Two Wests after 11-S?

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After the impasse of relative stability and professed multilateralism raised in the Post-Cold War, the Twin Towers’ fall shaped the consolidation of a deep change in US foreign policy pillars, that now focuses its efforts on high policy - the national security sphere - menaced not only by material capacities of state actors but by new threats of transnational nature, above all, the wide dimension of International Terrorism.

The 2002 Strategy of National Security (US NSS02) officially supports such change of perceptions and obtains successfully the securitization of International Terrorism through the famous “War on Terrorism”, in which the military instrument, together with unilateral, preventive actions and the so-called multilateralism á la carte (Rojas Aravena, 2004), were the methods chosen to face it.

Such a Copernican Turn produced a deep impact not only on the same institutionality of the international system raised after 1945 (United Nations), but on the historic Atlantic Alliance itself, in which we could affirm the existence of two Wests and one Europe, and not one West and two Europes as it was during the iron curtain (Moisi, 2003). The Western agreement that prevailed immediately after 9-11 events, thanks to the joint exercise of the right of self-defense in Afghanistan, rapidly collapsed due to the existence of different conceptions of valid strategies to face the terrorist threat. Europe considered terror as a citizen security (Escobar; Muniz; Sanseviero; Sain; Zacchi, 2005) issue and, as a consequence, instruments to be used are not military actions (as the US strategy supported), but effective information exchange and penal and police multilateral assistance.

After Iraq’s intervention (2003) and George Bush’s re-election (2004), the United States launched (March 2006) the updated version
of its National Security Strategy (US NSS06). Making emphasis on the belic context that is going through and securing the bases for the future peace, the Bush Administration makes clear its will for moul-
ding the world under the format of the known democratic peace and free market premises. So, big points are: Will the US NSS06 imply continuity regarding the evident breaking-off between the United Sta-
tes and the European Union?; What will be the consequence of its ap-
plication in a Latin America with low state institutionality, leftist go-
vernment speeches and alarming poverty indexes and income distrib-
ution?; What will be the destiny of Atlantic institutions for security and defense cooperation?.

Resulting from these inspiring questions, the essay has been divided in three parts: the starting point focuses on the securitization process of the three main actors of the transatlantic area: US, EU and Latin America. The description of this rigorous and subjective process is followed by the evaluation of US NSS02’s implementation and the contrast features/approaches associated to the US NSS06. Finally, the conclusion is completely based on previous points in order to fo-
recast short/medium term trends in the EU and Latin America as a result of the implementation of the US’ refreshed national security doctrine.

Theoric Framework: 11-S impact in Security Studies

The end of the Cold War sets the grounds for a general overview of international security studies in two central aspects (Der Ghougas-
sian, 2004: 12): (1) the traditional centrality on war, on the military instrument and on the security of the state as the object of discipline; (2) the framing of the process of securitization.
On the one hand, from a realist board game, framed by the security dilemma and with actors exclusively of state nature, we move to the incorporation in the agenda of the so called new threats of transnational nature and asymmetric use of strength (Bartolomé, 2004: 12); to the importance of the concept of Human Security (UNDP, 1994), which erects individual’s fundamental liberties as the object to defend; and to the design of ways to guarantee security different from the conventional military instrument, being a clear sign of this idea the concept of Cooperative Security (Faya, 1997: 24).

After 11-S, the central issue in security studies’ debate relies on the dichotomy that exists between the security of the state and that of the individuals, which mainly results from the strong tendency that the Bush Doctrine shows to support the first option (Rosas, 2002: 7). In this way, the ambivalent substance and component of international terrorism as a threat has divided the perceptions and practical considerations of many actors of the transatlantic zone.

On the other hand, in reference to the second pillar of the mentioned academic reviews in security studies, it is necessary to point out that the paper will be embedded on the regional security complex school theory (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998: 26) that conceives the security as a move which takes politics beyond the established rules of the game, and frames the issue as a special kind of politics. In fact, the securitization process can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization by which the Danish school used to classify a sort of public policy spectrum (Buzan; Weaver; de Wilde, 1998):

In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from non-politicized (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely,
some other form of communal governance) to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure).

The Process of Securitization in the Transatlantic Area after the 11-S

The U.S.: A war on terror

The US government has presented a renewed National Security Strategy by which its centrality remains constant: the securitization of the “rise of terrorism fuelled by an aggressive ideology” (US NSS, 2006: Introduction) associated to weapons of mass destruction and failing states. The particular fact is that the extension of the threat is larger, reaching not only the American values, but a menace for the so called “New Era of Global economic growth through free markets and free trade” (US NSS, 2006: 25).

At the same time, by affirming the great success of US NSS06’s application (above all Afghanistan and Iraq’s military campaign), America’s will is to keep on “leading” the world towards an expansion of democracy worldwide through “full array of political, economic, diplomatic, and other tools” (US NSS, 2006: 6) at their disposal. Indeed, the sensitive point regarding preventive attacks has been confirmed as follows on the WMD’s prevention chapter: “To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defense” (US NSS, 2006: 18).

This security approach outlines the consolidation of terrorism as an existential threat requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure, such as a new
important legislative body [The US House of Representatives has introduced “urgently” the following acts: the Public Safety and Cyber Security Act of 2001, the Patriot Act (2001), the Uniting and Strengthening America Act (2001) and the Financial Anti-Terrorism Act (2001)], a huge increase in defence budget [According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the US spent US$ 478.2 billions on defense during 2005, which represents the 48% of the worldwide defense expenditures in the same field. UK and France follow the United States with 48,3 billions and 46,2 billons (both in dollars) respectively. More information available at: <http://yearbook2006.sipri.org/>], and the reorganization of the Army as well as federal agencies to undermine the threat.

Although it is recognised the primary role that global terrorism plays for the conception of warfare in Washington, it is also highlighted that many “governments at fragile stages of political development” commanded by “demagogues peddling an anti-free market authoritarianism” (known by radical neo populism) [vid. Un Sujeto Político No Identificado. 2004, in Le Monde Diplomatique (Spanish Version)], illegal immigration flows and Islamic fundamentalism are also seen as concrete menaces to US national security. Naturally, the introduction of a wide level of threats does not impede in short terms that the government could stick the major threat (international terrorism) to the increasing mobility of aliens in the US or to the anti-liberal policies of Arabic or Latin-American leaders.

The main point is that the strategy turns out to present an overextended flexible dimension of a potential/real threat that could be managed and defined differently according to leader’s interest and political context.

The E.U.: Conflicts of interests. Counter-Terrorism as a new cleavage
Firstly, the EU as a political entity did not have any 9-11 attack because neither Madrid (2004) nor London (2005) terrorist bombings could be seriously compared to the Twin Towers’ collapse in the US. Indeed, for a long time Europeans’ experience with terrorism has been linked to the form of car bombs and booby-trapped trash cans, which is the same, terrorism is not seen as an occasion for war but as a crime problem. That is why European authorities are far from launching a US style preventive war on terrorism, mobilizing military corps, establishing detention centres and redesigning administrative bureaucracy regarding counter-terrorism.

In turn, the EU Commission is much more interested in re-launching the Lisbon Strategy (2005) by which securitizes the European sustainable growth (social model, pension coverage and employment) and leaves to national competences to decide whether to reach a wider agreement against terrorism or create sub groups of intergovernmental cooperation.

In reference to a large scale agreement of the 25 members to counter-arrest international terrorism, the most relevant step was to create a common defence research and technology fund aimed at narrowing the gap between the US and Europe in high-tech military equipment. This gap remains huge as numbers clearly illustrates: 1) Static Defense Budgets [Twenty five EU countries spend roughly 175 billion Euros collectively on defense, which is not an insignificant amount of money. In fact, the EU’s is the biggest defense spender after the US. Although the EU spends about the half of what the US spends on defense, Europeans do not get near the half of US military capability (Keohane, 2004). Moreover, without new equipment, European soldiers might not even make it to the battlefield. To illustrate, European troops needed US planes to take them to Macedonia in 2001 because most of European armies do not have adequate transport capabilities] that consolidate a double-level disparity: On the one
hand, four countries concentrate almost the 75% of the EU defense spending, UK and France (45%), and Germany and Italy (30%). On the other hand, European spending on military power is the half of the US. Americans spend close to six times what EU nations do in military R&D; 2) Inadequate spending and savings on equipment to push pooled-operations to save money and improve interoperability among armies; harmonizing activity cycles and trainings; 3) Fragmentation of the European defense market. The six main European arms-producing countries signed the so called Letter of Intent in 1998 to harmonize some of their armaments regulation, but it has not yet had impact at all.

By contrary, if we take a look at the intergovernmental cooperation style, Balladur helps us to define the process of cleavage entre deux conceptions de l’ Europe (Balladur, 2006) that certainly separates one part of the Europeans which supports the common currency and a stronger political union (Pro EU Constitutional Text), from the other part of the EU club that welcomes the sole evolution of the single market (Pro Europe of Nations), restraining potential political ambitions. In this way, this structural cleavage has been working as a result of prerogatives and goals established by the Treaty of Maastricht during the 90s.

International terrorism as a global threat in the EU imposed a domestic fissure (in levels of national preferences) opening a new era of cleavages: six governments gave green light to step up coordination of their security services to enhance the integration of immigrants into the block as well as to fight terrorism. The G6 Group (Spain, Italy, UK, France, Germany and Poland) chose the intergovernmental cooperation instead of a common European approach of the 25 members. This sort of mechanism still illustrates how strong the classical multilateral coordination of policies is, as well as how weak is the idea
of a common ground to counter-arrest terrorism through the EU-25 agenda.

Latin America: Democracy in the eye of the storm

While 9-11 events were taking place, the General Assembly of the Organization of the American States (OAS), in special session, enacted the Inter-American Democratic Charter, document that lay the foundations to consider democracy as the object whose preservation is essential in order to maintain regional stability and security.

Far from transition processes to democracy [vid. O’Donnell; Schmitter, 1988] that portrayed the 1980s, Latin America is today going through a deep crisis of democratic governance (Camou, 2001), a consequence of the incapacity of domestic political systems to address different demands of society, which are principally about the alarming reversion of poverty indexes [According to ECLAC, poverty has impacted on 220 million people in Latin America which implies that almost half of the entire population (43,4%) is considered poor. See more information at: <http://www.eclac.cl>], a historical regressive income distribution [According to the Report titled “Desigualdad en América Latina y el Caribe: ¿ruptura con la historia?” (2003), published by the World Bank, the richest-one tenth (1/10) of the Latin-American population concentrates the 48% of the overall income, while the poorest tenth reaches only the 1,6%], and the existing increasing levels of social unrest and violence (mainly urban) [According to statistics provided by the World Bank, by 2004, the homicide index in Latin America was leading the worldwide ranking; in which violence is registered as the first cause of death in several countries such as Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, El Salvador and Mexico].
It is because of the perception of that situation that Latin American governments have reached a consensus, specially during the last five years and taking the OAS as their main tool, to securitize democracy, being, in this way, the democratic system itself the object to defend from the threats that bad governance and institutional weakness represent [It is illustrative in this respect to consider what was determined in the Nuevo Leon Declaration (2004): “Social justice and the reduction of poverty contribute to the stability, democracy, and security of our States and the region. We reiterate that among the principal causes of instability in the region are poverty, inequality, and social exclusion, which we must confront comprehensively and urgently (...). Spanish version available at <http://www.oas.org>]. It is thus demonstrated a distinct inclination to the interweavement of the region’s security and governance agendas, a process in which there is not only an underlying struggle (Herrera; Majdalani; Foglia; Vega, 2005) with the aforementioned priorities suggested by the lonely superpower post 9-11, but also a “dissent between the Latin American countries about the notions and structures of hemispheric security and defence” (Celi, 2005: 12).

A natural consequence of such heterogeneous context was the adoption, by the Declaration On Security In The Americas (2003), of a new concept of hemispheric security based on multidimensionality, which enlarges the traditional conception of regional security linked to the security of the state (Cold War), starting from the incorporation of new threats and challenges directly connected with the notion of human security [The Declaration considers, among others, the following threats: terrorism, transnational organized crime, the global drug problem, corruption, money laundering, illegal trafficking in weapons, extreme poverty and social exclusion, AIDS, environmental degradation, trafficking in persons, attacks to cyber security, maritime transport of potentially hazardous materials, and the possibility of
access, possession, and use of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery by terrorists]. In addition to that, the Declaration also consolidated the tendency towards the acceptance of a flexible architecture of security, which “recognizes, without defining or connecting them, different levels, conceptions and situations in the hemispheric security, beyond a hierarchic and systemic articulation scale” (Celi, 2005: 14).

Since then, the cleavage and guiding axis of regional debate is given by the definition of suitable means to operationalize such abstract and heterogeneous consensus, a problem that rests on the objection that “the implementation of this multidimensional concept represents a risk of an increasing securitization of regional problems and, for that reason, (brings along) militarization as a response to confront them” (Chillier; Freeman, 2005). In this respect, terrorism’s case is paradigmatical, as there is consensus in considering it a regional threat and, at the same time, disensus about which are the appropriate means to face it. While some states adhered to the premises of the War on Terror and even sent military contingents to Iraq (El Salvador, Nicaragua and Dominican Republic), some others consider it a typical problem of domestic security, being this the case of MERCOSUR members [It is relevant to point out that Directive 09/02 of the Common Market Council (Adecuación del Plan General de Coordinación y Coordinación Recíproca para la Seguridad Regional entre los Estados Partes del MERCOSUR) creates a specialized forum on terrorism (Grupo de Trabajo Permanente) and also intends to foster an integrated system of information which contains data of individuals as well as of organizations with real or potential willingness on promoting terrorist activities].

The Transatlantic area under the US NSS06 perspective
The US NSS06 is complex and ambivalent itself due to its organization. Chapters depict many mixed-issues (with no clear methodology) only on the basis of US perception of international affairs. This context makes difficult the analysis of the rest of the regions, above all, of the European and Latin-American ones. Therefore, we have designed a three-field analysis to describe the full implications in the European Union and a macro formula for Latin America, resulting from the diverse political and strategic importance of the region for the US.

E.U. – U.S. at Crossroads

The Cooperative Ground between US-EU reflects the wide series of issues that link common interests of both actors, reinforcing levels of interdependence in multiple areas such as security and the new oil regime. The centrality of those changes could be outlined in four items of the US NSS06:

1) “The colour revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan have brought new hope for freedom across Eurasian landmass” (US NSS, 2006: 2). The EU has been supporting these democratic revolutions due to its new border and geography resulting from the Big Bang enlargement (May 2004). The EU Near Abroad policy needs the US to contain Russian ambitions in order to influence the ex soviet republics, and thus reproducing its soft power and extending the peace and stability zone.

2) “The world’s dependence on these few suppliers is neither responsible nor sustainable over the long term. The key to ensuring our energy security is diversity in the regions from which resources come...” (US NSS, 2006: 28). The EU has suffered from the oil supply crisis which came from Russia last February 2006 provoking such tension that the 25 members decided to re-write a common energy
policy (vid. EU leaders give broad backing to common energy policy. March 24th 2006, in <http://www.euroobserver.com>) that aims at diversifying suppliers, respecting the environment and investing on new sources of energy. Naturally, this common perception designs similar strategies for both actors and creates the space for cooperation in short and long terms.

3) “Democracies are not immune to terrorism. (...) This accounts for the emergence in democratic societies of home-grown terrorists such as those who were responsible for the bombings in London in July 2005”. Actually, the new common figure that menaces the transatlantic community is the so-defined “Trojan Horse” which challenges the model of western multicultural societies as Leiken explains: “Jihadist networks span Europe from Poland to Portugal, thanks to the spread of radical Islam among descendants of guest workers once recruited to shore up Europe’s post-war economic miracle. The emergence of home-grown mujahideen in Europe threatens the US as well as Europe” (Leiken, 2005). Both actors might find the way to integrate the growing mass of immigrants in order to avoid the exportation of terrorist cells with EU or US passports (Allam, 2005).

4) Chapter IV (Post-Conflict Stabilization and Reconstruction) guidelines are fully compatible with EU operations in the Balkans (Solana’s paper on Security 2003) and particularly with its Rapid Force inaugurated a year ago. Although the EU will not have the complete command of EU troops in large scale interventions and become rapidly a military power (ex. Iraq 2003) for technical, political and military reasons, post bellum activities to restore governance and democracy to its new borders will be always a starting point to ease American efforts in risky regions.

Contrary to the cooperative ground, we propose the Critical Area of Cooperation, that is represented by the whole Chapter V of the US NSS06 (which specifies the preventive attack doctrine, WMD and
Iran’s case) and implies continuity with the version of 2002. Washington still considers that there is a “risk of inaction” and, in this way, to prevent hostile acts that could imply the use of WMD, the US “will, if necessary, act pre-emptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defence” (US NSS, 2006: 18). The anticipatory action to defend American interests and values will be taken using “all the elements of national power (including the concept of New Triad with both nuclear and improved conventional capabilities)” even if “uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack” (US NSS, 2006: 18-19).

Tension raises immediately with Brussels as the Spanish and Italian right-wing governments lost their respective elections, the war in Iraq is facing a critical stage, the EU is not at war and global terrorism is as strong as it used to be four years ago. Solana’s Paper on EU security (2003) is ambivalent because it does not reject the possibility of preventive actions, but rejects indirectly a wide and uncertain cause to activate mechanism of large scale-military options. Furthermore, the idea of exercising an inherent right of self-defence on the basis of perceptions, not clear threats in time and place of the enemy’s attack, contradicts the way the EU could accept to use force abroad. Politically, the 25 members will never perceive the same threat in the same moment due to the “double voice” risk and the lack of popular legitimacy of setting the EU to fight besides the US with non predictable results. To sum up, hard power is still competence of other multilateral organizations (UN and NATO) resulting from the fact that the EU still considers itself a regional engine of soft power that can deploy its forces only to restore/negotiate peace in its borders, or reinforce young democracies to foster regional stability.

Finally, between the cooperation and potential tension areas, we find the so-called Unpredictable Zone. This section has to do with UN and NATO internal reforms about which the US NSS06 points out: “The
NATO remains a vital pillar of US foreign policy. The internal reform of NATO structures, capabilities, and procedures must be accelerated to ensure NATO is able to carry out missions effectively”. Basically, NATO depends on what US and EU want to do together. If they do not define its commitment and patterns of security cooperation, NATO will pay for it. ESDP and NATO-EU / US cooperation are not marginal technical issues. They are emblematic of a central debate: how and whether Europe and the United States can match the on going European integration with a strategic shift of the transatlantic partnership to tackle together the new set up of the international security system. This debate and its implementation are both stucked to the adaptation of the triple “D” Doctrine and the well-known Berlin Plus formula, which seems to be far from being redesigned in its core issues.

L.A. – U.S.: The Construction of the State

The fundamental premise around which evolves the relation between Latin America and the United States in terms of security, is the almost insignificant strategic importance the region has in the current War on Terror. It is this situation, exactly opposite to the analysed in the EU, the one that determines that Washington has showed itself indifferent when facing the almost unanimous repudiation of Latin American governments towards its policy of preventive and unilateral actions [It is necessary to remark in this respect that, as NATO, the OAS activated its mechanism of collective security (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) in the presence of the 9-11 events, endorsing with this the American military campaign in Afghanistan], what was clearly seen by the position the region adopted towards the military campaign in Iraq [action only supported by Colombia and many Caribbean and Centro American states].
Starting from this study prism and moving away, therefore, from the analytical categories specifically designed for the EU case, it is necessary to point out that the American security agenda for Latin America presents a central theme axis: the perception that the increasing and sustainable weakness of state institutions affirms itself as an important indirect threat to its own homeland security. In other words, the progressive growth of difficulties for governments to guarantee order and crime prevention inside each unit lays the foundations for the region to become a fertile ground for the proliferation of potential threats (mainly terrorism) for American territory itself. Illustrative are the words of who was then the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Southern Command, General James Hill, who upheld that “(...) Islamic radical groups, narcoterrorists in Colombia, and urban gangs across Latin America all practice many of the same illicit business methods (...). Terrorists throughout the Southern Command area of responsibility bomb, murder, kidnap, traffic drugs, transfer arms, launder money, and smuggle humans” (Hill, 2006).

This is the situation that underlies and bases the deep relevance the US NSS06 gives to the promotion of truly “effective democracies” in the region, which is nothing else than a procedimental type (Collier; Levitzky, 2000) of democracy with a different nature than the apparently wanted by the OAS in its aforementioned declarations. Once the low level of state institutionality is perceived as a threat, the United States are aimed at contributing to the strengthening of the Latin American state, mainly in what respects to its role as exclusive holder of the legitimate use of force, in a way that contributes to indirectly insure its own homeland. The US NSS06 is clear in this respect: “if America’s nearest neighbours are not secure and stable, then Americans will be less secure” (US NSS, 2006: 37).

This interpretation of regional situation, and of the necessary means to confront it, has been a firm constant since the US NSS02, although
it has gained more importance in its 2006 redesign, a fact which can find its reason in the post 2001 proliferation of ideologically leftist Latin American governments with a nationalist discourse and in some cases purely anti-American (Venezuela and Bolivia). These are the situations labelled as radical neopopulisms, as real tyrannies, which, according to Washington, feedback the phenomenon of state weakness and raise themselves as a concrete threat to regional stability.

Beyond this main approach of the United States, axis of the macro formula of analysis suggested to understand its agenda towards Latin America, the American interest in the region confines itself principally to three particular situations: (1) narcoterrorism in Colombia, (2) the spreading of the Chavez effect and (3) illegal Mexican immigration.

1) “In Colombia, a democratic ally is fighting the persistent assaults of Marxist terrorists and drug-traffickers” (US NSS, 2006: 15). Before 9-11 events the American interest in South America was almost exclusively focused on the fight against drug trafficking in Colombia. Since the Andean Initiative of 1989 the United States have provided funds for the formation and equipment of police forces in this task, an assistance that gain a remarkable new importance since the launching of the Plan Colombia (2000) - which meant the allowance US$ 4 billion -. This plan has implied a strong military presence of the United States in the country, a situation which has been strengthen since the beginning of the War on Terror and the American perception that the strong bonds between terrorism and drug trafficking define the emergence of a serious threat, narcoterrorism, which has to be confronted by means of the military instrument [According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Colombia, together with Brazil and Chile, represent the 80% of the regional defense expenditures in 2005].

2) “In Venezuela, a demagogue awash in oil money is undermining democracy and seeking to destabilize the region” (US NSS, 2006:
The White House concern with respect to the situation in Venezuela is centered in preventing the regional spreading of what they consider a tyrannical set of ideas, populist practices and anti-American discourse in the leading of the former military and current President Hugo Chavez. Without a doubt, the assumption of the coke leader Evo Morales in Bolivia, strategic ally of Chavez, will reinforce that American position. It is also worth mentioning that in this policy of containment of Venezuela, Lula Da Silva’s Brazil plays an important role, being considered in the US NSS06 as a true regional leader committed to the democratic values.

3) “We must continue to work with our neighbors in the Hemisphere to reduce illegal immigration” (US NSS, 2006: 37). The US NSS06 pays special attention to the matter of illegal immigration as a threat to the American homeland, which finds itself in fine harmony with the recent decision of the Bush Administration of constructing a wall along the whole extension of their border with Mexico (621.4 miles) to strengthen security in the area. The project has met, from the beginning, a strong rejection from Latin American governments (vid. Centro America se une contra el muro, 2006, in <http://www.bbc.co.uk>) who, to a great extent, claim for a complete migratory reform and not for one exclusively focused in the coactive aspect.

Conclusions and Perspectives

To conclude, we present below several trends which aim is to characterize US dynamic of the relationship with Europe and Latin America, linked to security and defense patterns established by the US NSS06.

United States – European Union
The perspective between the United States and the EU is based on the three axes stated up to here. The actors’ will to cooperate is supported by a strong commercial and energetic interdependence. At the same time, its relationship gets weaker due to the confirmation of the centrality of the pre-emptive attack modus operandi and its methods to face regional crisis in hot areas of the globe (ex. Middle East). Therefore, the EU-US ties should be re-build through long-lasting bridges of productive interaction and concrete harmonization on how to perform the ius ad bellum. Taking into account the US NSS06, both actors will have to correct and negotiate their interaction in three central spheres:

1) The EU has to strengthen or, better, create the political space to produce real mechanisms of Homeland security (Homeland Europe) and, in this way, counteract international terrorism more appropriately. At the same time, it has to gradually increase the defense budget which could be the platform for updating the Berlin Plus in the NATO.

2) The United States has to be more accurate and clear as regards its definition of preventive attack: there is no clear definition on how imminent should be the threat to use force. This ambivalence is also confusing in the Homeland Security strategy, that seems to violate Human Rights standards (e.x. Guantamano case). The above mentioned definition must fit in the reform established by the United Nations and its system of collective security.

3) An external event that might help both actors to cooperate is China as an emerging global actor in commercial, financial and monetary matters. The capitalization of political consensus thanks to a possible threat of systemic misbalance with China as an Asian absolute power could result into a fortification of deeper bonds between Washington and Brussels.
United States – Latin America

The strategic irrelevance framework will continue to shape the relations between the United States and a Latin America immersed in a deep governance crisis that hinders the promotion of citizen security and obstructs reaching an operative consensus about specific policies to approach the particular circumstances the region is going through. Under this context, there are three main tendencies around which the Latin American security agenda post NSS06 will evolve:

1) Regional disintegration: The aforementioned difficulty to reach general consensus, added to the weakening of regional institutions as a space for policy coordination (ex. MERCOSUR and C.A.N.) and to the proliferation of intra-regional conflicts of a bilateral nature, determines that the region heads towards a dangerous disintegration (from which the current flexible security architecture is an accurate reflection) where it will be even more permeable to foreign interests and formulas.

2) Increasing securitization: The existence of a large and multidimensional concept of regional security as the current one, added to the pressure exercised by the United States to deal in an immediate way with loosely defined threats, and to the strong social demand to solve the violence problem, lays the foundations for an increasing securitization of the region’s problems and therefore, for the acceptance of militarization as a mean to confront them. It will be important to analyse the impact that may have in this process the fact that the period 2006-2007 has a strong electoral component (both in the executive and legislative level).

3) Sub regional consensus: Being so difficult to reach a consensus that embrace the region as a whole and existing institutional channels for sub regional and bilateral dialogue that, although its weakness in some cases, represent available tools of cooperation, Latin America
will have to give priority to its consolidation as a strategy to articulate common policies and, in this way, build the necessary consensus to generate reciprocal confidence. It is worth mentioning as an example, the recent creation between Argentina and Chile, of a binational permanent force for peace operations.

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