Detecting time-fragmented cache attacks against AES using Performance Monitoring Counters

Abstract

Cache timing attacks use shared caches in multi-core processors as side channels to extract information from victim processes. These attacks are particularly dangerous in cloud infrastructures, in which the deployed countermeasures cause collateral e ects in terms of performance loss and increase in energy consumption. We propose to monitor the victim process using an independent monitoring (detector) process, that continuously measures selected Performance Monitoring Counters (PMC) to detect the presence of an attack. Ad-hoc counter- measures can be applied only when such a risky situation arises. In our case, the victim process is the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption algorithm and the attack is performed by means of random encryption requests. We demonstrate that PMCs are a feasible tool to detect the attack and that sampling PMCs at high frequencies is worse than sampling at lower frequencies in terms of detection capabilities, particularly when the attack is fragmented in time to try to be hidden from detection.