

THE QUINTUPLE WAY: *COGNITIVE STRATEGIES – TRANSFORMATION STRATEGIES*

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Abstract

In this work five different ways of intervention, strategically articulated, on the social world, are established. And it includes two approaches regarding the realm of knowledge and that of social change. In the second approach, five basic categories are proposed: society, State, economy, poverty and power, which work as basic a framework understand society and to serve as an orientation to carry out the necessary change. This approach to fundamental problems in our society can be applied both to world order conflicts as well as to regional and local ones. The five-fold way embodies the set of strategic packages that make it possible to understand social life and to transform it.

Keywords: *Way; strategy; knowledge; transformation*

A. First approach

Discussion over possible ways to have access and foster the socio-economic development of nations seem to be bogged down by a staunch option. This option is as follows: State or market. And this is taking place both at the political level as well as at the economic and expert levels. Currently, some other alternatives are being offered in which these two ways are combined in different proportions. The most widely known ways are the one called “the Third Way”, proposed amongst others by A. Giddens (1) and the “Two and a half way”, established by A. Touraine (2). Both claim to have as their own political referents A. Blair (United Kingdom) and L. Jospin (France) respectively, although similar examples can be given within other national contexts, specially European ones.

It is evident that this debate has made it fairly clear that throughout successive historical stages one way or the other has been dominant, in a pendulous or cyclic movement, according to some interpretations. Statist conceptions and policies prevailed over a long stretch of the XXth century, from the crisis in the 30’s or from WW II up to the 70’s or 80’s. Both in the years that preceded and those which followed this period, the dominant element was the market and the concept of State fell into a crisis, especially so the Welfare State. Anyway, nothing was so sharply linear or excluding. P. Krugman (3), for example, points out countries which have successfully

achieved their development under State control, even in full-fledged market hegemony, although skilfully disguised under stacks of facts, with the complicity of the ideologies and expert analyses.

Today we are witnessing a process of critical rethinking that tries to overcome the unexpected and unwanted effects of the unilateral exercise of power of each way. Concurrently other alternatives are being tested that try to combine in a positive fashion the good aspects of the market and those of the State, thus avoiding the nasty consequences. However, despite advances and recoils, the hub of the debate has remained adamant in questions related to the State or the market, showing no significant change.

In this essay, the current state of this question is the object of our criticism. On the one hand, it is accepted that discussions have revealed a real and undeniable case of domination alternating between the market and the State. But, on the other hand, others claim that unilateral reductionism is being used to view society synthetically and, as a consequence, all political actions on them too. And this reductionism absolutely overestimates this “market-State” problem. And it conceals significant social activities that should be at the heart of the discussion. It must be said at this point that it is not a critique of reductionism in general. Popper (4) himself, amongst others, highlighted the need of this kind of operation in scientific disciplines.

The problem lies in the kind of reduction that will be used to build a model whose axes reflect the global society that it wants to investigate, independently of all its complexities. And to recognize that all models of society in which market and State predominate as constitutive parts and as options, represent intellectual efforts that are both insufficient and impoverishing.

The hypothesis developed in this work maintains that societies may be divided at least, into five micro-societies relatively independent from one another. This disintegration is related to the need to develop policies and strategies to satisfy each of these components and the whole of society. These micro-societies are: a) State, b) Market, c) Proto- development, d) Poverty, e) Misery. These parts form, in one of their possible divisions, global society and, at the same time, they obey certain specific principles that differentiate their modalities. These basic principles define the different characteristics of the five components. And they do not ignore the fact that, concurrently, there are transversal crossings based on class differences, class fractions, strata, ethnicity, nationalities, religions and beliefs, cultures and ideologies, etc. According to the kind of analysis, one form of breaking up will be privileged as a function of the cognitive

objectives that are sought. In this case, the quintuple division will allow us to restate the problem in the terms of the debate that has been proposed.

It is convenient to clarify, at this point, that these five components are not tight compartments. They are subjected to constant movement through interchange, transference, absorption and rejection. That is, there is circulation and bogging down, according to the situations and historical periods that each society and the world are going through. This simplified model can be depicted as follows:

a) State			
b) Market	c) Proto-Development	d) Poverty	e) Misery

These five social categories are present in almost all types of society, although some of them – usually called traditional and “primitive”, may be free from “market” or have a “sui generis” State. These five micro-societies have different sizes and dynamic characteristics, different absorption and rejection capacities, whether they are hyper-developed capitalistic societies (e.g.: U.S.A., Japan), socialist-capitalistic developed ones (e.g.: Sweden), developing, “emerging” or underdeveloped ones, etc. However, as has been mentioned before, none of them seems to be able to avoid the quintuple presence. Platón (5) himself recognized this fact twenty-odd centuries ago when he spoke about “rich and poor” within the boundaries of every city-State. And today it is possible to perceive this everywhere, despite all the social, economic and technological revolutions that have taken place, that seem to increase paradoxically, the areas of the State, of poverty and misery.

As has been said earlier, each component part obeys a different principle that organizes its own peculiarities. Each of these principles brings forth a variety of behaviours and certain characteristics within their respective symbolic worlds.

The principle of the State holds that its institutions must take responsibility for the destiny of the global society as well as for the situations experienced by each of its component parts. Leadership, defense, sovereignty and welfare constitute the fundamental values that emanate from this principle. Then the State is the most inclusive and all-embracing of all the parts since it has influence on the fate of the whole of society and that of each of its component parts, including itself. All this is done well or badly, according to the kind of State and the political bias of the dominant

groups, but its functions are irreplaceable . When a dominant market ideology pretends to invade all social territories, including the State, it is making a grave mistake because it is misinterpreting its specific roles and is entering unknown areas where it cannot and should not do anything at all.

The market principle upholds the pre-eminence of competition, productivity, profit and permanent accumulation. This principle makes the market a formidable force driving economic development. This micro-society has its own growth and dynamics. And its presence benefits the whole of society when it produces goods and welfare. But its fruits are specific to its own sphere and only the State and a few other social organizations can re-establish a balance and reduce inequalities, disseminate concentrations and control the expulsive and destructive effects that are also a consequence of its work. Also, only the State can provide better conditions for market growth. However, this is not always so: when statist ideologies believe that it is necessary to fight against the market because of the selfish and antisocial principles it upholds, they forget that societies should draw benefits from its potentials while at the same time they should avoid its drawbacks. Even China has understood this.

The principle of “proto-development” holds that it is necessary to protect the different productive forms that combine traditional with modern techniques, in various proportions and according to each case in particular. This mode of production feeds and provides jobs to various communities, even when it is not guided by strict market principles. This has been accepted even by hyper-developed countries, as shown by their defense of farmers against demands of free competition from the others. Developing countries made the mistake of underestimating and abandoning without any protection these productive forces when they let themselves be blinded by market ideology. They should have understood that there is an area for the market and another for the proto-market, and that both are necessary and indispensable when adequately combined. That is, in a global and strategic view, both can be socially, albeit their principles are contradictory. This does not mean that there are no overlaps and passages, which may be positive or not, between adjacent areas. But to introduce alien principles, without adequate control and protection, may trigger social catastrophes and disintegrations that end up augmenting the incidence of poverty and misery, as can already be seen in numerous regions of the planet.

Poverty and misery are not only categories that denote vast populations doomed to abandonment and to extreme helplessness, but also sociological and cultural realities that create diverse ways of life, protection, safeguard, production and even recreation.

Members of these micro-societies build and invent day by day thousand different modes of survival in the worst possible conditions, including violence and hunger. The principle of poverty, even taking into account its internal differences, stresses the need of keeping alive in spite of the fact that their fundamental needs are not satisfied. Both principles, one more acute than the other, but equally urgent and immediate in nature, contribute to the formulation of precarious but concrete answers to the series of pressing and peremptory needs. Here, social modes of survival must be combined with strong interventions from the State and from a number of social organizations of different kinds and objectives. These micro-societies are not only fragments from the other two, they have diverse origins and respond to sociological principles that must be taken into consideration. Proposals to apply market and proto-market principles usually prove to be ingenuous and stupid, when they are not downright unhealthy and dangerous. It is necessary to introduce resources and guidelines but at the same time respecting their own ways of life that have the merit of having helped them survive in the face of indifference or scarcity and, most of the time, wrong alien interventions.

Here are a few provisory conclusions:

1. State and market do not represent a simplified social world in its entirety.
2. As a consequence, the paths for strategic and political interventions (6) cannot be limited to these two options or to variants between the two.
3. This model rescues from oblivion three forgotten questions and three instances of concealment placing them on the same level as the others. No one denies the value of all the important studies on poverty and misery that are being made on a permanent basis. What we are trying to do is to give them their own places back, something that should be equally considered within the global society.
4. The State recovers all the environments that fall under its jurisdiction, including its own. The merciless competition between the State and market is absurd and it responds to Manichaeian ideologies that qualify one while disqualifying the other. In fact, State and market can complement each other and benefit themselves if both adequately fulfil their respective tasks. This does not always happen this way. One thing is sure, the State assists other micro-societies, of which it is the only member, that can render assistance (it is always better if the State is complemented by organizations and social movements that are willing to co-operate). Then, the State should not be the subject of denigration or market logic; it should be rebuilt according to its own principles, avoiding its bureaucratic, wasteful, macro-cephalic and authoritarian tendencies.

5. The concept of globalization entails a mixture of real elements, some of them mythical and mystifying that sometimes dazzle many politicians, economists and experts, just establishes direct relationships with the developed area of the market. And here it produces both positive and negative effects depending on the specific case. The other areas remain aloof from these relationships and even watch distrustfully its overpowering – and sometimes – destructive interventions. However, good State policies can profit from and divert towards it some of the consequences, chosen because of their beneficial character and reject others which are dangerously destructive (7). The globalization concept is really part of the pair globalization-localization but this discussion is related to another issue (8)

The quintuple way is the policy and strategy package that governments should test through the State (jointly with all social organizations and movements to intervene in all five micro-societies, taking into account the general aspects of this global society as well as the specific aspects of its component parts. The “first way”, the “second way”, the “third way” and the “two and a half way” seem to be trapped within the reductionist view of State and market. On the other hand, the quintuple way conception will allow us to overcome unilateral policies that have achieved some resonant successes on some social areas and have suffered painful failures on others, unfortunately more needy. And, may be, it will allow us to take into charge the series of socio-political and cultural problems by means of a set of multiple effects in all fields.

B. Second approximation

In the first approximation to the “quintuple way”, we have tried to reconstitute a point of view which overcomes the habitual conceptions that are imprisoned between the defense of Market and/or State, including all its possible variations and responsibility transfers; and tried to include the problem of poverty (with all its possible denominations and re-conceptualizations) – as a fundamental problem of social life, no longer susceptible of being relegated to a second place. Notwithstanding, the work maintains a certain predominance of economic combined with statist reductionism. Besides, certain advances made conceptually and along socio-political lines demand a new restatement; these arguments give impulse, then, to the formulation of a new approximation that will correct certain shortcomings and fill a few voids and that will bring about a reshaping of the general and specific framework..

1. Thinking of the Social World

Thinking of the social world, and particularly of Argentine society, is a task that implies facing a series of difficulties that must be considered. Especially so if what is being sought is to set up a cognizable object that should be explanatory as well as meaningful. This first difficulty is related to the almost incommensurable number of elements these worlds are made up of. Thus, it is necessary to transform this into a finite series. And, in turn, this implies trimmings and definitions depending on the degree and kind of knowledge being sought.

The second difficulty lies in a fundamental option. In order to know this world it suffices to possess the kind of knowledge associated with daily life, based mainly on experience and on the words from the social actors themselves. Or, alternatively, to bestow more confidence on systematic, disciplinary, proven knowledge, and as far as possible, legitimated by a scientific status. Faced with this option, it is possible to offer an epistemological alternative that consists in connecting, crossing and amalgamating both options to achieve a better synthesis. Some of these alternatives go so far as those proposed by Prigogine, Morin and Monod, among others, when they postulate a "New Alliance" of the sciences, the humanities, art, philosophy, religion, myths and all forms and traditions of thought that are recorded in the history of mankind (9)

The third difficulty refers to establishing some limits related to the cognizable object that is sought. The concept of society is too wide and ambiguous and demands, as a consequence, some clarifications. Argentina, particularly at present, demands the definition of its extents within the temporal limits. Argentina is a society, as so many others, under "dominant chaos" (10). And it differentiates itself from a few others that experience what has been called "dominant order" (or "dominated chaos"). And this implies working out a dichotomy: chaos-order or order-chaos in a way that is dialectical, contradictory and complementary, so as to show certain states that are always experienced by all societies, independently of their political, social and economic systems they have. The hypercritical state in which Argentine society finds itself at present implies the aggravation of these chaotic states to the detriment of its ordered states, with all the implicit dangers but, at the same time, with all the possibilities that this situation creates for change and transformation.

2. Achieving Epistemological Status

Achieving epistemological status in social studies allows one to think of society, current society and current Argentine society, from a theoretical, disciplinary, interdisciplinary,

multidisciplinary and trans-disciplinary standpoint (that should include knowledge from different traditions) (11), capable of discovering the crucial social relations on which they are founded. Societies grow in complexity and get more confused as time goes by. And while a few of them, in general the most developed ones, achieve a minimal degree of coherence and articulation, despite all its excesses and mistakes, there are many others, -most of them in fact- that are unable to escape from the predominance of chaotic and disjointed states as a general tendency. In agreement with this, theories must be the object of revision as to its interrogations, its postulates, and its chains of hypotheses, to try to contain and explain a social universe too “vibrant and noisy” (12), that is always one step ahead. To reach epistemological status in social studies directed towards finding the main connections in the afore-mentioned social universe in general and those of Argentina in particular, requires us to make some theoretical and strategic decisions. This series is shown as follows:

a) New Paradigm (13)

Some epistemologists uphold the existence of two paradigms to cope with the infinite profusion of facts and events, both in nature and society. We are dealing here with “simplification paradigms” and, more recently, with “complexity paradigms”. The first is the one that characterizes the history of modern scientific thought cut off from philosophy and religion. It is founded on the reduction of the parameters and variables to the indispensable minimal amount, so as to shape a cognizable object that is observable, measurable, legal and predictable. Moreover, this paradigm maintains that the language of science should be clear, simple, concise and rigorous. Simplification goes in this direction. The choice of the language of mathematics as the archetype of scientific language is not accidental. Galileo (14) had already enounced that the book of nature, in contrast to the holy book possesses a specific language and that this is the language of mathematics. In the same way, A. Einstein affirmed: “extreme sharpness, clarity and certitude are only achieved by affecting integrity” (15)

In the social science, to some extent due to imitation and subordination, a similar process took place. Perhaps Galtung (16) is, among others, one of the best exponents (not in his more recent work) of these postures. In his now classic work “Theory and Methods in Social Research” he exposes the paradigm’s reluctance to the presence of philosophy in social studies. He tells us in the preface to his book: “He who has come into social science through mathematics and natural science may harbour the very intense sensation that most of what is now offered within the methodology of social

science suffers from over-sophistication. There is a conscientious philosophical analysis of the foundations of social research ... However laudable these efforts may be, the former leads easily to sterile debates ... and is lost amidst efforts to apply philosophical categories designed by people who, often, are not familiar with ... and who have little or nothing constructive to offer”

The second paradigm, along opposite lines, is the one already mentioned characterized by “complexity” and although it has precedents in the origins of modern science, it consolidates in a contemporary period. It is still surprising that all epistemological disputes between Popper, Khun, Lakatos, Feyerabend, Stegmüller, Radnitzky and others, have evaded the problem of complexity. “Are we still” as Morin has said “in the barbarian age of ideas? Or does complexity represent a close to insoluble problem to the hard sciences, accustomed as they are to working on a small number of variables? The truth is that Morin as well as Prigogine develop the criterion that science should overcome the simplifying old paradigm and substitute that of complexity.

Undoubtedly, this is more a project than a fact. But there are also indications of a certain search, from different places within the hard sciences, for operative and explanatory models which are less reductionist than they usually are. On the contrary, sometimes we witness attempts from the standpoint of these disciplines, by means of reductionist models, to tackle social and political problems. They are mathematically “correct”, but that is about all they offer. The end result is poor, ingenuous and useless. We have seen attempts to apply the “mathematical theory of catastrophe” by Thom to political problems by means of two basic variables. Paradoxically, the model works and gives a result, but just trivial and reductionist.

In Morin, we have at least a conception of complexity and some theoretical and methodological proposals. The paradigm of simplification, he says, is based on the logic operations of reduction and disjunction. That of complexity is founded on the principles of distinction, conjunction and implication (17). Morin holds that there are three fundamental principles we need to think about complexity:

1. *The dialogical principle.* It associates two terms that are, simultaneously complementary and antagonistic;
2. The principle of *organized recursiveness*. This is the “whirlpool” process that starts and restarts continuously. One is producer and product at the same time. A

paradigmatic example is seen in society and the individual. Each member creates the “other” and in turn it is the product of the other member;

3. The *hologrammatic principle*. This principle holds that not only the part is found in the whole but also the whole is found in the parts. This is how it attempts to surpass both reductionism that deals with parts, as well as holism that deals exclusively with the whole.

As a matter of fact, the creation of a paradigm of complexity will necessitate a prodigious cultural and civilizing effort, that is, an immense historical task that has only just begun. In other works by Morin, especially the up to now four volumes of *The Method*, one perceives this fundamental preoccupation for the creation of a “paradigmatology of complexity” that will take charge of all these questions (18)

Social science is characterized by a particularly complex cognizable object. But it has not had a consequent theoretical and methodological approach. The large selectivity of variables in the constitution of problems and hypotheses, leaves out so many potential variables, without any experimental control, that one never knows if the end results are due to the behaviour of the selected group or to that of the enormous set left out. And the same happens with control groups. Social “facts” and “processes” are so complex and so much “constructed” by the researcher’s theories and purposes, sampled from a boundless mass of stimuli from social reality, that it is always possible, to find the necessary “data” to verify or contrast hypotheses. Except for some kinds of research which are very restricted and limited in nature and whose end results may have a certain validity, the rest of the innumerable meaningful social problems are left to the intentions of the researcher, without the possibility of universal transfer.

In our case, we propose an inter-paradigmatic combination. A new paradigm of “complex simplification” taking into account that both procedures and conceptions, when combined, allow the cognizable object to recuperate both its main axes and the richness of its constitution..

There exists a set of procedures, true methodological procedures, associated with scientific work and with the construction and the contrasting of theories. These procedures are not usually clearly formulated and are, however, one of the keys to the advancement of knowledge. Moreover, in this key element we find two common points between the two disciplinary fields (hard and soft) and some specific differences that must be taken into account. Ruelle says that physics has as its objective to explain the world that surrounds us and to commit itself to fragments of that reality. In his own

words: “ It proceeds through *idealization* of this fragment of reality and tries to describe it by means of a mathematical theory” (19) And, he adds, it is necessary to delimit a set of phenomena, to define physical concepts operationally and, once this “physical framework” has been set up, to choose a mathematical theory. Then, the physical theory is constituted when it is possible to establish a correspondence between the objects of the mathematical theory and the physical concepts (20)

It is interesting to stress Ruelle’s indications regarding diversity, coherence and the use of theories to do science. Thus, he says: “There are many theories that cover different classes of phenomena. And even to explain a given phenomenon we have at our disposal, in general, several different theories ... In fact, jumping from one theory to the next is a good part of the art of doing physics ... Physical theories need not be logically coherent; they owe their unity to the fact that they describe the same and only physical reality”(21)

Prigogine distances himself in several aspects from Ruelle but, notwithstanding, he establishes a body of theoretical-methodological procedures which have important similarities. Prigogine dice:

“Experimental dialogue with nature ... does not imply a passive observation, but a practice. It is manipulating, setting on stage physical reality until it becomes possible to achieve the maximum degree of proximity with respect to a theoretical description. We need to prepare the studied phenomenon, to purify it, to isolate it until it looks like an ideal situation, physically unattainable but intelligible par excellence, since it embodies the theoretical hypothesis that guides manipulation” (22)

And he goes on being very categorical as to the relation between theory and experience, especially before those who underrate the theoretical level; that is why he advises that natural processes should be subjected to:

“...an interrogation which has sense only in reference to one hypothesis ... and to a whole of assumptions relative to behaviours that it would be absurd to attribute to nature”.

And he adds:

“Experimentation questions nature, but in the guise of a judge,, in the name of postulated principles. Nature’s response is recorded with the greatest precision, but its pertinence is evaluated with reference to the hypothetical realization that guides the experiment ...”

Next he reinforces this idea of a theoretical role:

“Nature can certainly refute the theoretical hypothesis in question, but this does not mean that it ceases to be the pattern that measures the reach and sense of the answer ...”(23)

In the social disciplines, the researcher who achieved the furthest advances in the realization of “idealizations” with a certain degree of complexity, without excessive simplification or reductionist steps and with results that even today serve as a basis for further theoretical elaboration or research, was Weber. Weber’s theory of “ideal types” proposed the construction of abstract, pure, distorted and arbitrarily selected models with a number of attributes that had no direct correlation to empirical reality. But, on the other hand, these models did answer the purposes of the investigation and allowed to extract selectively from reality those decisive, hidden and invisible traits. It will be necessary to explore the possibilities of “ideal types” in the light of new developments in social science.

b) Selection Principle

The second decision consists in establishing a selection principle that takes into account what has been stated in the previous decision and the need to further a view of the whole of the cognizable object. This kind of principle pretends to clean up the field that has been profusely invaded by categories, concepts and trap-words (24) that hinder the construction of a “complex and simplified idealization” of the problems to be faced. This selection principle intends to define the most significant axes of development to be taken into account in order to know social reality while respecting the required specifications. And this presupposes a double operation. The task of eliminating “to the bone” all the noise, the clamour of that which is striking, the surface effects; in short, everything that can dull a strategic view of the field and, simultaneously, add a basic nucleus without which it is possible to construct rationalizations that are partial, biased, trivial and devoid of meaning and information.

What the selection principle does is to add and to subtract. It is done by means of a severe critical operation of the state of the question as regards theories, research and practices related to the social world. Here we are interested in the internal coherence, the interpretative “density”, the predictive capacity, the amplitude and reach of the

strategic view, the openness to controversy, and the flexibility in order to take part in studies of the most general and most particular socio-historical problems.

Making use of some of I. Lakatos (25) concepts but in a different application, one can talk of “negative heuristics” and “positive heuristics”. The former is the operation of systematic pulverization of the existing material in order to rescue what interests us. And this without dismissing the fact that in other frameworks of analysis, there is a lot of interesting and informative material to keep working on. This can not come from an all-or-nothing posture. Here one pretends to break new ground, with what belongs to it and with what does not, and to subject to the critique and scrutiny of all parties and also, to the clarifying effect of time, perhaps the greatest decanter of deviations and mistakes.

There is always a “reductionist” operation behind all approaches, even those that look for the maximum level of totalization. Sciences must especially resort to reductionism to better manipulate the *variables*? related to the objects of research. All reductionist operations are convenient and, at the same time, dangerous since it has to sacrifice lots of material that might prove valuable; moreover, it might be indispensable, if it is hidden under blankets of manifest density or triviality. Also, the selection of significant variables is influenced by the theory, the pre-theory, paradigms, usage and customs and by the cultural and intellectual climate (including fads) within a given space-time.

The idea of reductionism can lead us into different directions. One of them tells us that “Reductionism is at the heart of science programs”.(26) Here Elster carries out a reductionist operation from the higher levels to the lower levels; in his own words: “reductionism adopts a way of explaining phenomena in a hierarchical level of the sciences as a function of lower level phenomena”(27) - Popper also stresses the scientific value of reductionism and the criss-crossing of levels and theories whose results even if incorrect open up new paths (28), these are mechanisms for the selection of variables that allow the passage from appearance to the part of reality that one wants to know.(29) Thus, he writes: “...we select out of the infinite variety of facts and their aspects, those... that look interesting because they are related to some scientific theory...” (30) And later, he says: “what we can affirm is that all scientific descriptions of facts are highly selective and always depend on a theory.

Negative heuristics opens the door to positive heuristics. Here the attention is focused not only on the wreckage but, and very especially, on the selection of the conceptual centres with highest significance to social life. It is through our elaboration and learning that these latter centres appear thus constituting the main nucleus of all searches and

interrogations on how society works. These centres, true conceptual guidelines within the field of work, are the ones with most energy, strength and vitality, that is, the greatest power to support society and keep it going. And they express the neuralgic points of greatest social conflict that settles and is developed within each historical period. And this in no way implies that these centres are in good shape and that they fulfil the requirements which they were created for, or that they are capable of solving issues such as poverty, that were brought about by their own incompetence. On the contrary, these centre-guidelines may exhibit all the signs of decadence and deterioration and, even so, they may show by their effects and impact, the quality of neuralgic points of the social world.

If there is anything that can characterize social life, that is the complex fabric of social relations, institutions, organizations, ideas and beliefs, strategies and actions. This dense and complicated social fabric becomes unattainable to any attempt to apprehend it, however totalizing it may pretend to be. Social disciplines, the humanities, philosophy, creeds, art and ideologies, individually or in original combinations, undertake the task of explaining and/or understanding some area or cross-section of this complex reality or formulating a “point of view” that focuses selectively on aspects whose cognition, exaltation or transformation, are considered primordial.

c) New Field

Having reached this point, the third decision gives us the possibility to build a field of knowledge that will not only revisit existing social problems from a new standpoint but also will discover new problems that have remained up to now unknown. This new field is proposed as a platform for the production of knowledge about social issues but taking into account the epistemological considerations previously stated, those that will follow, and especially, the basic quartet of guidelines needed to face these questions, since they give it solidity, hierarchy and a comprehensive defining spectrum. The construction of this field shows some characteristics already formulated by Bourdieu in his field theory, but it also makes use of others that contradict and complete a framework otherwise too biased by ideology and desire. This field, ours, has along the lines of the quoted author, some meaningful points that deserve consideration, the ignorance of which has helped turn some fields into ivory towers. One of these points indicates that a field is a territory for fighting, for competition. Then there are fighters that dispute and there is also a power game played by different strategies to keep for

themselves existing capital. Thus there is, within each field, a certain distribution of capital and there are rival strategies ready to maintain their supremacy or to bring about a change of hands of the appetizing object (31). Here it is proposed that there are three more important kinds of capital: material, symbolic and cultural, in so far as they are related to material goods, prestige and status or wisdom and knowledge, respectively. Then, there are contenders that control the field and others who want to enter and change the situation. Every field has its own code that one needs to know in order to access it and be able to compete within it(32).

In our case, we share Bourdieu's ideas when he considers fields as areas of fighting and realization. It is accepted that there is use of strategy, power and codes since it coincides with our elaborations on the same subjects, although with some differences that will be discussed later on. On the other hand, it is considered that the concept of capital reveals a clear case of economic reductionism, in agreement with its ideological foundations, and that despite the acceptance (it has become a fad) that it has achieved in diverse intellectual circles, it is not yet capable of replacing terms like realizations, creations, cultural products, status, prestige, social networks, etc., that are present in their own definitions but that undergo a kind of trimming by the dominant concept. And through this, we lose sight of all other instances that can contribute to enrich the field. Moreover, the idea of competing or of fighting for the capture of capital, whatever its origin, turns any creative and productive activity into an "object of the market" and a zero-sum game, that can take place under some circumstances but not in general, let alone in all of them.

A field of knowledge is an intellectual active space that establishes a series of demands, orientations, theoretical products and practices that confer it its own character. A field has its own strategies, since they form according to the standpoint that has been achieved and to the human, cultural and epistemological resources at its disposal. This field-standpoint that is being built through time, has some elements of its own and other elements developed in other fields, since it values the encounter and combination between self and alien fields, in so far as it contributes to the achievement of what is sought, with mechanisms that it considers valid and apt. And this field considers that this combination provides an original result not found in other related or neighbouring fields. That is why it respects and values all that is produced in different and rival fields when they attain an acceptable level of quality, but it also defends the possibility of creating original points of view that may pinpoint and discover those aspects that have not been explored by other fields.

This point of view, taking into account all that has been expressed earlier, intends to create a five-category neuralgic nucleus; all those categories that resist all attempts of exclusion by absence or weakness, that show the maximum capacity for explaining the social world. And this quintet is a theoretical instrument to do research, produce knowledge, to circumscribe and evaluate social practices. Then the main power fight in this field involves the generation of the competences to pose the best problems that it faces in its own horizon. Moreover, the fight and proliferation of paradigms, theories and fields, contribute to the opening of new pathways and new horizons. In the same way, in the discipline game, interdisciplines and trans-disciplines open worlds and build bridges and connections, otherwise impossible to achieve.

3. Fundamental Axes

a) Previous Listing

According to what was formulated in the consolidation of an epistemological status, and taking into account all the foundations rendered by the points which made reference to 1) the paradigmatic confluence, 2) the use of a selection principle, 3) the formulation of a theory of the social field, we may now undertake the elaboration and framing of the fundamental axes of social life. In order to do this, it is necessary to give an answer to a listing that sorts the conditions that must be fulfilled by this whole. The listing is as follows:

1. How to achieve a global, synthetic and inclusive vision,
2. How to select the most meaningful parts.
3. How to articulate the whole and its parts.
4. How to develop the relative autonomy of each part.
5. How to achieve an active interrelationship among parts, and between parts and whole.
6. How to place problems within the axes framework.
7. How to place also the problems on the corresponding axis (or axes) or in their proximity.
8. How to create a theoretical system that is at the same time open and in expansion.
9. How to develop a theoretical system on a continuous basis through, aggregation, dis-aggregation, substitution and annulment.
10. How to subject every advance to permanent evaluation, testing, criticism (and refutation).

b) The Axes-Centres

According to what has been said, to undertake the study of social questions implies taking charge of all its complexities and differentiation and, at the same time, to define a frame of reference and to select dimensions and variables, that will allow us to focus the question on the problems whose investigation is sought. If we focus on the social questions in Argentina and we conjecture that a similar approach could be applied to most countries that are outside the so-called developed world, the process of selection leads us to formulate an analytical model based on five axes considered primordially significant from a theoretical point of view and from research experience and praxis. These five fundamental axes are:


- a) Society**
- b) State**
- c) Economy**
- d) Poverty**
- e) Power**

These five axes imply a very severe selection process considering the crowded horizon of categories that might be used to describe social life. These five categories present, however, a high degree of generality. And this in turn implies that each of them covers a wide and heterogeneous field in social relations. That is, each category encompasses a vast space of classes of specific social relations. In like manner, these classes (different from others) contain varied series of actions and activities that show a living heterogeneity. This allows us to select and circumscribe valuable material and, simultaneously, to preserve the varied richness that is produced within each circumscription. Then, each categorical basis presents a specific universe of social activities that has its own developments, under-developments, crises, ruptures, forward and backward jumps.

However, the cited categories or fundamental axes that describe are not tight compartments. They do not even present an excluding logic capable of satisfying certain epistemological demands for jealously-guarded boundaries and limits. Quite the contrary, these concepts are permanently interrelated and overlap and invade everything all the time. It so happens that selectively they try to represent social life with all its overlaps, crosses and draggings. And, simultaneously, they express some instances of differentiation worthy of consideration, in spite of all invasions and

inundations it is this play of different parts that continuously interchange influences and determinations. And it is that whole flowing through time with the specific dynamics of a play of parts that link with one another and with the whole that contains them. It is that dialogue between all members. It is that continued interrelation between parts and the whole, where each part and the whole keep their identity but, at the same time, it is an identity that is a product of that interrelation. It is that play of parts and the whole where the latter is not only the sum-total of the parts but where each part encloses itself the whole. This proposal reminds us of the series of principles that were formulated by Morin to discuss the concept of complexity. From our standpoint, it occurs to us that these principles represent not only the notion of complexity but also the ideas of theoretical and paradigmatic multiplicity and of interdisciplinarity-trans-disciplinarity. In like manner, they correlate with all possible social states and processes that take place in history.

The five-axes social model is presented in the following scheme:



These five axes and their reciprocal interrelations constitute the social model that serves as a basis to deal with a multiplicity of problems, both theoretical as well as empirical, that stem from the dense and complex fabric of social life. This general picture indicates that there is a solid interpretative basis as well as solid social basis that support the historical course of events and processes of social life. And it also shows that any problem, no matter how urgent and specific, should take into account and should place itself within this general framework that provides more sense and proportion to its own framework. This holds true as long as this insertion does not weaken the specific action and, on the other hand, contributes to re-establishing strategic interconnections between the afore-mentioned problem and the whole, of which it is an active part.

Anyhow, the five-axes model and its reciprocal interrelations do not represent a closed and self-sufficient scheme. It is the product of previous learning and of wide, selective consideration of elements, relationships, and alternative schemes; but it is also an open picture whose dynamics, while showing a great explanatory and comprehensive

capacity, it is subjected to constant tests, essays and errors. And it admits, consequently, the dis-aggregation and aggregation of axes and interconnections that show it can increase this capacity and theoretical and heuristic solidity.

Applied to - and partly emanated from Argentine life and its crises- the model reveals it can cope with ancient, updated and new problems, both in its current state as well as in its historical pathways and in its future projections.

The social model, given the subject and the problem to be analyzed, alters its hierarchies and articulations within its internal dynamics. Thus, it becomes possible to make a new approach to analyze society, State, the economy, poverty and power altering their weights and their consequent and reciprocal connections.


Let us have a look at the Argentine and Latin-American examples, by reconstructing the model and privileging two axes: society and power.

1. Building a society

This is the most extensive axis. It is formed by members-agents and different kinds of interrelations: social, economic, political, cultural, etc., in its integrating as well as dissociating aspects. Society can be seen as a combination of common normative, valuation, associative and productive interactions, especially by way of consensual and community approaches. And one can see, simultaneously and/or contradictorily, as a fabric that has been torn apart by interests and individual views that bring about the conflicting dynamics of social classes, strata, ethnicities, races, creeds and organizations that express and represent them.

In Argentina today, without denying the divergences and agreements mentioned earlier, we are witnessing a process of dualization⁽³³⁾ within society that provokes novel crossings and realignments in the social matrix, mostly similar and different from other processes in dual societies. A “dual” society, among so many distinctive characteristics, leaves an identifying “mark” on each part. And this mark qualifies both parts, whether they are rich or poor, and assigns responsibilities and blames. And it implies the acknowledgement of a social debt between the parts. But this mark does not stop here. It marks also the State, the citizens, the economy, politics and culture.

The axes model becomes more complex through a process of dualization, dis-aggregation and abduction:



This scheme implies two societies in one; a State that is present in one society and absent in the other; one of these societies “marked” by non-poverty and the other one by poverty; a double economy (market and social economies); a double citizenship (poor and not-poor); and, finally, a double circuit through which social relations flow and establish two mutually excluding worlds and, paradoxically, internally including ones. A legal, “official”, legitimated and dominating world; and an impoverished, marginal world that has been legitimated by its own social foundations; a world in which legality and illegality combine in proportions that are a function of the current situation and to an original cohabitation code that stems both from the urgencies brought about by misery as well as from the hopeful search for survival and change. Two separate worlds that show also some bridges and connections that cannot yet find a way to grow and consolidate a unified project.

And this takes place amidst acute states of turbulence, chaos and fragmentation, i.e. growing social entropy, that randomizes all combinations and generates all the alarms. Fragmentation is a precise term when it exhibits the explanatory potential of chaotic collapse and dispersion. But when it is repeated and it becomes a fad it loses precision in the hands of admonitory simplicity. Fragmentation is entropic, despite all doomsday forecasts, it gets in the way and collides with processes and strategies that show the birth of new organizing and articulating, solidary and communicative states, especially so on the social foundation of those worst hurt. And this is a paradox that is usually associated with the most turbulent chaotic states since they provide unexpected opportunities.

2. Power build-up

2.1. Introduction

It is useless to pretend that philosophical reflections are, as the first Wittgenstein once claimed, just a word game. Philosophy, in a certain way a discipline of interdiscipline, could provide a true and committed observation point regarding people problems. Especially with those that seem not to be able to find or choose their own destinies. Real causes are rarely if ever clearly exposed, but remain hidden under a shower of facts or, or are perversely hidden. Moreover, different points of view “discover” the most diverse collections of multi-causality. To this we must add that analyses reveal varied identities in the categories of innocent and guilty. However, something is emerging as the tip of an iceberg in this sea of troubles and it is the conviction that nothing occurs unless power is involved, crucially or tangentially. A philosophy that is focused on social questions can claim that the power problem is present in all social processes, fuelling its fights and developments, expressly or from the underground. Besides philosophy, theories, doctrines and ideologies that conceptualize the idea of power show that, despite all their variations, there is a growing recognition of the role it plays in the production of events. This status, that is legitimized by M. Foucault, has more than enough antecedents in world history, especially in ancient narrations, sagas and epic poems and in the philosophical and religious legacies from cultures and civilizations that, most of the time, use the concept of power in a “practical state”, as Althusser proclaimed.

Neither is it indispensable to venture a definition of power, an effort that entails more disadvantages than advantages, since while it clarifies a field of reflection, it limits and obscures the possibilities of searching outside the field boundaries. Therefore it is convenient to side with I. Prigogine when he abstains from defining “randomly” any concept because he knows it is too complex and that our ignorance is greater than our knowledge, and on top of it, this ignorance becomes proportionally larger as our knowledge grows. For this reason, he proposes as knowledge strategy to concentrate on some fundamental characteristics, without pretending to exhaust the subject. This is also our way of thinking.

2.2. Power and Morality

One of those characteristics shows that power, whatever it is, entails the capacity to do and undo, to create and to destroy, to compel and induce, to command and liberate, to rule and emancipate. And that these dimensions, amongst so many others, are contradictory and complementary (Morin) at the same time. And that they are subjected to their own dynamic forces according to historical-social circumstances and the weight of their determinations and indeterminations. Here is where the philosophical interrogation originates: is it not mere instrumentality, alien to the moral universe, such as it is understood in so many interpretations? And since these questions are related: would it not be the prince's privileged means of subordinating its subjects, in all kinds of society, including those institutionally democratic, as it seems to be implied by classical and cynical Machiavellian policies? Here political philosophy owes a discharge to the Florentine genius as "The Prince" encloses many different Machiavelli, despite his many admirers, as he is a different man in every book he writes, including the cited book and his "Discourses", not to mention other works.

There is no doubt that all these questions lead us to hold that power possesses a strange, contradictory and inseparable relationship with ethics, and in particular, with the ethics of "being", "doing" and "having", as has been mentioned earlier. Power and morals - a community instance of ethics - seem, on occasions, to reinforce each other, and on other occasions they seem to repel each other. Sometimes, this relationship serves as a reciprocal nutrient and sometimes it becomes an insurmountable obstacle. And this, in turn, generates more questions: is it possible to unfold the self without power? And, by the same token, are not "doing" and "having" two modalities of power? And following the thread of this discussion, the following question is posed: can't a wrong construction of power entail a mutilation of the self, even while accepting "doing" and "having". And on some occasions: isn't it possible that this "doing" and "having" may be the causes of this mutilation? And, by the same token: shouldn't the strategy be focused on "doing" the moral instance, with the aim of changing the conditions of "having" and putting the development of the capacities of the self on the right road.

This level of abstraction can perfectly come down to earth to put social processes and events in more precise and better structured terms. The violent crisis that today's world is going through and Argentina hyper-crisis may be analysed by means of a scientific and philosophical discourse that should pursue a better approach to a subject-matter that, if undertaken from other standpoints, may become unapproachable or difficult to grasp. These questions are especially related to the current world situation and to

Argentina despite all its specific differences, as the problems of “being”, “doing” and “having” are the big issues for social subjects, for the State, society and its reciprocal interrelations. Next, one can ask oneself the following question: Aren’t the State, the historical subject and diverse collective entities suffering reductions to their own beings, their tasks and their possessions, by virtue of the dominant “living models”, especially those of the “dominant market”, that are not those that match the yearnings and real possibilities of the peoples that have faced closed crossroads, ending up in a cul-de-sac? And another question comes forth: Isn’t power acting on those impositions and domination and isn’t it showing clear signs of weakness when the State, the agents and society itself lose legitimacy?

The answers to all these questions must be the result of investigations and strategies that show the clippings occasioned by this domination, although it might also point out some unquestionable successes. And if we are talking about a “model” we should avoid falling into the trap offered by an exclusively economical explanation as it is in a “life model”, although of a virtual character, that covers the economic, political and cultural levels. On the other hand, we have to explain life models as they express the true alternatives that each social process and crossroads pose. And related to this, it is necessary to investigate the power of symbolic and material domination in some models that have been adopted in some latitudes, including Argentina. The “life model” is in fact a possible and realistic archetype that has been socially built. It combines Utopia and concrete conditions of existence. On the other hand, technical and mathematical models have an operative internal logic. However, they all become involved at some place on the scale. And none of them works without power.

2.3. Power and Otherness

Power is always a form of social relation and, as a consequence, it involves other people. The problem lies in what happens with otherness. Within a power context, the “other” is frequently subordinated. It is when power obeys the logic of coercion and authoritarianism. Here the other is valued in terms of the bond that develops between weak and strong. There is no subordinating power without subordinated subjects. In this issue the “other” reinforces the domination bond. Also, the “other” may be a virtual referent, undeclared, in this power relation. In these cases, the “other” loses self-consciousness and becomes alienated as a result of being just a pure reflection. The greatest case of concealment of the “other” consists in denying his/her existence, his/her being and behaviour. Then the “other” becomes a mere mirror-image of the

ruler. This is what usually happens in political, economic, educational, familiar and other relationships.

Finding and rediscovering the “other” changes the kind of power that is being wielded. The “other” enables the passage of the “object of power” to “subject of power”. In these relationships he who wields most power fosters in the other the development of capacities to create their own power; and he who wields the least power grows in self-reference and autonomy. This analysis does not deny authoritarian relationships, but insures that all terms have a share of self-reference power to redeem the clipped otherness and allows it to profit from the creative capacity of every individual.

The discovery of the “other”, as a historical subject, makes power circulate in rising spirals. The “other” becomes a full person without detachments, doing and having power for him/herself. The “other” also rediscovers the other, who is the “one”. “One” and “other”, others from others, endlessly elaborate the proposal of being within a society, with the means and objectives historically available, doing and having with hardship what they can achieve. There is no place left for justification of injustices, inequalities, exclusions or poverty. In short, all of them are forms of negating the other. And sometimes they get close to the disappearance and death of the other. And when this point is reached, there is no society, except caricatural imitations of the “other”. Then society: with whom? Neither is there a State without the other: whom is this State for? And there is no historical subject without the other: whose subject would it be? It is surprising that these multiple questions be reduced to problems of having and power, with the support of “hard” and blind disciplines much more attentive to internal “disciplining” than to the look that breaks boundaries and opens itself to other fields. In fact, the questions about “having” and power may become good power strategies for better producing, creating, and distributing, as long as they are part of larger strategies to give them a sense.

2.4. Confidence – Crisis of Confidence

Confidence is a positive value that consolidates social relations, institutions, strategies and the members that carry out and represent them. Moreover, confidence as a social and cultural value forms the basis for the acceptance of a socially-built “reality”. There is no social reality (Schutz), truth (Foucault), institutions (Castoriadis), strategies (Labourdette) or actions and social practices (Habermas) which is not based on a framework of confidence. When it shakes or, even worse, collapses, all the foundations of society are put into question, including its institutions, structures, and its leadership

which pretended to lead as well as represent (legitimation). And this includes admission, recruiting and promotion systems and maintenance of those leaderships.

Something completely different is taking place today along with Argentina's recurring and periodic crises. A fundamental rupture is being perceived. One of the crucial aspects of this rupture is seen in social confidence, faith and creed. And this happens to the existential foundation of social life, at least to some of its layers as it becomes less solid and stable. It still does not match the nation's identity or the ideas and values of democracy, pretty thrashed during decades of numberless mistakes. But it does match the institutions and those who represent them. Both the leaders and the organizations that claim to express and interpret the relevant ideas and values of society have lost their representative roles. And this casts a mantle of doubt on them, and under the risk of extinction today democracy's formal institutions are being scrutinized by the people. And nothing can resist this scrutiny when it is devoid of affection and confidence, as it discovers all defects and stratagems.

Sometimes, confidence crises reach the grassroots of the social system. This is when people question the system of beliefs, norms and ideas legitimated by juridical and social order, production methods and economic distribution and the kinds of political organization and concentration of power. Today, some of these are happening in Argentina. And this is when some institutions and their occupants are deemed unjust and intolerable. Governments and their authorities, justice and especially the Supreme Court, Parliament, and their political classes and, finally, the capacity of the traditional political forces. It is not negligible. But it does not either indicate that the social edifice is falling and that the conflict is entering Hobbes' fight "everybody against everybody". On the contrary, the confidence crisis moves in parallel with respect to the new confidence that expresses the waking up of original ways of organizing criticism and rejection, the accords and solidarity, the exchanges among "him/herself's" in an unknown otherness. The constant "we-they" changes places and dwellers, while it is possible to perceive a radical social transformation.

Distrust is a counter-value of maximum importance. On the one hand, it corrodes the legitimacy of several institutional wholes and that of their occupants. But, on the other hand, it desecrates and, as a consequence, questions the traditional normative and executive constructions of politics, the economy and culture. And in this interplay, society not only destroys but also constructs novel forms of social organization and leadership.

Then, there is a confidence crisis affecting the economic and the political systems and the leaders that represent them. This reveals how important the socio-psychological instance maintained by members of a community is, as they are faced by the “hard” data from the economy and the political sector. Confidence is a value that is always at the basis of the economy and politics as it constructs the legitimacy of its transactions, exchanges and approvals. The rejection generated by the economic and political leaderships is the result, amongst other things, of the distrust awakened by its activities, its honesty and its rhetoric. Distrust breaks up the traditional representation system of leaderships and organizations in different fields. From them are born oligarchic, parasitic, arrogant and corrupt structures and casts. In the same way, confidence feeds the new forms of cohabitation, organization and representation that Argentine society is on the very foundations of the current distorted social pyramid.

2.5. Bifurcation of Power

To carry out a sociopolitical analysis in Argentina, from a strategic point of view, requires us to make a fundamental division. This cross-section of political nature differentiates between two overlapping levels, although mutually dependent. A) in one of them we find the numerous social, economic, political and cultural events that put the country, day after day into a state of uncertainty and general chaos and that reveal at the same time a break away from traditions, of states of collective conscience and of original forms of organization which were up to now unknown. And this is taking place in spite of efforts and decisions made both at government, legislative and judicial level, as well as those made at the level of social organizations established with greater or lesser degree of credibility. B) At the other level, we are witnessing the problem of power in Argentina and that of its regional and world interrelations; and especially, the process of its own construction, dissolution and reconstruction.

The hypothesis that we uphold here claims that power, at this stage in the country's life, is undergoing a crucial bifurcation. As long as we consider power not only as a form of domination but also as a form of creation and liberation, in a theoretical perspective that has as main precursors, but not the only ones, M. Foucault and others, and the subject is developed in a series of their own works. The process of bifurcation of power denotes the moment in which the social system breaks up in two basic directions (with all their derivations and subdivisions), and both fight to prevail and determine the course and orientation of events and the historical destiny of society. The bifurcation of power, a second-level process, signals a key differentiation in its

construction. And it must be taken into account that this is basically an underground process, and it usually remains hidden under a shower of shocking facts, which are also exaggerated by communicational logic (that does not exclude interests and intentions) of graphic, radio and television media, among others. But even if the process is underground and hidden, this does not mean it ceases to be a key social dynamic force and the primordial question that any society must solve to be able to choose a destiny, especially in crucial times. Each social fact, according to what has been said, splits into two parts as it constructs the event. In one of them, it creates a reality; in the other one, it creates power. Both are indivisible as the one can not exist without the other, but they relate to different bodies. In some historical circumstances as is happening in Argentina now, the power scheme bifurcates and splits at least into two directions. Here the social system “chooses” which way it wants to go. And this means that, consciously or unconsciously, community members build the history of their social relations when faced by fundamental options. In the face of Argentina’s current crossroads, on the one side traditional power is being destroyed amidst a terminal hyper-crisis and some are trying to rebuild it without much success. On the other side, a new power is being constructed with a different quality. The same events provide material, paradoxically, for both sides, sometimes unwittingly, as they corrode as much as they recuperate things and they construct as much as they dissipate power.

The new ground broken by this bifurcation lies in that one of the directions, that of the new power, may create the possibility of a qualitative jump within the whole of social, political, economic and cultural relations and, therefore, bring about a transformation of power structures, institutions and leadership. If this does not happen, i.e. if the other direction of the bifurcation prevails, some inevitable changes will be made but the social system will keep on reproducing the same cycle until the next rupture and opportunity crisis. Nothing has consolidated yet. Everything is in a chaotic state and this chaotic state generates incertitude, anxiety, and anarchic menaces, as well as opportunities for change and for the formation self-organized bodies that would have been otherwise impossible to achieve. It must be repeated, a chaotic is a pre-revolutionary state and, at the same time, a destructive one. And it all depends on what is done and what is sown. The general deterioration of all social instances, paradoxically, has produced – and is still producing – great possibilities to found the republic anew. But nothing is predetermined.

The social problem in the power field is revealed in Argentina in all that the new power lacks to reach those dimensions that will allow it to produce change, transformation and the mere course of events; and, also, in what the traditional power must modify, award grant and contribute by means of complementary funds. Without this, there will not be new State, institutions, leadership and grassroots organizations capable of reformulating Argentina.

4. Final words

The five previously categories: society, State, economy, poverty and power, form the general framework of the social world that must be considered if we want to essay cognitive strategies and transformation strategies. These five concepts and their reciprocal interrelations accommodate social, economic, political and cultural instances and give them sense and orientation. Therefore, the quintuple way, in a second approximation, shows the strategy packages that must be used to face social problems. The relationship and sequence “part-whole-part” helps to define the objectives, to follow the necessary paths, not to postpone or forget crucial points and to profit from all the implications. Up to now we have been limited to narrow fields or to fields lost amidst generalities without centres. And this was true of economic reductionism as well as of the mythical globalization process. It is time to build a socio-political and cultural matrix that should be capable of triggering an advancement in social studies and in transformation praxis. All the world, its regions and Argentina in particular, despite some exceptions that only confirm the rule, show us the critical states that seem to be based on five fundamental columns, with varying individual predominance among them. In the same way, the possibility of knowing and making profound modifications to the dense fabric of its social relationships, compels us to test series of strategies that will tell us where to direct our efforts in order to achieve the largest impact and the best results.

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