wall and a glass-filled frame fitting into it. This correspondence provides motivation for using the same word to refer to both. In isolation, an opening in the wall doesn't have much if anything in common with a glass-filled frame. Independent of any knowledge about the way windows happen to work, there would be no objective reason to place these two very different kinds of things in the same category. The fact that the opening in the wall and the glass-filled frame have been brought together to fit one another physically and to correspond to one another in the same cognitive model 66. seems to make them members of the same cognitive category-so much so that in sentences like the following the word window 67. doesn't seem to distinguish between them.

How many windows are there in your living room?

Here 'window' 68. seems to refer not to either the opening or the glass-filled frame, but to the combination. It takes sentences like the following to tease the senses of window apart. (P.417)

47. The names that we have given to image schemas, and to image-schema transformations, are very much in keeping with the kind of symbolization that might be used in studies of computer vision. But the names are not the things named. This is shown by the naturalness of image-schema transformations relative to visual experience, as opposed to the arbitrariness of the names for those transformations. It 69. seems to me that image-schema

transformations are cognitively real; the pervasiveness of the kinds of relationships between senses of lexical items that those transformations characterize is a strong indicator of their cognitive reality. And the naturalness of these transformations relative to our visual experience suggests that image-schema transformations and the schemas they relate are not propositional in character (in the sense of the term used in computer vision studies). Rather, they are truly imagistic in character.

48. Among the tasks used in these experiments were mental rotation and scanning tasks, both of which involve not just static images but continuous motion. It seems to me that the appropriate conclusion to draw from these experiments is that much of mental imagery is kinesthetic—that is, it is independent of sensory modality and concerns awareness of many aspects of functioning in space: orientation, motion, balance, shape judgments, etc. This includes image schemas, which are sufficiently general in character to be prime candidates for having a kinesthetic nature. If richer, more detailed images have been shown to be kinesthetic, then it would seem that schematic images could be kinesthetic as well. (p. 446)

49. Before we go on, there is one further possible confusion that ought to be cleared up. It is sometimes maintained that the mind uses technical formal systems (e.g., phrase structure or transformational grammars). If this were true, some type of generative linguistics would be cognitively correct. One of the goals of this case study is to show that that is not the case, by actually working out cognitively based descriptions and explanations of subtle linguistic phenomena that technical formal systems seem not to be able to deal with.

Linguists trained within the generative tradition have sometimes claimed that only technical formal systems allow for the kind of precise formulation of principles that is necessary to adequately describe and explain linguistic phenomena. What is implicit in this claim is that cognitively based accounts of linguistic phenomena are necessarily imprecise and therefore incapable of providing adequate descriptions and explanations. Another goal of this case study is to take a problem area in English grammar and provide for it an account that is much more adequate, both descriptively and explanatorily, than any account in terms of mathematical formal systems can be. This is one reason why the present case study is as detailed as it is.

50. The choice of go versus come with 3 = you is exactly the opposite of the choice when 3 you. We can see the reason for this difference of lexical choice if we compare the sentences:

- Here comes your pizza! - Here you go!

Either could be used by a waiter delivering a pizza to a customer's table. But there are subtle differences. In the come-sentence, come refers to the movement of the pizza toward the hearer. It is typically uttered when the pizza hasn't quite yet reached the hearer. The go-sentence differs in both respects. It is usually uttered as the pizza (or whatever) reaches the hearer. And the go does not necessarily refer to any movement of any sort. Instead the go seems to refer to the hearer's embarking on some activity that could only begin with the delivery. Thus, the come-sentence focuses on the delivery, while the go-sentence focuses on what happens after the delivery.