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dc.date.accessioned 2014-05-07T19:16:36Z
dc.date.available 2014-05-07T19:16:36Z
dc.date.issued 2013
dc.identifier.uri http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/35172
dc.description.abstract Why do people pay taxes? One obvious answer is that there are enforcement mechanism (fines and penalties) established by the State. This deterrence approach to tax compliance has been formally analyzed in the seminal paper by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). In this model tax payers decide whether and how much to evade taxes in the same way they would approach any risky decision or gamble, that is, by maximizing expected utility (Slemrod (2007)). Under this framework tax evasion is negatively associated with the probability of detection and the severity of punishment. (Párrafo extraído del texto a modo de resumen) en
dc.language es es
dc.subject economía es
dc.subject Venezuela es
dc.subject impuesto es
dc.title Deterrence and reciprocity effects on tax compliance: experimental evidence from Venezuela en
dc.type Objeto de conferencia es
sedici.identifier.uri http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/financlocal/12-Ortega-Sanguinetti.pdf es
sedici.creator.person Ortega, Daniel es
sedici.creator.person Sanguinetti, Pablo es
sedici.subject.materias Ciencias Económicas es
sedici.description.fulltext true es
mods.originInfo.place Departamento de Economía es
sedici.subtype Objeto de conferencia es
sedici.rights.license Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported (CC BY 3.0)
sedici.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
sedici.date.exposure 2013-07
sedici.relation.event II Jornadas Iberoamericanas de Financiación Local (La Plata, 2013) es
sedici.description.peerReview peer-review es


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Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported (CC BY 3.0) Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported (CC BY 3.0)