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dc.date.accessioned 2021-08-25T12:49:49Z
dc.date.available 2021-08-25T12:49:49Z
dc.date.issued 1994
dc.identifier.uri http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/123345
dc.description.abstract This paper analyzes a regulation game with asymmetric information and lack of commitment. It expands Besanko and Spulber's (1989) framework to the case of elastic demands using a generalized Nash solution. It is found that the most important property of the equilibrium with inelastic demand is not carried over to the elastic demand case, i.e., incomplete information worsens underinvestment, contrasting to Besanko and Spulber's result. en
dc.format.extent 87-96 es
dc.language en es
dc.subject Complete information es
dc.subject Information asymmetry es
dc.subject Economics es
dc.subject Microeconomics es
dc.subject Public finance es
dc.subject Investment (macroeconomics) es
dc.subject Nash solution es
dc.subject Price elasticity of demand es
dc.title Investment without regulatory commitment: The case of elastic demand en
dc.type Articulo es
sedici.identifier.other doi:10.1007/bf01065392 es
sedici.identifier.issn 0922-680X es
sedici.identifier.issn 1573-0468 es
sedici.creator.person Urbiztondo, Santiago es
sedici.subject.materias Ciencias Económicas es
sedici.description.fulltext true es
mods.originInfo.place Facultad de Ciencias Económicas es
sedici.subtype Articulo es
sedici.rights.license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)
sedici.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
sedici.description.peerReview peer-review es
sedici.relation.journalTitle Journal of Regulatory Economics es
sedici.relation.journalVolumeAndIssue vol. 6, no. 1 es


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Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0) Excepto donde se diga explícitamente, este item se publica bajo la siguiente licencia Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)