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Deterrence and reciprocity effects on tax compliance: experimental evidence from Venezuela

Document type: Objeto de conferencia

Abstract

Why do people pay taxes? One obvious answer is that there are enforcement mechanism (fines and penalties) established by the State. This deterrence approach to tax compliance has been formally analyzed in the seminal paper by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). In this model tax payers decide whether and how much to evade taxes in the same way they would approach any risky decision or gamble, that is, by maximizing expected utility (Slemrod (2007)). Under this framework tax evasion is negatively associated with the probability of detection and the severity of punishment. (Párrafo extraído del texto a modo de resumen)

General information

Exposure date: julio 2013
Issue date: 2013
Document language: Spanish
Event: II Jornadas Iberoamericanas de Financiación Local (La Plata, 2013)
Origin: Departamento de Economía
xmlui.dri2xhtml.METS-1.0.item-dc-subject: economía ; Venezuela ; impuesto
Subjects: Ciencias Económicas

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Created: 7 de mayo de 2014
Available since: 7 de mayo de 2014
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  • http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/35172

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