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Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements are Unstable

2002
 
Document type: Objeto de conferencia

Abstract

In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria -equilibria that are not in pure strategies- are unstable for a broad class of learning dynamics.

General information

Exposure date: 12 de julio de 2002
Issue date: 2002
Document language: English
Event: Seminario de Economía (La Plata, 2002)
Origin: Facultad de Ciencias Económicas
xmlui.dri2xhtml.METS-1.0.item-dc-subject: equilibrio económico ; JEL: C72, C73
Subjects: Ciencias Económicas

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Created: 30 de noviembre de 2016
Available since: 30 de noviembre de 2016
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